



**61<sup>st</sup> Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs**  
*Nagasaki's Voice: Remember Your Humanity*

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**Working Group 3 Report: “Regional Working Group – Europe”**

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**Executive summary of the concrete recommendations of the group**

***Recommendations for Pugwash:***

- 1) Provide a **platform** to discuss the new security dilemmas:
  - Keep the dialogue alive between Russia, and NATO, as well as the wider Euro-Atlantic community to avoid miscalculations and the threat of war (especially in sub-regions like the Baltics)
    - Stronger Pugwash ties with the Baltics
    - Information sharing (on troop manoeuvres, exercises, military deployments) is needed to avoid unintended consequences
  - Discussion about the objective reasons for the mistrust and the crisis between Russia and the West
    - Look for new opportunities to bring the parties together whenever possible
  - Reopen the debate on BMD cooperation, and start a scientific-based dialogue on the role of BMD in Europe
    - Review of NATO BMD system after the conclusion of the JCPOA
    - Review the lessons for other regions, and the general consequences of BMD systems to strategic stability
  - Work on different tracks to reduce tensions and mistrust
    - Expand the Russia-EU discussions on Syria
  - Evaluate the value of security assurances (what is left after the Budapest Memorandum)
  - Identify what are the most adequate reassurance measures (less reliance on nuclear weapons)
  - Facilitate the shaping of a kind of a “code of conduct” to tone down antagonistic propaganda campaigns
- 2) **Inform** parliamentarians and the general public to create momentum to withdraw forward deployed NSNWs from Europe
  - Organize a Pugwash workshop

- 3) Use the momentum to maintain and (if necessary) to update the INF Treaty – use Pugwash **expertise** to facilitate this
- Start a discussion on further limitations of (and a potential ban on) longer-range cruise missiles
  - Expand the scope of the INF

***General comments:***

- Reinststate the **channels of communication**
  - Use the OSCE – find regulations in different areas (such as the CFE)
  - Reshape the NATO-Russia Council (keep in mind the common interests – e.g. fight against IS)
- **Restructure** the European security architecture so that it would integrate Russia in a better way

Main argument: security architectures should function in times of crisis, as well (which does not seem to work now) – identify common security interests and values

**Report of the rapporteur**

Regional Working Group 3 convened to address the challenges which Europe is facing today. Specific issues included the future of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, nuclear doctrines and nuclear sharing, missile defense, the impact of the crisis in Ukraine on arms control prospects, regional security and disarmament, confidence building measures, and forums for dialogue.

**The security environment in Europe**

Since the end of the Cold War, the relations between Russia and the wider Euro-Atlantic community have never been as tense as they are today. The military postures and the rhetoric of great powers reflect some of the worst features of the Cold War times. Both sides are engaged in robust modernization programs to upgrade their nuclear, conventional and ballistic missile defense capabilities. They are testing each other on military and political levels, and – to a certain extent – the antagonism that we are witnessing today has a strong ideological dimension, as well. Unpredictability has become an important factor again, and it also affects the general arms control and disarmament process. However, the crisis in Ukraine is only the symptom of a much deeper problem between Russia and the West. Despite the start of a constructive dialogue between Russia and NATO in the second half of the 1990s, a real strategic partnership did not happen, and Russia was not integrated into the European security architecture. Therefore, suspicion and mistrust have never really disappeared from the relations. This partly explains why the roots of the current problems also go back to much before 2014. Over the past few years, both NATO and Russia have provoked each other with rhetorical threats, concrete military deployments, and future modernization plans. These steps

were meant to hedge against potential aggressive actions by the other side. As a result, a multi-level conflict has unfolded. On the global level, we have the confrontation between the United States and Russia; on the regional level, there is a conflict between the EU and Russia; and on the sub-regional level, there is an unresolved crisis combined with violent action in Eastern Ukraine.

Renewed language of nuclear intimidation and the breach of the Budapest Memorandum brought a new nuclear insecurity to Europe, in the framework of which the number and the scope of military exercises has multiplied, nuclear platforms are moving on both sides, certain weapons systems are becoming more advanced in capabilities and more “usable” for warfare, there is an increased nuclear rhetoric, and some of the most important cornerstones of the nuclear arms control regime are shaken.

### **The importance of dialogue and the role of Pugwash**

The main way Pugwash can contribute to strengthening cooperative approach in relations between the parties and reversing the current trend toward military build-up is by providing a platform to discuss mutual security concerns and the emerging security dilemmas. The main way Pugwash can contribute to the peaceful resolution of this situation is by providing a platform to discuss these new security dilemmas. As a result of the crisis in Ukraine, NATO has cut all day-to-day cooperation with Moscow, and the most important channels of communication were suspended. Under these circumstances it would be imperative to revive the dialogue between Russia and NATO, and encourage discussions of European security issues on EU-Russia level. Given the significant movement of troops, and the dramatic increase in air patrols and military drills, communication and transparency are crucial to avoid miscalculations, unnecessary preemptive measures, and the threat of war (especially in sub-regions like the Baltics). Pugwash could build stronger ties with the Baltic States to understand the roots of their concerns, and also to bring them together with the relevant Russian counterparts who could play a crucial role in developing an inclusive security dialogue. Besides, information-sharing should be strengthened on troop manoeuvres, exercises, and military deployments so that we could avoid unintended escalation and disastrous consequences.

Pugwash can play a leading role in launching a discussion to objectively identify and address the reasons for mistrust and crisis between Russia and the West. It could look for new opportunities to bring the parties together whenever possible. Besides the already mentioned issues, Pugwash could also reopen the debate on ballistic missile defense (BMD) cooperation, and start a scientific-based dialogue on the role of BMD in Europe. After the conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran, a review of NATO’s BMD system is needed. In addition, analyzing the lessons of the European experience with a view to other regions could also provide an important contribution to global peace and security by identifying the general consequences of BMD systems to strategic stability.

The crisis in Ukraine also questioned the value of security assurances, and an evaluation is needed on the damages which were caused by undermining the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. Security assurances are considered key elements in the prevention of proliferation and in the

containment of an unnecessary arms race. These guarantees are also inherent parts of the global non-proliferation regime, and nuclear-weapon-free zone arrangements rely on their continued credibility.

It is important to examine the consequences of the crisis in Ukraine with a view to great power assurances, as well. In this regard, a very closely related issue is the question of reassuring their respective allies. From the perspective of NATO, identifying the most adequate reassurance measures for the Central and Eastern European allies could lead to a lessened reliance on nuclear weapons, and it could facilitate a withdrawal of those estimated 180 US gravity bombs in Europe which are still located on the territory of five European NATO member states. In this regard, participants of the working group proposed that Pugwash should reach out to policy makers, and take a leading role in informing parliamentarians and the general public to create momentum to withdraw forward deployed non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) from Europe. Pugwash could organize various workshops to inform the public on the ongoing modernization of the B61 gravity bombs, to discuss whether these weapons are really needed for the national security of the US, or the reassurance of its allies; whether there is any real justification for the upgrade of these gravity bombs with and advanced capability in the European theater; whether it is worth the extremely high price tag that it has reached; or whether it makes any sense to maintain forward nuclear deployment in Europe when some of the allies do not seem to be eager to keep the nuclear mission. (*The suggestion of the Italian Pugwash group to have a seminar on this subject in Rome in the near future was noted with satisfaction.*)

Another aspect of the increased nuclear tensions relates to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). In the 2014 Compliance Report, the US has officially accused Russia of being in violation of its obligations under the INF Treaty. Russia is also accusing the US of being in violation of the INF Treaty. However, no discussions between the two countries are taking place through the appropriate treaty mechanisms. In this specific case, Pugwash could use the exceptional expertise of its members to create momentum to maintain and (if possible) to update the INF Treaty. This could include convening honest technical dialogues between the technical experts of the US and Russia, and launching a discussion on further limitations of (and a potential ban on) longer-range cruise missiles. Besides, the renewed attention on the INF could also pave the way for a future expansion of the states-parties to the agreement, involving other global players, whose recent military developments constitute a significant source of concern for regional and global security.

With regards to the importance of dialogue, Pugwash could also provide a platform and take the initiative to facilitate the shaping of a kind of a “code of conduct” to tone down antagonistic propaganda campaigns. Since the crisis in Ukraine, countries of the West and Russia have been trying to demonize each other, and took every opportunity to undermine the global position of the other side. This, on the one hand, makes it more difficult to find peaceful solutions to the current problems, and it also bears the risk of pushing NATO and Moscow into an escalatory cycle which they might not be able to control.

As Europe has historic ties with the Middle East, its security architecture is directly affected by the conflicts of the wider MENA region. Therefore, working on different tracks to reduce tensions and mistrust in the fight against ISIS, and expanding the Russia-EU discussions on Syria are in the interest of all players. Pugwash could facilitate these discussions, given its strong ties in the region.

### **Further recommendations**

In general terms, the current problems which affect European security are interlinked and the first step towards a peaceful resolution should revive the channels of communication, and the use of those forums where European countries are still sitting at the same table with Russia. Despite its limited mandate, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is a perfect tool to bring the parties closer together and to find regulations in different areas (such as the reinvigoration of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty).

Besides the channels of the OSCE, reshaping the NATO-Russia Council would also be essential to ease tensions and to find solutions to the most urging security dilemmas. In this regard, our hope is that the identification of common interests such as the fight against ISIS or the successful implementation of the JCPOA could create the momentum to rebuild trust between the parties.

Once an honest dialogue has been launched, NATO and especially the European allies should build on the lessons of the past and think about how to restructure the European security architecture so that it would integrate Russia in a better and more coherent way. In conclusion, we agreed that security architectures should function in times of crisis, as well which unfortunately did not happen in this case. For the future, this definitely indicates the urgency of some reforms, which should be based on the identification of common security interests and values.