Pugwash convened a workshop at the end of the third week of the 2015 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, “Prospects for a successful NPT Review Conference and possible next steps,” involving twenty five participants drawn from UN delegations and civil society. Discussion focused in particular on areas of contention as well as possible ways forward. Below are some conclusions and observations as seen by the rapporteurs.

1) **There is the risk that there will be no final document from this conference.**
   a) MC2 and MC3 appear to have made reasonable progress. MC1 appears headed toward a deadlock; the chairperson’s present report is not likely to command consensus but a revised version might be helpful before the incorporation in the RevCon President’s consolidated report.
   b) Some expressed concern that continuing with “standard non-productive diplomatic practice” will remove any chance of actual progress at this conference. Diplomatic creativity is sorely and urgently needed at this time and not the current “business as usual” approach that will lead to deadlock.
   c) At the barest minimum, the final document should both reflect the fact that each country reaffirms its political commitment to a nuclear weapons free world and reinforce the need for further implementation of existing commitments to that end.
   d) Where the outcome document contains action elements (rather than aspirational and rhetorical statements) they should be reasonably implementable. If there is no political will to put diplomatic muscle behind action points, including them in the final document might only further the erosion of the NPT process.
   e) Creativity and hybrid solutions in the final document are needed. For example, rather than seeking consensus on the whole of the document it might be possible to express majority and minority views: one part of the document expressing political support and another part reflecting the diversity of opinions. ‘Constructive ambiguity’ might be the only way to draft language that can be acceptable to all.

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1 The rapporteurs for this report were Roberta Mulas, GEM Erasmus Mundus Joint Doctoral Candidate at Warwick & LUISS Universities, Sandra Butcher, Executive Director, and Poul-Erik Christiansen, Projects Assistant, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs. Please note that the views presented here represent a range of opinions expressed in the meetings, and they do not necessarily reflect the personal views of the rapporteurs, nor of the Pugwash Conferences as an organization. The meeting was held according to traditional Pugwash/Chatham House rules to enable an open exchange of perspectives and exploration of creative possibilities for ways forward. Thus, the substance of the discussions can be reported out, but no item discussed can be attributed to any one individual. There was no attempt to seek consensus.
2) **The humanitarian initiative on the consequences of nuclear weapons is a significant development, but deep disagreements prevail on how this should be reflected in the final document.**
   
   a) The step-by-step approach is no longer acceptable to a growing number of countries that prefer either a ban or a convention. The NWSs rhetorical commitment to this approach is fueling a growing polarization.
   
   b) Similarly, the issue of ensuring time-bound commitments is highly divisive: while some find it necessary, others consider it a 'non-starter.'
   
   c) To secure necessary compromise, there is an urgent need for creative dialogue: The various groupings including the NAC, NPDI, NAM, the P5, and others, should find ways to consult with each other and with the chairs. Bilateral engagement is also needed. President Feroukhi could gather the leaders of all groups together to get them to talk to each other. Leaders of those groups could proactively seek meetings with the President and chairs.

3) **Despite the great uncertainties at the moment regarding various proposals regarding the Middle East WMD free zone, there is still a belief that this conference can be held if there is some flexibility regarding the issues to be addressed at the meeting or the sequence of such topics.**
   
   a) There was agreement to varying degrees that that the failure to hold the 2012 conference on the Middle East zone was very damaging to the credibility of the NPT process.
   
   b) Various proposals put forward are being widely discussed among delegations. The new Spanish and Russian proposals were both considered positive and were under review by many delegations.
   
   c) The NAM is meeting next week. Where needed, delegations should be asked to consult in advance with their capitals to get instructions that could lead to a compromise position following on from earlier papers.
   
   d) Some thought that limiting the pass/fail criteria to the convening of the conference, as opposed to progress toward the zone, was limiting diplomatic creativity at this time.
   
   e) It is probably unrealistic to expect any regional country to attend a future conference on the zone without having some input into the agenda. However, rather than front-loading a broader discussion into negotiation of the agenda, a more simple formulation of the agenda might prove useful in allowing states agree to convene.
   
   f) Some see no progress having been made on the zone while others see some progress in the series of dialogues that were achieved, though some noted that further bilaterals might be needed. It was noted that Egypt and Israel held a bilateral here in the margins of the Review Conference, and this was considered positive.
   
   g) Some positive developments over the past five years were noted: Syria has acceded to the chemical weapons convention and destroyed its stockpiles; the State of Palestine joined the NPT; the Iran nuclear file has strongly progressed; and Israel participated in the RevCon as an observer state as well as submitting a paper.

4) **The P5 process has become a point of controversy.**
   
   a) The process is good but it needs to be put to use for real progress.
   
   b) The process helps avoid further damaging divergences among P5 countries. Even on tasks considered minimal by some, such as the glossary, the ongoing discussions amount to
preliminary steps toward eventual multilateral negotiations and fulfillment of NPT commitments.

c) Some are critical that the P5 act as a bloc and it was noted that the P5 itself encouraged this ‘lumping together’ through its own practices. It should be recognized that the P5 have differing national situations and they believe that the value of the positive (if limited) steps taken in some of the countries should be better understood. Rather than undermining this cohesiveness efforts should be made to encourage this group to pursue more viable options for moving forward.

d) Efforts to increase transparency are to be commended and could contribute to making the P5 process more meaningful. However, some felt that inflexible approaches to reporting are problematic and ignore the great disparities in national procedures. For example, the current draft operative paragraph 11 regarding transparency measures is not at this time likely to be realistic, although it could remain a goal.

5) Other issues remain important, and some might prove comparably easier areas for progress:

a) Language could be agreed about the CTBT, reaffirming: the importance of Entry Into Force; the importance of the CTBT as a multilateral institution; calling for further progress regarding onsite inspections, monitoring, data centers, etc.; and action on the part of the remaining eight annex 2 countries. (It was noted that current language regarding consequences of nuclear tests is unlikely to stay in as it is considered a redline by certain delegations.)

b) Recognition of the important role played by regional nuclear weapons free zones should serve as the basis for their expansion to other areas. In the absence of concrete progress toward a nuclear weapons free world, these zones lay the groundwork for such a goal.

c) Operational measures to increase more stable nuclear postures could be emphasized – such as eliminating launch on warning from nuclear strategies, removing nuclear weapons from high alert, and other steps could be encouraged for all states with nuclear weapons.

d) The importance of negotiations related to non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons could be noted.

e) It was generally agreed that the hosting of nuclear weapons (which is different from sharing) was not contrary to the letter of the NPT but it is a strongly political issue. The final document could include a recommendation to those countries currently hosting tactical nuclear weapons to end this practice.

f) Some felt the creation of a strong international norm against basing of nuclear weapons on foreign soil would be good for the spirit of the Treaty and good for the future.

g) Issues related to nuclear sharing in time of war need greater transparency. They were considered by some (including in the NAM statement) to be in violation of Articles I and II of the treaty, although this is not a consensus view. Some suggest language reinforcing that, “the NPT stays in effect at all times and under any circumstances.”

h) Negative security assurances should be reinforced, and with creativity could become a promising item for future negotiations.

i) Discussions regarding Article X need further attention and sensitive dialogue.

6) Some procedural issues are impacting progress and could be addressed.

a) The President needs to be very clear about procedures during the remainder of the meeting.
b) There is a lack of consistent styles across the main committees that is causing confusion and delay.

c) Chairs don’t have enough time to read all the papers and cannot explore compromise on other issues because of the division in three separate main committees.

d) It is advisable that discussion in the last week proceeds in plenary but floor time should be used more creatively, rather than reiterating national positions. If dialogue is forced into back rooms, it only furthers the idea of lack of transparency. “People are tweeting and not paying attention,” said one participant. “The ‘art of negotiation’ is suffering.

e) Some questions arose as to whether full use is being made of advances in technology – including digital reporting and better use of the website.

f) Reporting procedures could be more disciplined. They could be limited to the five year review cycle, and a session could be devoted solely to discuss implementation reports. All states parties - or those under the so-called nuclear umbrella - could provide reports.

7) Dialogue is needed, and not just in the NPT Review Cycle

a) Dialogue related to arms control and disarmament does not need a settled international environment for it to proceed, in fact such dialogue can also contribute to building confidence and creating conditions for breakthroughs in other areas.

b) As a general point, all regions could benefit from ongoing discussions of regional security issues. However the direct link of those to arms control and disarmament negotiations should be able to be handled creatively as it was during the Cold War.

c) Many noted the need to ensure a new generation of people versed in and familiar with the skill of negotiation and detailed knowledge of related issues is an urgent priority as many of the leading voices in the field approach retirement. States parties could be urged to provide funding for young professionals and students to engage in these issues in international forums.

d) Despite the various debates at the Review Conference, the low salience given to the issues such as the Middle East WMD Free Zone and to disarmament by senior political figures more generally has a deadening impact on progress. Few heads of state or foreign ministers raise these issues with each other. Very little effort is made by delegates to raise these issues with the media, there are no ‘big personalities’ driving the public discourse.

e) To help move things forward in a less heated format, creativity for producing avenues of dialogue that do not alienate any party are needed. This conference could recommend:

i) A high level/intellectual group (not a traditional group of government experts) including NWS, some NNWS, and selected international NGOS could be created to discuss possible avenues for progress and report to the UNGA by autumn 2016.

ii) A high-level meeting or summit on nuclear weapons could be convened. Lessons could be drawn from the nuclear security summits and from the open-ended working group on how to bring together all states with nuclear weapons and NNWS, noting that there were positive and negative aspects to each.

iii) Every opportunity should be taken to raise the profile of these issues at major international meetings. For example, on the occasion of the 2016 G7 summit in Japan, world leaders should recommit to their shared stated goal of a world free of nuclear weapons by visiting Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Prospects for a successful NPT Review Conference and possible next steps

Church Center, 777 UN Plaza
Saturday, 16 May
10.00 am – 4.00 pm

FINAL PARTICIPANT LIST (as of 16 May)

Please note: All participants take part in their personal capacities and the meeting is held according to Chatham House/Pugwash rules of non-attribution.

Dr. Ali Ahmad          Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton (Lebanon)
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Mr. Mohsen Askarian    Department of Disarmament and International Security
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Ms. Sandra Butcher     Executive Director, Pugwash Conferences on Science and
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Prof. Paolo Cotta-Ramusino Secretary General, Pugwash Conferences on Science and
                                World Affairs (Italy)
Mr. Tom Countryman     Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Security and
                       Nonproliferation (US)
Amb. Jargalsaikhan Enkhsaikhan Former Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary,
                                Permanent Mission of Mongolia to the UN
Dr. Paolo Foradori     University of Trento (Italy)
Ms. Jennie Gromall     Senior Advisor, Multilateral and Nuclear Security Affairs
                       (MNSA) International Security and Nonproliferation Bureau
                       (ISN) U.S. Department of State
Dr. Rebecca Johnson    Executive Director, Acronym Institute (UK)
Mr. Emad Kiyaei        Executive Director, American Iranian Council, Princeton
                       University
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Mr. Tariq Rauf  Advisor to the Chairman of Main Committee I, Director of SIPRI’s Arms Control and Non-proliferation Programme (Canada)
Amb. Matthew Rowland  Head of delegation, UK Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament
Mr. Selim Sazak  International Student/Young Pugwash, Columbia University (Turkey)
Dr. Tatsujiro Suzuki  Pugwash Council, Director, Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition (RECNA), University of Nagasaki (Japan)

Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
“Importance of Dialogue in Areas of Nuclear Risk”
Monday, 18 May 2015, 15.00 – 18.00
Conference Room C, United Nations

Prof. Paolo Cotta-Ramusino – “Addressing Conflict as Part of Disarmament Strategy”
Secretary General, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Professor of Mathematical Physics at the University of Milan

Dr. Steve Miller – “The Increasing Urgency of Non-Proliferation Measures”
Chair, Pugwash Executive Committee
Director, International Security Program, Belfer Center, Harvard University

Dr. Tatsujiro Suzuki – “Challenges & Importance of Discussing Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy”
Chair, Pugwash Japan
RECNA, Nagasaki University
Former Vice Chair, Japan Atomic Energy Commission

The session will be chaired by Executive Director Sandra Ionno Butcher
and will include commentary by other Pugwashites and International Student/Young Pugwash representatives

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