Ten Key Factors for Finding a Negotiated solution to Iran’s Nuclear Issue

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Iran’s nuclear issue is one of the most important and complicated political issues on the agenda of the IAEA and the multilateral negotiations, with no mutually acceptable solution after two and a half years. Furthermore, during the past few months and with the issue reported to the UN security Council, the situation has become even more complicated. Nevertheless, a negotiated solution is still possible, and parties involved have not reached a point of no return. In light of the existing experience in this issue, I believe that if a fair, rational, legal, and peaceful solution is to be found, the following ten key factors should be taken into account:

1. Iran’s internal realities in the nuclear issue:
   A- The nuclear issue has found a national character, and all political factions, groups, parties, and individual figures with entirely different political views are unanimous in asserting the exercise of Iran’s right to fuel cycle.
   B- The nuclear issue has become a matter of national pride in Iran. Therefore, no solution can ignore this fact
and disregard the right to indigenous peaceful nuclear technology.

C- The West’s treatment of Iran’s nuclear issue should not leave the Iranian people with an overwhelming feeling of being discriminated against and a feeling that the West seeks to deprive Iran of its inalienable right to development and advanced technology.

2. Lack of confidence between Iran and the West is not limited to the nuclear issue. Resolving this issue is also not tantamount to resolving all differences between Iran and the West. However, reaching a negotiated solution on the nuclear issue is bound to facilitate and expedite efforts to finding solutions to other disagreements between Iran and the West.

3. Iran’s nuclear issue has been blown out of proportion and overly politicized internationally, making it all the more complicated and difficult to find a negotiated solution. It is necessary to reconsider this over-exaggeration to facilitate finding a solution to the issue.

4. Iran’s rights under the NPT should not be denied. Iran should be assured of the non-discriminatory exercise of its legal and inalienable right to the fuel cycle under the NPT. This is what was accepted by the Europeans in the first paragraph of Paris Agreement of October 2004. Therefore, nothing beyond the NPT should be imposed on Iran.

5. As the sole international body responsible for providing assurance about the exclusively peaceful nature of nuclear activities by NPT member states and their non-diversion to military purposes, the IAEA can help to resolve Iran’s issue by developing an Iran-specific formula to provide assurance to
others concerned about non-diversion of Iranian nuclear program. this is a solution agreed upon in an early 2005 meeting in pairs between French president Jacque chirac and Dr. Rohani, the former Iranian chief nuclear negotiator.

6. The participation of other countries in the enrichment activities in Iran, first proposed by the Iranian negotiators in the first half of 2004 and offered officially to the international community by the president of the Islamic Republic in the UN General Assembly Summit in New York in the latter half of 2005, can be a basis for the participation in Iran’s enrichment program by states in our region in order to promote regional confidence in all spheres.

7. In August 2005 meeting between president Mbeki and Dr. Rohani, it was agreed that Iran would export its UCF product to and import yellow cake from South Africa. In a letter to the leaders of the US, France, Germany, and Britain, the South African president raised this initiative, so that UCF at Isfahan could go to operation on a mutually agreed basis. Since this proposal was agreed to in principle by the Europeans, there continue to exist a good chance for an agreement on this basis. In this context, of course, the UCF project at Isfahan could be part of Iran’s proposal concerning international consortium for enrichment and fuel production.

8. Measures such as implementation and ratification of the Additional protocol, IAEA’s provision of assurance about Iran’s compliance with the NPT, and full and transparent cooperation of Iran with the Agency are the real and objective measures to promote international confidence in Iran’s nuclear program. The Islamic Republic of Iran recognizes this fact and is
prepared to consider these measures in the context of an agreed solution.

9. Utilise the opportunity for Iran-US talks on Iraq in good faith and a timely manner in order to de-escalate tension in Tehran-Washington relations and thereby allow for a calmer atmosphere in which a politically negotiated solution to Iran’s nuclear issue would become accessible.

10. Given these key factors, the three working groups of political-security, technological, and nuclear cooperations, envisioned in pairs Agreement, could resume their work and improve upon and finalize all areas of cooperations previously discussed within a three-month period at most.

under such circumstances, of course, the November 2004 resolution of the board of Governors should stand again, and Iran’s nuclear file be removed from the agendas of the Board and the security council.