Article II

The Conference recommends that no nuclear weapon should be deployed on the soil of a non-nuclear weapon state and that those nuclear weapons now deployed on the soil of non-nuclear weapon states should be promptly withdrawn.

Article III

All Parties who have not concluded safeguard agreements with the IAEA should do so as soon as possible, as mandated by the NPT.

All Parties to the NPT are urged to sign and ratify the additional protocol which is to be considered as an integral part of the Agency's safeguards system as referred to in Art. III.

The obligation not to provide, without due safeguards, sources of special fissionable material or equipment, or material especially designed or prepared for the processing of special fissionable material to any non-nuclear-weapons States (as defined by the treaty), should be enforced even in the case of transactions between Parties and non-parties to the NPT.

Any exchange of nuclear material and equipment especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, should be subjected to appropriate safeguards, as in Art. III of the NPT.

Article IV

Each Party to the NPT is entitled to have unrestricted access to nuclear technology for peaceful uses. The principle of assurance of non-proliferation and assurance of supply and services for nuclear energy should be equally applied to all Parties to the NPT. This principle is referred to in the report “Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Export Group Report”, submitted to the Director General of the IAEA. The IAEA is encouraged to ensure the right to

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1 A draft of these recommendations was discussed by participants at a consultation convened by Pugwash in New York on Saturday, May 7 (participant list is at the end of this document). While Pugwash is grateful for the comments and perspectives of the participants, these recommendations are solely the responsibility of the Pugwash Conferences.
access to nuclear fuel of member states, with the development of multinational institutions for the production of nuclear fuel. The Conference endorses the IAEA as a guarantor of supply. The Conference welcomes the development of international cooperation in the more general area of energy production, with particular attention to sustainable and environment-compatible energy.

**Article V**

The Conference reiterates that peaceful nuclear explosions would violate the moratorium on nuclear explosions and impede the entry into force of the CTBT.

**Article VI**

The Conference reaffirms and underscores the vital importance of transparency, irreversibility and verification as essential ingredients in any nuclear disarmament arrangement. The Conference re-emphasizes the importance of implementing the practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the NPT that were agreed upon at the 2000 Review Conference. In particular, the Conference urges all member States to take the necessary actions in order to:

- Let the CTBT enter into force as soon as possible
- Start negotiations on the FMCT with the goal of letting it enter into force as soon as possible
- Reduce the number of nuclear weapons well below the present level established by the existing arms control treaties, both by multilateral agreements and unilateral initiatives
- Eliminate all tactical nuclear weapons
- Forgo any production and design of new nuclear weapon systems
- Decrease much further the role of nuclear weapons in the security arrangements of NWS
- Bring down to zero the alert status of deployed nuclear weapons
- Reaffirm the unequivocal commitment to nuclear disarmament of the Nuclear Weapon States

The Conference expresses its concerns that the development of missile defence may trigger nuclear arms races at the global as well as at the regional level. Furthermore, keeping outer space free of weapons is an important element of common security and stability as well as a
necessary element in protecting the global environment and the development of civilian peaceful technologies that include space activities as an essential ingredient. This is consistent with the obligations of other treaties, including the Outer Space Treaty.

Article VII

The establishment of NW-Free Zones should be encouraged and the positive impact of existing NWFZ's should be highlighted. The conference welcomes the resolution of the “First Conference of States Parties and Signatories of Treaties That Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones,” held in Mexico City, 26-28 April 2005. The Conference expresses its hopes for a prompt establishment of the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. In some cases, the concept of NWFZ should be extended to the more general concept of WMD-Free Zones. The Conference urges all States in the Middle East to conclude at the earliest possible time a treaty establishing a WMD-Free Zone in the Middle East. All the parties to such security arrangements should acknowledge the need of guaranteeing the individual security needs of all the States of the region, and should see the elimination of WMDs from the region as an important element of peace and security in the region. All Parties to the NPT are encouraged to take concrete actions so as to facilitate the creation of such WMD-FZ in the Middle East. A Conference for the establishment of such a zone should be called as soon as possible by the UN. The Conference encourages also the creation of a standing committee for the establishment of such a zone.

Article VIII

In order to implement the 1995 Review and Extension Conference decision on "Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty", the need for accountability which underlies the 1995 Treaty's indefinite extension, and the commitment to reporting made in the 2000 Review Conference, the Parties should report on an annual basis and provide information on the implementation of each article of the NPT to a standing bureau that will include the President of the last Review Conference and the UN Undersecretary General for Disarmament Affairs. This standing bureau will monitor the implementation of the results of the Review Conference together with the Depository Governments and the Chairmen of the Preparatory Committees to the following Review Conference, and should be able to convene all State Parties in an extraordinary meeting, if circumstances so require.

Article VIII (Alternate version)

In order to implement the 1995 Review and Extension Conference decisions, and given the need for accountability which underlies the 1995 Treaty indefinite extension and the commitment to reporting made in the 2000 Review Conference, the Parties should report on an annual basis ideally providing information on the implementation of each article of the NPT. Implementation of the NPT would be strengthened by the ability of the Parties to meet annually. As well there should also be the ability to convene all Parties in an extraordinary meeting if circumstances so require.
Universality and Article IX

The definition of Nuclear Weapon States is in Art. X of the treaty. Non member States can of course unilaterally accept to be subject to restraints and regulations similar to those of the member States. This would be a welcome development.

Article X

The right of withdrawal from the treaty is defined by Art. X. Withdrawing countries cannot make use for military purposes of the technology acquired under the provisions of the NPT while they were Parties. In this case, the inspection rights of the IAEA continue to hold even if a country withdraws from the NPT. Violations should be addressed by the UN Security Council.

Nuclear Terrorism

In view of the continuous risk of nuclear terrorism, the Conference urges all the States to make all possible efforts to control fissile material and of instruments useful for the development of nuclear devices. The Conference supports UN Res. 1540 and calls on all States to cooperate in the control of existing nuclear material, and in the prompt and efficient disposal of excess fissile material. The IAEA should play a primary role in the process of control and disposal of excess fissile material. The Conference proposes the establishment of a global inventory of fissile material, in order to effectively facilitate the control and monitoring of such material.

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Pugwash Consultation on the 2005 NPT Review Conference

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New School University, New York, NY
7 May 2005

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