

# IRANIAN NUCLEAR ISSUES & A MIDDLE EAST WMD-FREE ZONE



REPORT

Yad Hashmona, Israel, 15-16 June 2012

This workshop addressed issues raised by the Iranian nuclear program, prospects for negotiations, and the possibility of a military attack on Iranian facilities. It also explored the prospects for the proposed 2012 conference on a Middle East WMD-Free Zone. The complicated and changing regional environment and domestic pressures in key countries provided a backdrop for discussions.



## IN MEMORIAM

This meeting was dedicated to the memory of Professor Alex Keinan, a prominent Israeli microbiologist who has been called “the father of science policy” in Israel. Prof. Keinan was firmly committed to the idea that scientific cooperation is integral to confidence-building in the Middle East. His long association with Israeli Pugwash dated back to the mid-1960s. It was through Pugwash, for example, that he was involved in quiet interactions with the Egyptians before the peace treaty. The memory of his intellectual acuity, open-mindedness, humanity, and optimism set an appropriate tone for our discussions in Yad Hashmona.

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# Iranian Nuclear Issues & a Middle East WMD-Free Zone

YAD HASHMONA, ISRAEL, 15-16 JUNE 2012

## SUMMARY

This meeting was the eighth in a series of Pugwash workshops held in Israel and devoted primarily to the Iranian nuclear issue. This report reflects the fact that the majority of the participants were Israeli.

- The meeting in Yad Hashmona demonstrated there are continuing deep and serious concerns in Israel as to the nature of the threat posed by the Iranian nuclear program. This unease is further complicated by the massive changes underway in the region.
- Negotiations with Iran by the P5+1 are unlikely to yield results in the near future, particularly given the US election period. From the Israeli perspective, there is a time urgency to these discussions that does not fit easily with this extended timeframe, as Israelis fear Iran may be stalling for time while continuing to move toward development of military nuclear capability and/or nuclear weapons.
- While some feel that the negotiating partners have credible options for a peaceful settlement of these disagreements (including a model agreement put forward by Pugwash after wide consultation), it is unclear whether the sorts of possible negotiated agreements under discussion between Iran and the P5+1 could allay Israeli concerns.
- There are strong voices in Israel promoting an extreme brinkmanship policy in the belief that continued heavy pressure and unyielding threats of possible military action will bring Iran to serious concessions.
- Others fundamentally disagree that this pressure will work as intended, and fear the current situation is creating the possibility of a disastrous outcome, including casualties, a possible war, the unraveling of the NPT and further proliferation. At the same time, some believe a military attack would be ineffective as it would practically guarantee Iranian determination to develop nuclear weapons.
- The planning and timing for the proposed 2012 conference on a WMD-Free Zone in the Middle East, falling as it does during this time of regional uncertainty, leads most in Israel to remain highly skeptical about the meeting, though officially Israel has not yet committed one way or the other. Israel's concerns over the scope and framing of the proposed conference are serious and absent the lack of strong political will from relevant capitals, this conference faces daunting challenges.
- The proposed 2012 conference, however, could be used to launch a process that would address some of the Israeli interests in a wider dialogue, and also could provide a key opportunity for side discussions of all parties.
- In this highly tense time period, there are influential voices urging the necessity of some direct communication between Iranians and Israelis, between Iranians and Arabs, and between Arabs and Israelis. Such dialogue may become urgent should things worsen.
- Some also believe that Israel must address and resolve the Palestinian issue, as they believe it is of vital interest to Israel's national security. Others object to any attempt at linkage of these issues.

## REPORT

This meeting was the eighth in a series of Pugwash workshops devoted to the Iranian nuclear issue held in Israel and organized in cooperation with Israeli Pugwash. Participants addressed the complex matrix of issues at play in the Middle East, with a particular focus on the Iranian nuclear issue and the possibility of a WMD-Free Zone in the Middle East. They explored the ways in which Iran’s domestic scene is changing, including the likely impact of the end of President Ahmadinejad’s tenure and the increased role of Supreme Leader. Discussion also addressed relevant internal and external situations of other regional countries and the complexities of the role of international actors in the region. The meeting focused heavily on Israeli perspectives, and explored Israeli threat perceptions and what options and compromises might or might not be effective and/or acceptable, including at the “far end” a military option.

This workshop involved 30 participants from 7 countries (please see Appendix A for the participant list). It was co-sponsored by the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, the Alliance Center for Iranian Studies at Tel Aviv University, and the Academic Center for Law and Business. The meeting was held according to traditional Pugwash/Chatham House rules: participants took part in their individual capacities; statements are not attributed to any individual; and distribution of the substance of discussions is encouraged.<sup>1</sup> There was no attempt to achieve consensus, but rather, as in all Pugwash meetings, the goal was to encourage the sharing of diverse perspectives. The report reflects the fact that the majority of participants were Israeli.

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**C FREILICH, A BARAM, B HOURCADE, D LANDAU, E BARAK, G GOLAN, S BROM, P JONES**

<sup>1</sup> This report was prepared by Pugwash Senior Program Coordinator Sandra Ionno Butcher, who has sole responsibility for the content (sibutcher@earthlink.net). The opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of the rapporteur, the Pugwash Conferences or any of the sponsoring organizations. Pugwash appreciates the support for its Middle East project provided by the Norwegian MFA, the Carnegie Corporation, other funders and our national groups.

## Iran's domestic scene

To provide context for discussions about the nuclear program of Iran, participants first discussed the domestic scene in Iran. In particular, they explored whether there has been a recent shift in the triangle of power between the Supreme Leader, the President, and the Revolutionary Guard.

To the extent some detect a weakening of the relative power of Iranian President Ahmadinejad, questions arise as to how this may impact the nuclear issue. Some believe that the Supreme Leader is becoming more influential as President Ahmadinejad appears to be weakening. Some caution that at the same time the Supreme Leader is possibly becoming increasingly isolated, and may be relying more on the Revolutionary Guard. However, one participant said that such isolationist arguments oversimplify the situation. He noted that Khamenei has been known to reject advice from his advisors and reaches outside his inner circle for advice. Someone else expressed concern that Khamenei is "more dangerous" than Ahmadinejad, given his opposition to improving relations with the West.

On the nuclear issue, it was noted that the Supreme Leader agreed to negotiations despite his previous opposition, and the Revolutionary Guard supported him. Some felt this change of policy was notable in that it might signal that with President Ahmadinejad "sidelined," policy makers perhaps have an increased ability to act on these issues. However, one person questioned whether Khamenei is able to make a big decision like Khomeini did, for example, with the Iraq war. While the nuclear issue might be this sort of issue, this person felt that Khamenei lacks Khomeini's charisma and religious standing and it therefore would be extremely difficult for him to make such a decision.

Participants discussed what will happen when Khamenei can no longer function, as it is not clear who will be the next Supreme Leader. Someone suggested that after Khamenei it might be more likely that a committee will be established, rather than another Supreme Leader. Others believe this form of "collective leadership" cannot function.



G GOLAN (RIGHT)

Questions arise as to who will be the next president and the future role of the president (will the next president act more like a prime minister?). One participant said domestic politics will be increasingly focused on the presidential election and cautioned that in Iran the frontrunners are not always the victors. One participant thought who the Supreme Leader supports for the next president will depend on how the role of the presidency itself evolves. It is unclear what Ahmadinejad will do next, following the end of his presidential term. Will he have an honorary position, or will some other sort of job be created for him? The possibility that a vice-presidency might be created was raised. Some wondered about the extent to which Ahmadinejad and others have been working to create an "economic power base."

Participants also discussed the role of the Revolutionary Guard. One participant pointed out that while the regime depends on the Revolutionary Guard, the regular military does not have a role in the "inner sanctum" of power. Another person said that while the Revolutionary Guards do not want to lead, they do want to guard their interests, including financial interests that may be affected by sanctions. It was noted that the banking sector sanctions may have an impact beyond the Revolutionary Guards and the bonyads. (The role

of the clerics in business was similarly noted.) If the Revolutionary Guard and clerics are in fact stakeholders, one participant wondered if sanctions might in this respect produce some additional effect. One participant wondered if the Revolutionary Guard plays a role similar in Iran to the military in Egypt, and questioned if Iran may be moving closer to a sort of military dictatorship.

Recent parliamentary elections were considered by some participants to be very important. They said results showed that approximately 1/3 of the voters supported the Supreme Leader, 1/3 favored traditional Islamist right-wing policy makers (opposed to Israel), and roughly 1/3 supported independents. This resulted, they say, in a relatively good balance in the country between the left, center, and the right. However, someone else cautioned that leaders felt they had to pressure people to vote, and the Supreme Leader is aware that he must watch the tension of the “crisis of the legitimacy” of the regime.

Some societal trends were discussed by various participants. One participant noted a deepening divide between Tehran and the countryside. The society is challenged by devaluation and fluctuation of the rial (10 rials=1 toman), which leaves businesses unable to adapt. The prices of meat and chicken, for example, have increased five times in just a few months. Demographics are changing rapidly. The number of children per family has decreased quickly since the late 1980s, and there are now many young couples with no children, raising questions about how this might impact society in twenty years. Someone said the people are “absolutely disillusioned” with the leadership and its consolidation of power. However, another said that while the population may not be happy, it also is not angry. Some cautioned against over exaggerating the domestic scene, which is in fact far from the point of collapse.

Life in Iran is “not so bad,” someone said. For example, food is self-produced, and the people are not starving (one person said they are doing better than people in Spain). The standard of living is high. Tourism is increasing (domestic and also from the Gulf) and the infrastructure is being developed (for example, fast trains.) One person said he was recently in the Tehran airport and looked at the arrivals board with flights from all over the world – and noted Iranians are not isolated in the way



E ROZSA, S LODGAARD

many people from the West sometimes assume. However, another person said that while the economy is not the problem, Iran is “weak” because it has “been out of history for 30 years.” This person said that “all in Iran know it is weak.” One participant pointed out that it is unknown how the broader economic situation in Europe might impact the Middle East in the next six months or so. (He thought it would not be wise to precipitate a collapse of the oil market.) Someone said the tolerance level of the people to corruption, inflation, and unemployment is unknown.

Someone called Iran the “Soviet Union of the Islamic movement.” There is support in terms of leadership and orthodoxy but people, including among the policy community, are dissatisfied with the structures. Within the regime some reforms are in process, comparable some say to those underway in the late communist period. Someone said another parallel with the former Soviet Union is its provision of financial support to other countries, who accept it for various reasons, but those recipients do not all consider Iran as a model of society. However, another participant cautioned against projecting attributions to Iranian society from other experiences, as it is a very complex culture. The process in the Soviet Union, it was noted, took 70 years.

Someone else commented that “the system works” in that no one will take a step that might lead to even mild criticism of Iran, or they will be “dead meat” at home. It was noted that this pressure leads to rigidity (though

in some ways, one person noted, this is less so than in the US on certain issues). However, another participant wondered at what point domestic disillusionment might turn into political action: “Will June 2009 come again? When will we see signs that Iran is in a pre-revolutionary state?”


One participant cautioned against over-confidence in predictions about Iran, as experts have consistently been wrong in their evaluations. He warned it is impossible to predict the realities needed to provide the basis for change and the possible popular reaction. Decision makers rely on both their hearts and their minds. He said that for 30 years people have predicted the Islamic revolution will fail in six months, and ultimately they will be right, but to be right prematurely is in reality to be wrong.

One person cautioned against overemphasizing the role of Islam in Iranian society. He said, “The historian of the past is the citizen of the present.” While today everything seems to be about Islam, this person reminded participants that for many revolutionaries of the late 1970s the Iranian revolution was not supposed to be an Islamic revolution. It was about bread and welfare. Today, the Iranian people do not have better welfare or greater freedoms than under the shah. He noted, “To speak against the shah was a crime; today to speak against the Supreme Leader is a sin.” People may look to Islam for inspiration, but foreign policy is made based on other matters. One participant reinforced the idea that historically in Iran whenever there is a clash between ideology and interest, the leaders opt for interest. In other words, he said, “reality is stronger than ideology,” even in revolutionary Iran.

### Iran and the “Arab Spring”

Participants discussed various aspects of the so-called “Arab Spring” and how these developments may or may not impact the Iranian nuclear issue. Someone noted that while initially Iran seemed happy with developments in the Arab Spring and felt that the events were serving their purposes (since, for example, Egypt allowed Iranian vessels passage through the Suez Canal to the Mediterranean), this perception is different now. One participant said Iran is “confused” about the Arab Spring. Another said, “Iran sees only things to lose in the Arab world.” One participant noted that Iran has not had one approach to the developments. In Syria, he said, Iran sides with the government and against the people, but in Bahrain it is with the people against the government. This is proof, according to this participant, that Iran pursues its interests above all else. One person commented, “Iran is good at taking advantages of vacuums in areas where the central government is weak” and gave the examples of Gaza and Lebanon. Some believe that the Arab Spring has made it more obvious that Iran’s regional influence has limits and is shrinking.

Someone commented that Iranians believe the Arab Spring has been an Islamic awakening. Participants doubted the Arab Spring drew its inspiration from Iran. One person said this depends whether one thinks 1979 or 2009 provided the example for the various movements. Someone commented that while Islamic movements may gain in this process, the changes were driven mostly by domestic situations in each country.



B HOURCADE

There was some general discussion about the nature of the changes, and the fact that while the monarchies survived, the countries mostly affected were originally a combination of pro-Soviet, anti-colonial, and para-socialist systems (some questioned this analysis and the extent to which it applied to Egypt).

Someone commented that Iran is focused more on the “Persian Gulf” than on Arab states. From Iran’s perspective, it is most important to be ready to challenge Gulf States like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the Emirates, in reference to political power in the region. One participant noted that from a broader perspective, all states in the region are repeating traditional regional patterns of conflict and cooperation that have existed since the “modern Middle East” was created after WWII, and are driven primarily by specific basic interests of the nation state, beyond ideology or soft power. Some Israelis point out that in this time of change “nightmare scenarios are possible to envision.”

Some specific cases were briefly addressed:

- Syria has been an ally of Iran from the early days of the revolution, and if the Assad regime collapses this could be a problem for Iran (one person noted they “never recognized Alawis are Shiite”). If Iran supports Assad, some felt it will pay a price in the Arab world. Some believed it is clear the regime in Syria is on a slippery slope, weakening, and will eventually end (though it might take time). However, the alternatives in Syria are not necessarily ones that Iran will find reassuring. Continuation of a low-level civil war fed from both directions could last for years. Someone said that it is wrong to see Syria as a battleground only between Iran and the West, but most fundamentally it is a battle ground between the West and Russia.
- In Egypt, one person commented, the Muslim Brotherhood has not been particularly consistent or coherent, yet they managed a success. It was suggested that there is a need to facilitate dialogue between Iran and Egypt, in part to address animosity between Iran and the Arabs to the extent that it exists, and as a means of helping Iran feel less besieged. The strong Egyptian public support for the Salafists, one person said, was notable and may cause complications for Egypt’s relations with Iran.
- One participant said the influence of both Turkey and Iran in the Arab world after the Arab Spring has been more limited than either hoped. The competition between Iran and Turkey has always been lingering below the surface. Many in Israel believed Prime Minister Erdogan was aligning Turkey with Iran but someone noted this was a superficial analysis that missed the natural competition between the two. Turkey was better positioned than Iran to reap the benefits of the changes of the Arab Spring, and many believe it is a more attractive model even for those within the Islamic movements. This is not to say that the Muslim Brotherhood will emulate Turkey as they have a very different environment, but someone noted they have more similarity with Turkey than with Iran.
- Bahrain has been a “fast and sharp” awakening for Iran, according to one participant.
- Saudi Arabia has become more assertive in being willing to fight what they see as the hand of Iran behind the Arab Spring (though many believe this perception is not true, nevertheless it may be driving policy). The Saudi regime was described as “undemocratic” and “illiberal,” though someone noted that the alternative “could be worse.” The political survival of the House of Saud, according to this participant, will be the primary goal of the regime. One participant pointed out that not only did the Saudis not have an “awakening,” but they were shocked at seeing the US abandon Mubarak and this led to some concern there that if they do not follow the US line, they too could have problems. They want the US to leave, but not right away. The Saudis have promoted Salafists, including in Egypt. One participant noted the 1.5 billion aid pledged to Egypt matches the US funding and the Muslim Brotherhood is reportedly planning to meet the king.

- The role of Hamas was discussed in terms of the broader regional issues, with some noting that Hamas has distanced itself from both Syria and Iran. A couple of participants commented that Hamas is not interested politically in Iran directly, and that they are not receiving money with conditions attached from Iran (one person even suggested Hamas is no longer accepting Iranian money).
- Hezbollah, according to one participant, might be marginalized after the Arab Spring. Another person said that the fall of the Assad regime would have severe implications for Hezbollah, and at the moment, there is a closer relationship between Hezbollah and Assad.
- In Libya, one person commented, there is no evidence of a real “Arab awakening.”
- There was some discussion on the Sunni/Shia divide. Some cautioned against exaggerating this divide, while others said whether it is real or not, it is driving policy. Someone said the more this is discussed, the worse it becomes, and that if this is not calmed down, it might spread beyond the region. It is already a big problem in Iraq and to an extent in Bahrain (one person said a victory in Bahrain would be a “big victory” in Iran). Saudi Arabia, according to one participant, “is on the wrong side.” There was also discussion about the possible “Wahabi (Salafist) Awakening,” for example, in Qatar.



E RABINOVICI, D MENASHRI, P COTTA-RAMUSINO

The role of outside powers in the region following the Arab Spring remains unclear and, according to one participant, “disappointing.” The first phase, according to one participant, indicated a weakened US role. From the Russian perspective, the Arab Spring might be considered a “total failure.” Another participant pointed out that Putin’s approach to the region is very different than in Soviet times. Syria, for example, is most important to Russia for economic rather than military reasons, though this can change. China could perhaps provide a more likely alternative to the US role in the region than Russia. However, another participant pointed out the role of outside powers is somewhat unpredictable and can change. For example, someone highlighted the global interests demonstrated in the summit statements from the leaders of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS). One participant pointed out that Iran is “very concerned” regarding its relations with Russia. It is not an easy relationship, and they are aware that “Russia has left them in a lurch” in the past. It was also pointed out that China is most concerned over the possible closure of the Hormuz Straits.

## Iranian nuclear program

Concerns over the Iranian nuclear program were central to the discussions in Yad Hashmona. However, there was not an attempt to systematically catalogue the various issues, which have been covered in prior meetings. Discussion focused on ensuring the perspectives of all sides were understood, as a basis for exploring prospects for a resolution. The conversation focused heavily on prospects for negotiations and possible next steps, which are addressed in separate sections.

Iranian perspectives on the nuclear program were summarized by one participant, who noted that the Iranian program is based on relatively old technology and dates back to the Khatami administration, which thought that even "the capability would serve as a deterrent." The Iranians failed to report the introduction of nuclear materials, and were caught in violation in 2002. Khatami stopped further enrichment, and he signed and implemented the Additional Protocol. According to this participant, the West "was not forthcoming" and referred Iran to the IAEA. One participant said that Khatami (and Mousavian) felt they were "taken for a ride" and had exposed themselves to criticism from Ahmadinejad's people while getting nothing. When Ahmadinejad came to power, he started enrichment and ended adherence to the Additional Protocol. While Iran is not under the Additional Protocol, "they occasionally stuck to it," according to one participant, who also noted that developing some "theoretical nuclear studies with possible military application" is not necessarily forbidden by the NPT. The issue is "fuzzy." Many countries have made their own designs, which is in reality not difficult to do. Others reinforced that this version of history is up for interpretation.

Some say that in fact the Iranian military nuclear program is "on course." Many considered Iran on the "threshold" of having nuclear weapons. One participant said it is not a question of preventing them from having the knowledge of how to do build a nuclear weapon since they already know how and have been progressing. Many see the situation worsening, and note with alarm the last IAEA report. One participant said Natanz has some 9,000 centrifuges, 200 kg of LEU, it has been operating Qom since December with four working cascades and two that are soon to be operational. It reportedly has tripled its capacity to produce uranium enriched to 20 per cent. There is concern about clandestine sites. Someone said (according to the 8 November IAEA report, paragraph 53) there has been a structured program regarding Iranian nuclear explosive devices, and some work may be ongoing at Parchin, Qom, or other sites. The Iranians, one person said, have claimed that ten more facilities will be constructed.

One participant pointed out that since February 2006, when the Iran nuclear issue was referred to the UN Security Council and Iran's withdrawal from the Additional Protocol, there has been an impact on the lack of information available about the Iranian program, so it is difficult to definitely resolve these varying perspectives. One person noted there also is a "discrepancy" in the interpretation of Iran's nuclear program after 2003 between Amano and the US National Intelligence Estimate. Beyond questions over Iran's possible ability to develop a limited number of nuclear devices, some believe Iran would be unlikely to settle for a small arsenal. It was pointed out that Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Ya'alon gave an estimate that Iran could have 7-8 nuclear weapons operational in 12 months. It is clear that developing a full arsenal, a fleet of ballistic missiles, etc. would take a long period of time.

The question of who would have their finger on a possible future nuclear button was also discussed. This was tied with concerns about the possible isolation of the Supreme Leader. Others countered and said the Supreme Leader consults widely on various issues and if in the future Iran acquires a nuclear weapon, one participant thought it likely that a committee would be in place on nuclear use, with the ultimate decision in the hands of the Supreme Leader.



**B LAPIDOT, D DANIELI**

## Fatwa

Participants discussed the weight and impact of the fatwa issued by the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei forbidding the production, proliferation and use of nuclear bombs:

“[T]he Islamic Republic, logically, religiously and theoretically, considers the possession of nuclear weapons a grave sin and believes the proliferation of such weapons is senseless, destructive and dangerous.”<sup>2</sup>

Some say this has considerable influence on how the Iranians would approach the line of having a weapon. If they get close to the line, some believe they will need a period of rulings to change the fatwa and a series of statements providing new interpretations of the fatwa might signal that Iran might be approaching that line.

Others disagree, and say the fatwa does not have any direct impact on Iran’s strategic decision making regarding whether or not to pursue a nuclear capability or a nuclear bomb. Others say that from a legalistic point of view, the fatwa is not in itself sufficient guarantee, as not all Iranians need to follow it, only those who follow the Ayatollah who issued it and Khamenei is not the leading Ayatollah. It also is only valid so long as the person who issued it is alive.

Some strongly disagreed with this interpretation and said that Khamenei’s political credentials are not in question. The fatwa, from this perspective, is relevant as long as it is not withdrawn and others cannot go against it openly. Khamenei could possibly change what he has said, but if he does so it likely would be through a series of edicts spread out over months.

One person pointed out that the fatwa may be used domestically as an internal justification to halt the nuclear effort if negotiations yield some results. Another participant pointed out that the fatwa might be used later, if negotiations progress, to say verification of the agreement is not needed because of the fatwa.



## Prospects for negotiations

Participants discussed varying perspectives on the negotiations between Iran and the P5+1. The Yad Hashmona meeting took place days before the opening of the Moscow round of negotiations. One participant said that “time is critical” and the parties “must seize the window of opportunity.” Others felt that both sides were trying to “buy time,” since the US wants to postpone decisions past the November election and Iran wants to minimize potential damage while amassing materials. Iran today is “riding high” on a “wave of satisfaction and deepest fears,” said one participant, who suggested others need to use this to move them toward serious negotiations.

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<sup>2</sup> See for example, “Leader’s decree forbidding nuclear weapons won’t be disobeyed: Turkey” Press TV, 5 April 2012. <http://www.presstv.ir/detail/234778.html>

Participants noted that negotiators have to “overcome a deep trust deficit” and a “gulf of mistrust.” Skepticism runs deep. For example, one participant said that Iran has for 20 years been cheating and conducting clandestine programs, and they do not come to the table with “clean hands.” Someone said that the best solution would be a compromise that dissatisfies all, leaving both sides “reasonably unhappy.”

Someone noted that there is a lack of clarity on benchmarks, and asked what will be the sign that things are “moving somewhere”?

### **Iranian context**

It was noted that the Iranians would in fact like to have an agreement, if it is not too costly in political terms (and sanctions are key to this, some say). Iranians have a sense, however, that the other side (the US and Europeans) are not willing to make a deal that would relieve sanctions at this point and that Ashton and her team are “unclear” and “not firm.” One person said the Iranians feel like whatever they give “will never be enough.” One participant said Iran’s perception is that there has not been any serious engagement since 2005 and the mood in Iran is that there is “no point in trying.”

Some pointed out that the nuclear issue is now a “national issue” in Iran and a matter of national pride and prestige which contributes to support for the regime. Today, the nuclear issue is tied to an Iranian historical narrative of fighting against the denial of technology to the country by others. The regime always tells the population that the West wants to strip it of its nuclear technology, but does not mention nuclear weapons. Someone pointed out that Iran needs at this time to reinforce the regime through the negotiations. The more Iran is isolated and threatened militarily, the more the regime is reinforced. Iran cannot “surrender” and go home with nothing, no state could do this, said one participant. It was noted that the merchants and others are focused on the impact of talks on the economy.

“Talking” is considered one of Iran’s strengths. Some say it is enough for Iran to convene talks, but that they will not follow through on getting a deal. These participants believe firmly that Iran “at the highest levels” has made a decision to continue their nuclear program. Someone said that if one takes Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Ya’alon’s estimates that Iran could have operational nuclear weapons in 12 months, then it is a question for Iran of how to use the time in coming months. This supports, they say, the perspective that Iran does not want to conclude a deal. Someone else countered this view and said it is a “myth” that Iran wants to negotiate just for the sake of negotiations.

Iran’s chief negotiator Jallili is perceived as not being linked to Ahmadinejad, and perhaps may be a possible presidential candidate. One participant described him as “more rigid” and less of a “personality” than Larijani. Jallili is perceived as a daily coordinator, and his loyalty to the Supreme Leader is not in doubt. One participant said that in preparing for negotiations there is an emphasis on input from many stakeholders, including a strong foreign affairs secretariat and a variety of institutions and individuals.

Some pointed out that it might be possible to help Iran change its perspectives. Iran sits in an earthquake zone, and especially post-Fukushima there may be ways in which pursuing a nuclear program is not in its national interest. Others say Iranians are deadlocked in their decision making processes, and tend to “do more of the same” when they are deadlocked, sometimes “with greater dedication” because there is no decision made. Some believe this is the way Iran is operating today.

### **P5+1 (or E3+3)**

Participants discussed complications arising from internal disagreements among the negotiating partners, with Russia and China sitting outside the circle a bit more than the others. Some felt that Iran may or may not be able to exploit this possible weakness. One person said the new French government will want to be “as close as possible to Obama.” Someone said the international community “needs to remain firm.”

The impact of the US domestic scene on negotiations was also addressed. Some say the US threat perception of Iran is a major factor and that the perception of Iran being at the top of the enemy list has outpaced the reality of any possible threat posed by Iran to the US. Congress is adding pressure for the US to be tough at all costs. A recent resolution, for example, that seeks to forbid discussions between US and Iranians was supported even by some members of Congress who have themselves previously been engaged in meeting with Iranians. There is a perception that the political climate is such that even people with different political visions are “forced” to abide. The extent to which the pro-Israeli lobby in DC might be contributing to the US domestic and Congressional pressures also was discussed. Someone noted that Israel should be careful, since the US has committed to curbing Iranian nuclear weapons, and not nuclear capability.

The threat perception and the Congressional realities combine to limit the administration’s maneuvering room. Some wonder if this is the whole story, as Congressional resolutions have in fact very little power and the US system places responsibility for foreign policy with the president and not Congress. It is only when Congress exercises its rights over financial matters that it can have a serious impact on foreign policy. However, others note that financial matters are very much relevant in the way the Iranian issue is dealt with in the US. One person noted it would take a “veritable regime change” in Iran before US sanctions legislation could be lifted given the way the legislation is constructed.

One participant said the US side believes there is nothing they can put on the table in negotiations. While postponing EU sanctions might be possible, suspending US sanctions is considered too high a political cost for the present administration at this time.

The possible impact of the US election was discussed. It was acknowledged that the election is playing a role in the way the Obama administration is pacing itself in negotiations. There is a sense in Israel, based on contacts with the Romney team, that the policy would remain the same even if a new president is elected.

### **IAEA**

Some distinguished between the “two tracks” of disputes with Iran: the IAEA and the P5+1. Some said that the Iranians are trying to split the P5+1 from the IAEA. They said that the Iranians have a desire to minimize the outstanding IAEA problems and to “circumvent” the IAEA since Amano is “more credible than his predecessor, to put it mildly.” (Others disagreed with this characterization.) One person said the example of the IAEA director general going to Tehran for what was thought to be an agreement regarding visiting Parchin, which then “all fell apart”, is further proof of the Iranian tactic of “buying time” and allowing more time for enrichment. One person said, “The details of Parchin are known to all.” However, others said that even if the Parchin visit were allowed, it would not promote an agreement on “the main issues.”

### **Israel and the negotiations**

Israel is obviously deeply interested in the process and outcome of the negotiations. One person said that Israel should have been present in the negotiations with Iran, and that it has demonstrated “enormous flexibility regarding national pride” in not making this an issue despite the “national insult.” It also was pointed out that since Israel is not party to the talks, it is not bound by the conclusions of the negotiations.

Someone said it is important to understand that Israel has suffered a “profound crisis of despair” and that it is scarred by suicide attacks and a perceived inability to deter the enemy. The nuclear issue, the missile threat, the continued supplying of missiles to proxies, and related issues, some say, color Israel’s threat perceptions. As previously stated, many believe strongly that “Iran doesn’t want or need” a negotiated settlement, because they would have to “give up their goal” of a nuclear program. Someone said, “There is no mutual interest.” This is “not about building confidence,” said one participant. As a result, some believe the “credible threat of consequences is crucial.” (This perspective is discussed further below.)

Someone wondered if Israel would accept any deal, and if so, what kind. For example, would it be most critical to have some reasonable assurances that at each point in time there would not be in Iran amounts of enriched uranium that enables the production of fuel for nuclear devices.

One Israeli participant said if we can look at the domestic situation in Iran, then we should also look at the domestic situation in Israel with an equally critical eye. He said the public in Israel also does not believe in politicians. He said Israel is the “most unequal society in the Western world,” where the cost of living is higher than in Berlin or Miami, but where this wealth is not filtered down. It was noted that the social protest in Israel does not at this time have political manifestations. While this person felt a need for an alternative to Netanyahu, this is “not simple” but it may be why there won’t be a military strike. Some felt that it is not possible to separate engagement with Palestinians, or some unity or better agreement with Saudi Arabia or Egypt, from the nuclear file. One participant questioned the extent to which the Palestinian issue and Arab-Israeli issues are underlying the current conflict with Iran. Another person said that Israeli leaders have “used the Iran threat to send the Palestinian issue into deep freeze.”

One participant highlighted an interview with Vice Prime Minister Ya’alon (Strategic Affairs Minister, and reportedly one of the people closest to the Prime Minister) that appeared in Ha’aretz as our meeting took place.<sup>3</sup> This participant referred to this interview as the “most outspoken and reasoned exposition of the ‘bomb Iran’ debate.” Ya’alon said in effect that the repercussions of a nuclear Iran are intolerable to Israel. While Netanyahu had promised the US president to lower his rhetoric on the eve of negotiations, some felt the deputy prime minister’s statement was a tactical decision, calculated in cooperation with the prime minister, in preparing public opinion for a possible attack. Some believe that any Israeli leader would have this mindset regardless of political persuasion.

According to this perspective, “On the issue of Iran, the usual lines of hawk and dove are transcended.” Since Mofaz is now in the loop as well, some believe that one should conclude that they will bomb (the possibility of a military strike is discussed further below). Some think Mofaz has “sold his political capital” and has become “a second Netanyahu.”

It remains controversial, however, to raise comparisons with the holocaust. One participant expressed adamantly that he believed Israel must defend against a future “nuclear holocaust” from Iran. Others objected and said that while no one is supporting Iran’s strong rhetoric, Iran has never



P COTTA-RAMUSINO, A BRAVERMAN, A ZOHAR

<sup>3</sup> Ari Shavit, “IDF chief of staff-turned-vice premier: ‘We are not bluffing’”, Ha’aretz, 14 June 2012  
<http://www.haaretz.com/weekend/magazine/idf-chief-of-staff-turned-vice-premier-we-are-not-bluffing.premium-1.436414>

threatened a “nuclear holocaust” but has in fact said to the contrary that it will never use nuclear weapons. Some thought that Israel absolutely must defend against a possible threat of this magnitude to its society. Others were opposed to using such words to describe the current situation, and thought such comparisons are “obscene,” “dangerous,” and do not “serve the cause of clear, rational strategic thinking.” If leaders are driven by such emotions, one participant said, “This is very dangerous for Israel.”

The Iranian rhetoric regarding Israel was highlighted, and while there is debate about the exact phrasing of controversial statements, one person pointed out that “death to Israel” has been a long-time slogan of Iran. Some felt the rhetoric cannot be overlooked, when exploring Iran’s behavior in Bushehr and Qom. It is not “practical politics.” Someone else noted that senior Iranians will say they have no objection to Israel once the Zionist character of Israel is removed, and yet to Israelis, this is not possible.

Another Israeli participant said that there are many perspectives in Israel and noted that in the past Israel reportedly “had no issue” with the Shah’s attempts to develop nuclear capability. Iran was pursuing nuclear capability at the time not with regard to Israel, but the surrounding Gulf states and the US and Israel may have helped (this was called “a dramatic statement” and it was strongly contested by others who unequivocally stated that no Israeli administration was involved in the nuclear program of Iran under the shah). It was only with Ahmadinejad that Israel became more targeted in the rhetoric, and this participant wondered if it might be possible, after Ahmadinejad, to return to an earlier perspective.

Some questioned the assumption that if Iran had nuclear weapons it would use them against Israel. One person noted that some time ago (2005) the Iranian national security advisor asked if people think Iran is “so crazy” as to use nuclear weapons against Israel. One person noted there was a national security directive under Khatami not to provoke Israel. And yet, many believe Iran has done much to make Israel a “big enemy.” Someone predicted that if Iran gets the bomb, people in the elite of Israel will leave the country, possibly suggesting that this consideration should be a motivation to support a possible Israeli military strike.

### **Pressure and Sanctions**

Many, if not most, of the participants agreed that recent events have proven the “crucial role” of sanctions in applying pressure to bring Iran to the negotiating table. It was, according to this perspective, only when sanctions against the Central Bank were implemented at the end of January that Iran came to the table. The conclusion to draw from this is that when Iran is pressured it “takes a step back,” said one participant. Someone else noted that “pressure is important on both sides,” and that it is not only Iran who has been pressured, but that the West is feeling pressure from the pace of Iran’s nuclear program and its actions.

Sanctions exploit Iran’s weakness, according to many of the participants. The coming into effect of additional US sanctions on 28 June and EU sanctions on 1 July “may finally be getting to the crunch,” said one participant. There is no likelihood, most assumed, that sanctions would be lifted or postponed. One person said “the logic of negotiations dictates that you don’t lift your strongest card first.” This person said, “It’s not written in stone that they should get sanctions lifted.” “This is not a symmetrical negotiation.”

However, others recognize there will have to be a compromise, and the West will not get 100 per cent of its demands. One person said the sanctions will not be removed, but the deal might be that no new sanctions are put in place. However, Iranians must be given something. They would rather not make a deal than be perceived as having conceded because of sanctions, said one person. It is not possible to survive in Iran with a deal made on that basis.

Some take issue, however, with the notion that this unprecedented pressure on Iran is working. While it might have gotten Iran to the table, we “still don’t see a substantive endgame,” said one participant. Some believe

that Iran thinks it can weather the process and wear down the proposals. “We don’t see a strategic change in Iran’s position,” said one participant. In the meantime, judging from the last IAEA report the situation is worsening, this participant said. There exists among some Israelis the belief that if the goal is to end the Iranian nuclear program more, not less, pressure is needed now. (Not all participants agreed this is or should be the goal of the negotiations.) One participant thought it is unlikely that the international community would be willing to exert more pressure via sanctions, as it might lead to a “worsening of the global process.”

Others completely disagree that pressuring Iran will get a result. Someone said it is like putting a cat in a corner and squeezing it, it will lead to a lot of bruises. It is more important to give Iran “an honorable way out.” Someone said that it is important not to “break the will of Iran to negotiate.” If this happens, it could facilitate the right wing coming back into power.

Some believe negotiations have to include incentives. “Sticks alone won’t work,” said one person. The Iranians will respond only to “heavy pressure plus good carrots.” Those who are opposed to offering sanctions relief at this stage highlight some carrots, such as relief regarding civil aviation, cooperation on anti-narcotics, cooperation on TRR, cooperation in areas of nuclear safety and security, plus some other (undefined) elements on sanctions, etc. Someone said, however, that Iran “scoffs” at such ideas as “petty items not sufficient for them to respond to constructively.” Some senior Israeli participants agreed that offering carrots regarding airline parts, etc., will not be sufficient, and they do understand that some sanction relief will be necessary. However, they see this as a multistage process.

### Enrichment

One of the hottest topics is the question of Iranian enrichment. Iran considers acceptance of its right to enrich to be a red line. Some felt that Iran “can’t walk away from enrichment” because they have invested too much (politically and otherwise) on this principle. There is room, however, for compromise on how much, where, possible suspension, etc. The question is can the others accept it? One person said it is very clear, “if there is no enrichment, there will be no deal.”

However, given political realities some consider it unlikely that even if Iran were to agree to 3.5 per cent enrichment, it would not be “sell-able” in DC. Someone said that Israel will take an official position to demand the cessation of enrichment, as part of a “choreographed” role. However, in reality, most recognize that this is not possible, and they will accept what is possible.

In our discussions many reinforced strongly the position that Iran must stop 20 per cent enrichment, send the stockpiles of 20 per cent enriched uranium out of Iran, and to stop activities in Fordow. Some said the first stage would be to transfer the stockpiles out of the country or “some other sort of arrangement.” (Some noted frustration over the fact this idea was proposed in the Turkish-Brazil deal in 2009/2010. One participant argued the refusal of this deal was most likely due to the US desire for additional sanctions. Others disputed this explanation and said the Turkish-Brazil deal was “a bad deal for a number of reasons” and it is wrong to promote the idea that the US rejected a good deal.)

Someone noted that “enrichment is not the whole story” and the focus on enrichment can be “misleading.” For example, he said, there are questions about the heavy water reactor at Arak and concerns over other military



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dimensions of Iran's programs (including naval reactors, etc.). Concerns over activities at the Parchin site have been raised, especially regarding possible current and past work on a trigger mechanism. If true, this would be "unambiguous" nuclear weapons production activity and a violation of the safeguards and NPT. There was no agreement in Baghdad on whether or not IAEA inspectors would be allowed to visit the site. Iran points out that Parchin is not subject to IAEA safeguards, and it has no legal obligation to allow inspectors there. Someone pointed out that, depending upon the good will of Iran, allowing access to such sites might be a "win" for Iran, but even then the significance would likely be disputed, as many will believe they "probably already cleaned up."

### **Progress of the talks**

The negotiations to date were discussed in general terms. Participants noted there were small efforts at progress that reportedly were appreciated by the Iranian side. For example, steps like sitting at a round table as opposed to across from each other were positive, as it allowed Iranian negotiators to "preserve dignity."

Someone said that Ashton's "diplomatic pirouette" could not cover the fact that negotiations have been weak on substance. The P5+1 have put proposals on the table that include regional issues. They did not want to discuss sanctions in the plenary, and are not prepared to say what they are willing to do. One person said that while "more can and should be put on the table," the P5+1 offers were a "reasonable starting point" and they "merited a response" from Iran. This left a perception, according to one participant, that Iran is "not willing to do a small part."

One participant felt that the approach in Istanbul was "let's talk, and postpone." Some found themselves less optimistic after Istanbul than they had been previously. Between Istanbul and Baghdad there were different approaches. The P5+1 wanted a series of negotiations, not just technical discussions which were promoted by the Iranians. One participant said that the negotiators in Baghdad seemed like "amateurs." There was no clear sense of what was going to happen and the negotiations were almost a failure until the last moment. Some thought it was positive that the talks went a day longer than expected. In Baghdad, the Iranians wanted to add other issues, such as Syria, into discussions. One person said it became clear to all that to reach an understanding some additional issues must be discussed, beyond technical issues of inspection, verification, additional protocol, the NPT, fatwah, etc. Some said Iranians were "not forthcoming" in the negotiations, because they didn't want side discussions. They wanted everything up front. Having the US and Europe together, the Chinese and Russians together, Iran and some Iraqis together "is not the way to organize negotiations," said one participant.

Few seemed to think that the Moscow round, scheduled to take place just after our meeting, would yield any major breakthrough. Many believed, therefore, that full implementation of the sanctions should proceed.

In offering to host the Moscow meeting, one person noted that Russia put itself into a difficult position in which it would take some responsibility for the outcome. Some felt there was a definite prospect that the Moscow negotiations could fail, and if they did fail it might be the last such meeting.

One participant thought it very positive that the Ashton team “stood firm” when Iran threatened, according to this participant, to delay Moscow by requesting additional experts meetings.

Some Israelis thought the questions of how to institutionalize and operationalize the fatwa were promising, and “might be a first” if it could be done. However, they note, “time is of the essence.”

Some believe that as a basic confidence building measure, post-Moscow there may be an effort to allow talks to go on in some form. There are many who are aware of the danger that if Moscow is deemed a failure it might open the door for some to say all options have been tried, leaving just one option on the table.



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### **Pugwash model agreement**

Pugwash prepared a model agreement after wide consultations, which was distributed to the delegations. This model<sup>4</sup> was not distributed in Yad Hashmona, as it was only made public on the first day of the negotiations in Moscow. However, participants were briefed in general terms on some of the main elements, which some thought would leave all sides “moderately satisfied.” These include:

- Recognizing the rights Iran has under the NPT
- Stopping 20 per cent enrichment
- Delaying deployment of centrifuges in Fordow for a certain amount of time (possibly with some other conditions), while for the same period of time delaying the new sanctions measures set to come into effect on 28 June and 1 July
- Swap ready-made fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor
- Some additional arrangements would be made regarding the IAEA and Parchin
- After such agreements, the next step would be to implement the Additional Protocol, progress toward better safeguards, eliminate sanctions, etc.

This model was deemed by many international experts consulted to be feasible. Strengths of the model included the recognition of Iran’s rights, the fact that the old sanctions would still be in place as a bargaining chip for further control of Iran’s nuclear activity, and if the control of HEU is efficient, it removes concerns about further enrichment. It was noted that if Iran were to agree to some additional controls, it would be a “change of attitude” that should not be minimized.

One participant said the Pugwash proposal was focused too much on limiting 20 per cent enrichment, which is “not what the negotiation is about.” According to one participant, “The issue of 20 per cent is not the be all and end all of the effort.” Iran has “serious amounts” of LEU (according to one participant, 200 kilos of LEU

<sup>4</sup> Main points of a possible agreed framework between the I.R. of Iran, the People’s Republic of China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, 17 June 2012. The agreement is provided as an appendix at the end of this report, though it was not made available in Yad Hashmona, as it had not yet been released publicly.

each month). So, this participant said, even if all 20 per cent enriched uranium is removed from Iran, there would still be a “sizable” amount of LEU whose enrichment to weapons grade would not be dramatically longer, and this LEU is increasing each day.

Other proposals also were discussed. One suggestion was to have a multistage process, involving “significant carrots” at the later stages. For example, one participant suggested stage one could include: limit to 20 per cent, transfer stocks to a third party for inspection, suspension or temporary delay of additional sanctions at the end of the month to get to 3-4 per cent. This stage could take a few months, to perhaps get beyond the US elections, and still remove the immediate dangers. Stage two would “go beyond the nuclear issue to human rights and Iran’s efforts to undermined peace.” This would including terrorism (Hezbollah), and would involve “big carrots” at that point. “A regime guarantee could also be on the table,” said this participant.



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One person said that bringing into these discussions other issues might be a “real mistake” and might “give Iran a reason to avoid doing something on nuclear” issues. The forum of these negotiations, this participant thought, would be inadequate to discuss other subjects such as Syria, with the Russians and Chinese and others. However, at this stage, said another participant, it would involve the US only, and in fact the US alone can lead on any final deal on bigger issues.

### “Breaking points”

One participant suggested it is important to understand the “breaking points” on both sides since “nothing can follow in the negotiating field if these fail.” The fact that negotiations have not yet stopped shows “cessation is not something they seek.” Breaking points could be reached by the accumulation of domestic and international pressures on both sides. According to this participant, there have been many processes in the past 20 years in which leadership have “jettisoned” previous policies overnight and took new directions previously considered improbable or impossible. The example of the Iran-Iraq war was noted. Other examples include: 1) Sadat in 1973 at the end of the Yom Kippur war agreed to direct contact between Israel and Egypt at a high military level to begin to create the architecture for a ceasefire, and which led to the peace treaty, and 2) Israeli unilateral disengagement from Gaza in 2003.

If Iran’s primary interest is the perpetuation of the current regime and if this supersedes its interests in a nuclear program then Iran, according to this analysis, is reaching a point where the regime will consider whether its continued policy of resisting pressure on the nuclear issue creates a threat to the regime, either through additional and “more stern” sanctions or even military action either from the US, Israel, or a combination of states. Some believe that at this point Iran will enter into “serious negotiations” for a face saving measure to avoid a depiction of defeat. “Iran will stop short at 20 minutes past midnight,” said one participant. “Their mentality is to do this out of self-preservation.”

The breaking point of the P5+1 is “more complicated,” according to this participant. China, Russia, and France have different breaking points than the US. However, focusing on the US, the question was posed as to what would lead the US to desist and accept an Iranian nuclear capability of one kind or another? The

answers included a serious deterioration of US capacities on an economic or strategic level. Faced with such a situation, this participant said, the US would seek—either alone or in combination—a credible military option to “neuter Iran as a nuclear power for some time.” Such an attack could either unite the Iranians or endanger the regime. The US would “pay a very high price” for this.

### Assessing the possibility and potential impact of use of force

Discussion addressed the threat of a possible military attack. However, other forms of attack were also noted, though not addressed in depth. One participant said that the assassination of Iranian physicists was a “disaster” for relations with Iran. It was noted that Pugwash has posted on its website a letter to the families of those attacked, emphasizing that Pugwash is adamantly against targeted killings.

The recent reports of cyber attacks were mentioned briefly. One person noted that while cyber war may give an illusory immediate advantage, in the long run it will cause more problems for cooperation.

- It was noted that Pugwash is exploring possibilities for holding meetings on the impact of cyber war and the possible need for international agreements.

Some see such attacks more as a way to sabotage relations rather than the nuclear program. Others disagree with criticisms of such tactics.

#### Assessing the possibility of a military attack

Someone noted that many Israelis still believe that “diplomacy is infinitely preferred” to other options. However, there is among most Israelis a firm belief that the threat of military action must be credible, or as one person said, “The military threat has to be there especially if you don’t want to use it.”

Another person said, “August will be the time when both sides have to weigh consideration of the price of failure of negotiations.” If in this current environment no agreement is possible, then some asked, what is next? If there is no agreement, Iran will continue 20 per cent enrichment, more centrifuges in Fordow will be deployed. There will be, some say, motivation for Israel to attack.

Someone pointed out that the media inaccurately has dramatized the debate in Israel as between those who support and those who oppose an attack. They say there is consensus that Israel should attack if all other options are exhausted. One person said he does not remember ever having such a broad consensus in Israel. However, the public wants this done under optimal circumstances, and with the US. The question is how to know if other options are exhausted. One participant said the US will not start this, and they do not like it when Israel tries to twist their arm. The same applies for Europe, said this person.



S BROM (CENTER)

It was noted that Israel is not bound by the negotiations, and if the negotiations “succeed” but are not acceptable to Israel, than Israel may be faced with paying the “high price” of “going it alone.” However, the Israeli leadership today believes such a price is lower than condoning the price of a nuclear capable Iran. Some also believe that the threat of military action is the “primary reason the international community got serious” and that Netanyahu “put the fear of God into the international community.” From this perspective, the threat of an Israeli attack already has been very successful.

One person commented that there is a range of military options available, from precision strikes to “something wider.” Someone noted that the US may be providing intelligence to Israel for an attack, and that the sites would likely be wider and could include attacking the Pasaran, the missile sites, etc. If the US were to be involved, this person noted, there would be a “big war.” Others point out that it is not possible to know what Obama has said “behind closed doors” and it is not possible to know what damage can be done. “How many people really know the intelligence picture,” one participant queried. However, one person said, “No one is talking about an all-out war” and “if Israel acts it will be limited against nuclear sites.” Someone that that if Israel bombs with no casualties it could be “necessary shock” for Iran. Others doubted it is possible to conduct such a strike.

One Israeli said Israel can hit and cause damage, but the question is whether or not this would be effective. Hardware experts claim that Iran can develop a nuclear weapon in 1-5 years and that a military strike would probably gain a few years’ time, but some wonder if a few years’ gain is worth doing. Another person pointed out, however, that this is “not the whole picture” as it would be possible to “continue subversive action” following an attack, and further delaying the project. Some believe that while Iranians might at first rally around the flag, there is a chance that this might spark regime change, but others warn it also might run the risk of leading to another 30 years of conflict. Some were concerned that any possible military strike might create a schism between the Iranian and Israeli people.

One person said Israel is viewed by Iranians as “a mosquito” and the Iranians are not worried about the Israeli threats. Another participant commented it is “fascinating” that the Iranian leadership is not overreacting to and hyping the Israeli statements about a possible military strike.

However, another participant said that beyond the “façade of rhetoric” the Iranians do fear what Israel might do “in coming months.” Iran “expects the worst from Israel” and knows that Israel will not concede. Deputy PM Ya’alon’s statements were made to deal with these fears, “not to allay them.” Someone noted there has been a 20-year-old clandestine war, which is largely unreported at the request of both parties, and the Iranians have seen what might be done in various areas. Someone said “this is an eye-to-eye confrontation” and it is reaching the “most serious level of confrontation.” “The threshold is nearing where a quick deterioration to war is underway.” One participant said that Iran is not preparing itself.

Some think the “bomb or be bombed” dichotomy for Israel is a false one, since even if Israel does not bomb, if someone else does, Israel will still be blamed.

Some think that Iran would hit Israel hard in response, “more than some people portray,” though this might not happen right away. However, the argument goes, Israeli society could absorb losses if needed, and one person said to put it in perspective, it would be fewer than were killed in 1967 or in the Yom Kippur war, and the nation has as many as 450 killed on the highways each year. The war with Syria and Hezbollah are 10 times or 100 fold worse than any such conflict with Iran would be, but still Israel did it, said one participant. Others say that it is “not convincing” that Iran would retaliate with a counter attack.

However the sense there may be a war involving the US does obviously concerns the Iranians. As one participant said, Iran has no intention of getting into a serious conflict with the US because they are “not stupid.”

Some caution strongly against a military attack on Iran, as this could be a setback to any movement toward political change in that country. There is in Iran a fraction of people who see war as an opportunity, especially given the perception that the US roles in Afghanistan and Iraq are a disaster. If there is a military attack, some are concerned that the right wing in Iran may use the opportunity to seize power or at least to influence more control. One participant raised concern, for example, about the role of Gen. Soleimani (head of the Revolutionary Guards) and the Basiji in such a situation.

Some believe such a military attack “should be averted at any cost.” They urge pressure should be placed on Israel to avoid any unilateral action. “Misunderstanding is always the beginning of war,” said one participant, and “all wars are silly since as soon as people enter wars they want to get out as soon as possible.” “When you start a war,” this participant warned, “you don’t know where it ends.” In fact, it can become a self-fulfilling prophecy by creating a “national psychosis.” “If you keep speaking about war, that is what you will get.” Whether or not a military attack could be deemed successful depends on a lot of factors. The “mess” the US has made in Iraq and Afghanistan is a “big gift” to Iran, said this participant, who pointed out that such a mess in Iran would be “a different story.”

Another participant said that while wars such as that in Libya (where the US found itself without enough bombs for more than 2 weeks) led to “total chaos,” this Israeli government “is not silly.” Israel and Iran have been at war for 20 years, and this has been carried out on Israeli territory, said this participant. He said this is “not just rhetoric” as Israel has “daily conflict” with Iran on the ground, via weaponry supplied to Gaza (where thousands of advanced rockets bear Iranian insignia), via Sudan, and to the Palestinian Authority.

Others expressed dissatisfaction that some “seem more worried about the possibility of an Israeli attack than Iran’s nuclear program.” However, another participant pointed out that in this case there are other ways to achieve the goal of stopping the process of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons.

Another participant urged people to keep separate moral arguments from cost-benefit analyses. This person said that there is not enough information in the public domain about either Iran’s capabilities or operational information about a possible Israel attack, to make a proper cost-benefit analysis.

Some believe that the Israeli Defense Minister Barak is driven by strategic thinking not emotions. An Israeli military strike should have a wide international legitimacy, including high level military cooperation with the US. Realistically, a recent INSS conclusion was that a strike cannot take place in 2012.

A few participants commented that there is little likelihood of an attack over the summer, and that it would be difficult for Israel to attack while negotiations are underway, or perhaps before the US elections.

### **Worst-case scenarios**

There is a dilemma of brinkmanship occurring in some of the discussions. On the one side, some believe firmly that the “ABCs of deterrence” require that all threats must be credible, and that if states or people even hint that some action might lead to a



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“disaster” of some sort it will “weaken the deal.” Others felt that it is imperative that these sorts of concerns are voiced now and addressed, before things spiral out of control and the region ends up in a deepening crisis.

Some are concerned that if Iran is under extreme economic, military or political pressure from others, including Israel, it might decide to withdraw from the NPT. There is “no way,” according to one participant, that Iran would stay in the NPT following a military attack. The potential impact this might have on others in the region is “an open question.” Any prospects for a possible WMD-Free Zone in the region would disappear. Others might decide that the NPT is against their interests. One participant, however, said it would be “okay” if Iran were to leave the NPT, as it has “no intrinsic value.” Others strongly objected to this, and said that if the NPT collapses or cracks seriously “the environment will be intractable.” While the NPT is imperfect, this person said, you don’t want the Arabs, Brazil, Argentina or others out of the NPT.

While there are some rumors that countries like Saudi Arabia and Qatar may support Israel in an attack, one participant said, “no one in the Arab world will say ‘bravo’ to Israel,” including those who might be expressing support to Israel now. Others say that while “no Arab government will applaud” an Israeli military attack, and they will be severe in response, they will whisper “well done!” Some, like the Saudis, will be “thrilled,” said another participant. However, another person said even if this is true, it will be of little political advantage to Israel. Someone said, “You don’t need to keep the fat cats in Saudi Arabia happy.” “Being softer altogether would be better.”

The WMD-Free Zone conference will be called off, and Israel’s attempt to maintain a nuclear monopoly in the region “will not be taken well.” Iran can be expected to play the role of a great victim. One participant said it doesn’t matter if the WMD-Free Zone conference doesn’t happen, as it is a “pipe dream.” (See below for an in-depth discussion of prospects for the 2012 WMD-Free Zone conference.)

Some raised concerns that if Israel attacks Iran and has over flights over some key countries like Saudi Arabia, with or without consensus, this may further increase tensions.

The question was raised as to whether or not it would be possible to have a situation of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) between Israel and Iran. Someone said that if both sides are nuclear powers, then the possibility of war is higher than during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Kennedy, it was pointed out, could have won a nuclear war but “would have been left with the taste of ash in his mouth.” Communication was the only way this was avoided.

Others believe that one should consider, at least theoretically, the idea that Iran might become a nuclear weapons state or nuclear capable. *If it does become a military nuclear power, some believe it is essential that direct contact should be established between Iranian and Israeli security authorities. One participant said if this is not done now, before Iran develops nuclear weapons, the chances of an Israeli-Iranian nuclear war are unacceptably high.*

Another participant said he does not believe that even if Iran achieves military nuclear capability that this would mean “the countdown for the destruction of the State of Israel.” However, Israel “will not live with this,” and an escalation in the region will spiral out of control and “all will take nuclear cover.” The Saudis, according to one participant, helped to finance the Pakistani nuclear program and already have an agreement with Pakistan who will supply them with a nuclear kit. (Others argue that the suspicion that Israel has nuclear weapons did not cause this type of proliferation.) However, some thought it would be useful to help Iran to understand that if it does acquire nuclear weapons it will not have hegemony, and asked how Iran might feel if Libya, Syria, and other countries had nuclear weapons?

If the US were to get entangled in some way or another, one person pointed out, this could create an intractable area from Pakistan to Egypt, which would be “a big mess” for which there is no appetite in DC. In fact, one person said, people at the Pentagon privately have said the “biggest threat to the US is Israel” for these sorts of reasons. Others say that “once you begin eating, the appetite comes with it.”

Someone cautioned against making too many assumptions as to where the “international community” would sit on these issues, and noted that India, for example, might support Iran. Countries in the Gulf would consider their well-being compromised, with possible economic and environmental disruptions. The Strait of Hormuz could become a problem. Oil prices would rise.

*If attacked, some believed strongly, Iran would likely pursue nuclear weapons without any doubt, making the entire plan of attack counterproductive.*

### Prospects for a Middle East WMD-Free Zone

Participants discussed the prospects for the proposed 2012 conference on a WMD-Free Zone in the Middle East, including questions such as the likelihood of the conference taking place and how Israel, as a non-NPT member, might fit into this framework that grew out of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and the 2010 Review Conference. One person framed the question in the following way: While recognizing the creation of a zone is “not attainable in the foreseeable future,” does talking about it produce some sort of necessary result, and what is that necessary result that would make talking about it worthwhile?

Some thought it important to note that if this conference takes place, “it won’t be the final word on the subject,” but that it might most importantly start a process where states in the Middle East could discuss how to approach control and elimination of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in the region. Someone said that while the path to an eventual zone may be unclear, there is an urgent need on all sides to give a signal that such a path can be discussed, and initial steps explored.

There is a concern among Israelis that there is no precedent for this concept of a zone free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles. It was pointed out that such a zone doesn’t even doesn’t exist in Europe, while people are promoting this far-reaching concept in the Middle East, the “breeding ground for every security problem the world has known.”

It was noted that Israel has not officially adopted a position either for or against the idea, and considers the idea still in a stage of development. Israel is “trying to take a measured approach, but can’t ignore very major problems.” One participant noted, the easiest route for Israel would be to “blow it out of the water,” but they are not doing that and they are still looking at things.

One participant said the selection of a Finnish facilitator was a good step, since one of the flaws of the ACRS process was that it was chaired by the US. The meeting is to be convened by the UN Secretary General with the three NPT depositary



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states (Russia, US, UK). However, one participant felt the conveners (and in particular the US) have not been exercising full political muscle on this project, and they have given it to the facilitator to “let him break his head.” Someone pointed out that having a Finnish facilitator “doesn’t reduce the responsibility of states to reach out and make this a conference that is comfortable for all to take part in.” Israeli officials have met the facilitator 3-4 times.

### **Concept and framework**

Israel has concerns on the conceptual basis of the proposed conference. A “key question” is whether the idea is “able to absorb Israeli input as a basis for the meeting.” Israelis are not sure of this. Some are concerned that the objective of the meeting could doom it to failure.

There is a “major gap” between the Arabs and the Israelis and perhaps Iran on the concept/framework. Israel was not involved in the conception of the conference. The terms of reference is the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference agenda and it does not include discussion of regional security issues. Some wondered if the conference will address issues related to compliance, the breach of the NPT, chemical weapons issues, the missile threat from Syria, Iran, Gaza, Hezbollah, and conventional methods.

There is a belief in Israel that if the parties were serious about this proposal, they would not have gone through the NPT process, “the most problematic portal.” The conference will be “heavily flavored by these roots.” Someone said for Israel to participate would be a “very real policy shift for Israel.” If the concept has already been agreed, then some are “not very optimistic the exercise will happen.” Someone said, you cannot convene a meeting touching on national security and say “this is what we have decided and you have to accept...The Ten Commandments were a one-shot deal.” “No country takes a chance on issues related to national security,” especially when the area is shifting in so many ways. The roots of the 2012 conference, in which Israel was not a party to the discussions, was contrasted with a recent meeting in Brussels, where Israel was included in the planning, “a very key factor for Israel.”

One participant pointed out that Israel is not a member of the NPT for “significant reasons,” because they have a “different view.” It was also noted that the conference must have a focus on WMD and not just nuclear weapons or it would be very difficult for Israel to attend.

One person thought it is most important for states to agree that the logic of arms control would be applied and implemented in the discussions. From this perspective, it is important (as in ACRS) to focus on inter-state relations, and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs). If this is the logic, this participant said, then there is “a lot of room” for being creative and thinking about CSBMs, but if the meeting focuses on WMD alone, “it will be non-starter.”

Others thought that while it is important to use the mandate as a starting point, it can launch a wider process that could be better defined to the interests of all parties in the region, including Israel. The mandate does not include regional security issues, but Israel could raise what it wants to at the meeting. Some felt it would be very important if Israel were to attend—to “take a chance” and use this as an opportunity to express its own concerns, and to use the opportunity to communicate with Iranians in a subtle way. Someone else wondered if the facilitator would be able to “stop on the spot” any attempt to widen discussions at this meeting which might take an anti-Israeli tone.

- Pugwash will continue to maintain communication with all actors on this issue.

## Timing

Israel has some concerns regarding timing of the conference. 2012 was chosen without consultation with Israel and given events of the Arab Spring, the timing is “very highly questionable” since some of the major players, such as Egypt and Syria, appear unable to focus on this issue.

The question arose as to whether or not the conference can be postponed. Some said it can be, if the facilitator fixes a date. However, one participant said the facilitator was “very careful” in the wording of his report to the NPT PrepCom in Vienna in May 2012. The facilitator said, “Finland as the host government has announced that it is prepared to arrange the conference in Helsinki any time during 2012. The month of December has frequently been mentioned in consultations as a possibility and logistical planning is therefore underway accordingly.”<sup>5</sup>

A participant noted that we already are in the middle of June. For the rest of the year, it is likely that Iran will continue to dominate the international agenda. The uncertainty of whether or not negotiations will proceed and the broader implications of any possible breakdown of talks will impact how Israel views the wider developments.

Some are concerned that it could backfire on Israel if it seeks to exert pressure to not convene the conference. It could undermine Israel’s efforts to promote a general climate for regional security.

## Attendance

Questions about attendance at the conference were discussed. There is a strong emphasis that all players must attend. While this would be the best case scenario, some raised the possibility of allowing the conference to proceed even if some seats are empty. This puts the onus in terms of public opinion on any country that does not attend.

Some wondered what the impact would be if Israel decided not to attend. One person asked if it would be “suicide” for Israel to attend since the current atmosphere is so hostile to Israel, especially on the issue of Palestine.

Others wondered if this is a theoretical debate, since there is no clear government in Egypt, Libya, and Syria. One participant pointed out that it is not at all certain that all would even want Syria at the table, for example.

On the question of whether or not Iran is likely to attend the conference, someone said there have been some “significant positive answers” on their side “in the framework of a cloud of non-official discussions” and that the facilitator “has heard” these sorts of indications. While this is not fully reassuring, there have not been any negative answers. Someone suggested that it is best to proceed on this gently since if a big emphasis is put on this, it will “create antibodies.” Another person said that Iran will come if it is sponsored by the UN. One Israeli participant said they are “not at all sure how Iran sees the conference.” It might be possible to increase information from the Iran side on this point.



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<sup>5</sup> Report of the Facilitator to the First Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference to the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 8 May 2012, NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/11. [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/11](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/11)

Someone pointed out a perhaps obvious point: if there is any military attack on Iran, they certainly will not attend, and the conference is not likely to happen.

One participant said that it is important to take into account the risk of failure. To have the conference take place and fail “could cause damage at this particular time.”

### **Possible CBMs**

Some promote a gradual and step-by-step approach, with a mix of political, security, and arms control measures. One participant noted that confidence-building measures that Israel could possibly consider gradually in the future include:

- Adoption of a no-first use doctrine for WMD or nuclear weapons, possibly as a regional NFU treaty;
- If an FMCT treaty is accepted, then Israel should consider the idea of a regional FMCT;
- Ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty;
- Ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Some pointed out that sometimes discussing the issues of disarmament can help create a better environment. This was proven during the Cold War.

### **Toward an ACRS-Plus?**

Some felt the 2012 conference could draw lessons from the ACRS experience, which many thought was very important. Born from the Madrid process, countries of the region “felt ownership” of the process and it reflected the involvement of countries of the region, not “extraneous” actors.

This might be very useful since at the moment, it was noted, there is a lack of a comprehensive security dialogue in the Middle East. Some felt it could be “very positive” or “superb” if the 2012 conference could be broadened to include a wider agenda including political factors, and begin this dialogue (someone referred to it as a possible “comprehensive ACRS”).

One participant pointed out that from the Arab perspective, they are interested in the meeting as mandated by the 2010 NPT Review Conference. However, they also see the conference is “not the end of the story” and would want the conference to start a dialogue that begins with the conference, but which could discuss more complex regional security issues. Someone else said, “If the Arabs want to talk to us, they don’t need to go to New York City, they know our phone number.” This person pointed out that “Middle East breakthroughs happen outside the UN.”

- It was suggested if they wanted to meet directly, the League of Arab States could convene a meeting of regional states on regional issues.

Some felt if the conference were to address a broader “regional security dialogue” it would be “useless” unless it were a “fully inclusive process” and that failure to invite Iran, Libya and Iraq to the ACRS meetings, for example, was very important. Others say it is very difficult to envision a regional dialogue that involves Israel, Arabs, and Iran at this time. However, one person said, “Don’t minimize a wider Arab-Israeli dialogue.” Some say Israel is already trying to encourage dialogue “beyond bilateral” on a regional or sub regional basis (see below).

One participant suggested another lesson of ACRS might be to break discussions into sub regions, with different sets for different issues. This person felt it is important to separate this process from the peace process, and to provide the opportunity for those Arab states that are willing to talk to Israel to have a forum.

- It was suggested that Pugwash might convene meetings on a regional security dialogue, providing space for some initial difficult discussions to take place in a creative atmosphere.

## Toward direct talks?

### With Arabs

One person said it was important to not forget positive trends. He sees a wider possibility for discussions with the Arabs than has existed to now and this can be encouraged. Despite the regional circumstances, there is emerging “a more interesting common denominator in discussion with moderate Arabs” and a “greater coincidence of interests” on a wide range of issues, including, Iran, Syria, the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, Hezbollah, the role of Turkey, etc.

- How such meetings between Arabs and Israelis could take place, and in what context (whether bilateral or not) could be explored.

### With Iran

Someone pointed out that while direct talks between Israelis and Iranians might be a goal, it is a delicate matter. One person noted that there is a concern that an Iranian who negotiates with Israel might be considered a “traitor.” This person said once Hamas and Islamic Jihad recognize Israel, then Iran “would have no choice,” but this person believes this is unlikely to happen for a long time.

On the Iranian side, they have what one person termed “an ideological block” against having direct talks with Israel, and this may obstruct their perception of the need to talk. It might mean that they will take longer to detect such a need than perhaps the Soviet Union did at times of pending crisis during the Cold War. This participant warned, therefore, that it might be imperative to seek out other ways for Iranians and Israelis to engage with each other that are not direct talks, either through a forum like the 2012 conference, or perhaps through increased engagement between Iran and the Arab League. Someone else noted that ideology can change quickly when faced with crisis, as for example during the Iran-Iraq war when Khomeini changed policy after learning that Iraq had missiles capable of attacking Tehran and decided he would talk to Saddam. “When it is in their interest to talk with us,” said one Israeli participant, “they will find a reason.” Another person said it is important to show Iran that “dialogue is good for its national interests.” One leading Israeli participant emphasized that he has publicly reinforced the idea that Israel-Iran dialogue is vital to Israel and should include restricting military and security presence to national boundaries.<sup>6</sup>

There have been some recent quiet contacts between Israelis and Iranians after years of Iranian refusal to talk. Some believe Iranians came because they are worried they might yet find themselves in a worse position than they are today. Sanctions, from this perspective, have had an effect. Through these exchanges it was clarified that the nuclear crisis is “at the core of distrust,” there are bilateral issues that can be addressed and a “comprehensive political agreement is vital.”

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<sup>6</sup> See for example, comment from Efraim Halevy, 12 June 2012, [http://www.pugwash.org/reports/rc/me/Dhanapala\\_comment\\_2012/Halevy\\_comment.htm](http://www.pugwash.org/reports/rc/me/Dhanapala_comment_2012/Halevy_comment.htm)

Some felt that an Iran-Israel dialogue is not now “in the cards” but it may come in another time. There have been indications that some on the Iranian side might favor contact with Israel, but the domestic political cost for anyone to take a courageous stance on this may be too high at this time.

It was noted that the 2012 conference would provide a good occasion to have interaction and dialogue, and the meeting might “induce an environment” where communication is happening. Some felt that in the short and medium term, this might be the only way face-to-face discussions can happen.

Another participant said that dialogue between Iran and Israel will happen when it is in the vital national security interest of both parties. This may, for example, become necessary if the negotiations break down, and Iran begins to fear “justly” that a preemptive strike could become a reality. In that case Iran might find it necessary to evolve a channel to “avoid catastrophe.” Someone thought such a channel might have a “better chance” to work as opposed to using the 2012 conference, especially if the probable timetable of an Israeli strike might be in the months to come.

The role of civil society was touched on briefly. For example, one participant noted the success Project Sesame has had in bringing together scientists from all countries in the region, and suggest that Pugwash continue to seek to engage scientists from the region in meetings. However, events such as the attacks on Iranian scientists mean that some countries are less inclined to involve their scientists in such meetings.

Someone noted there are relevant international people willing to develop a second track, and are ready to go to Tehran or another location, but such initiatives are on “very shaky ground.” Iran sees official negotiations are “getting nowhere” and this is making them less inclined than in the past to talk to non-officials.

## Conclusion

The meeting in Yad Hashmona demonstrated there are continuing deep and serious concerns in Israel as to the nature of the threat posed to Israel by the Iranian nuclear program, and this unease is further complicated by the massive changes underway in the region. It is unclear whether the sorts of possible negotiated agreements under discussion could allay Israeli concerns. There are strong voices in Israel promoting a brinkmanship policy in the belief that continued heavy pressure and unyielding threats of possible military action will eventually bring Iran to serious concessions. Others fundamentally disagree that this pressure will work as intended, and fear the current situation is creating the possibility of a disastrous outcome. The planning and timing for the proposed 2012 conference on a WMD-Free Zone in the Middle East, falling as it does during this time of uncertainty, leads most in Israel to remain highly skeptical, though officially Israel has not yet committed one way or the other. In this highly tense time period there are influential voices urging the necessity of some direct communication, especially if should things worsen.

## APPENDIX A

### PARTICIPANT LIST

**Dr. Ephraim Asculai**, Senior Research Associate, The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), Tel Aviv

**Prof. Amazia Baram**, Professor Emeritus in the Department of Middle East History, and Director of the Center for Iraq Studies at the University of Haifa; former Fellow, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, US Institute of Peace, the Washington Institute, and the Brookings Institute

**Dr. Eitan Barak**, Lecturer, The Department of International Relations, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, **Israel**; Adjunct Lecturer, The Faculty of Law, Tel-Aviv University

**Mr. Avishay Braverman MK**, Labor Party Member of the Knesset, and former Minister of Minorities

**Gen. (ret.) Shlomo Brom**, Senior Research Associate, Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), Tel Aviv, **Israel** [formerly: Deputy for Security Policy of the National Security Advisor (in the National Security Council); Director of Strategic Planning in the Planning Branch of the IDF GHQ]

**Mrs. Sandra Ionno Butcher**, Senior Program Coordinator, International Secretariat, Pugwash Conferences, UK; Director, Pugwash History Project; Honorary Research Associate, Science and Technology Studies Department, University College London [formerly: Joint Executive Secretary, British Pugwash Group; Executive Director, Student Pugwash USA; Interim Research Director and Senior Analyst, British American Security Information Council]

**Prof. Paolo Cotta-Ramusino**, Secretary-General, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs; Member, Pugwash Executive Committee; Professor of Mathematical Physics, University of Milan, **Italy** [formerly: Secretary General, Union of Italian Scientists for Disarmament (USPID); Director, Program on Disarmament and International Security, Landau Network – Centro Volta, Como, Italy]

**Amb. David Danieli**, Deputy Director General (Policy), Israel Atomic Energy Commission [formerly: Ambassador of Israel to India]

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**Dr. Chuck Freilich**, Senior Fellow, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA; Professor, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, **Israel** [formerly: Deputy National Security Adviser, **Israel**]

**Prof. Galia Golan-Gild** PhD, Professor of Government and Chair, Program on Diplomacy and Conflict Studies, Interdisciplinary Center (IDC), Herzliya, **Israel**; Professor Emerita, Department of Political Science, Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Member, Pugwash Council [formerly: Darwin Professor of Soviet and East European Studies; Chair, Department of Political Science, Hebrew University of Jerusalem]

**Mr. Efraim Halevy**, former Director of Mossad, Tel Aviv, Israel

**Mr. Bernard Hourcade**, Senior Research Fellow (Emeritus) CNRS, Paris; (Until 30 June 2012) Public Policy Scholar, Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, DC

**Ambassador Jeremy Issacharoff**, Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem [formerly: Deputy Chief of Mission - Israel Embassy in Washington DC and Member of UN Secretary General Advisory Board for Disarmament Affairs]

**Dr. Peter Jones**, Member, Pugwash Council, and Associate Professor, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa, Ontario, Canada [formerly: Senior Policy Advisor, Security and Intelligence Secretariat, Privy Council Office, Ottawa (The Prime Minister's Department); Project Leader, Middle East Project, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI); Desk Officer, Arms Control and Disarmament Division Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Ottawa]

**Mr. David Landau**, former Editor-in-Chief of *Haaretz* (2004-2008); Political analyst and commentator; Correspondent for the *Economist*

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APPENDIX B

Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs  
Nobel Peace Prize 1995

MAIN POINTS OF A POSSIBLE AGREED FRAMEWORK BETWEEN  
THE I.R. OF IRAN, THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA, FRANCE, GERMANY,  
RUSSIA, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES

[INFORMAL PROPOSAL FOR AN AGREEMENT  
FOR THE NEXT ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS IN MOSCOW]<sup>7</sup>

17 June 2012

1. The I.R. of Iran assures that the nuclear activities inside Iran are aimed exclusively at the exploitation of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The other parties take notice of this declaration by the I.R. of Iran and welcome it.
2. All the parties reiterate the validity of the NPT in all its parts. Particularly the principle of non-proliferation, the principle of nuclear disarmament and the principle of cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. All parties reaffirm the right of State Parties to the NPT to develop peaceful nuclear activities, in keeping with the non-proliferation and safeguards principles of the NPT. In this framework it is understood that the I.R. of Iran has the right to develop and use techniques for uranium enrichment and other nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes as well as its responsibilities in promoting the goals of the NPT and in respecting all its obligations.
3. All the parties affirm that the IAEA is the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in accordance with the Statute of IAEA and the IAEA safeguards system, the compliance with the NPT safeguards agreements of NPT State Parties, undertaken in fulfillment of their obligations under article III, paragraph 1, of the NPT to verify the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. All the parties reaffirm that nothing should be done to undermine the authority of IAEA in this regard.
4. All parties agree that the IAEA Model Additional Protocol of 1997 is a fundamental tool to promote the effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards and thus to provide assurance of absence of undeclared nuclear activities and material. The parties acknowledge that the I.R. of Iran has signed an additional protocol in 2003. Pending ratification by the Majlis of the I.R. of Iran, the Government of Iran is committing itself to implement the additional protocol and to facilitate the ratification by the Majlis as part of a final agreement with the other countries that will include the removal of all the sanctions and the normalization of relations.

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<sup>7</sup> This model agreement was distributed to delegations prior to the Moscow round of negotiations, and was made public on 17 June 2012. Participants in the Yad Hashmona workshop were briefed on the main elements of the model, but did not receive the full text. It is provided here for information, since it has subsequently been released into the public domain.

5. According to what stated by the I.R. of Iran, the nuclear activities of the I.R. of Iran are exclusively aimed at the production of electricity in nuclear power plants, at producing isotopes for medical purposes and at developing scientific research. The parties acknowledge the positive role of international cooperation in the field of nuclear activities and will work for creating in the future an environment where this international cooperation will be possible among all the parties of this agreed framework.
6. The parties agree to cooperate in guaranteeing the safety and security and the integrity of the nuclear facilities inside the I.R. of Iran.
7. The parties agree to cooperate in the field of preventing illegal nuclear activities, theft of nuclear material and in developing jointly measures to strengthen the protection of nuclear material through the implementation of the IAEA Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) as amended, of the relevant Resolutions of the UN and other similar measures and in the spirit of strengthening the NPT. The parties also agree to facilitate the exchange of scientists and other technical personnel in order to cooperate more effectively in the fight against nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism and to work to remove the obstacles that may prevent such exchange.
8. The I.R. of Iran agrees to extend its full cooperation to the IAEA, by furnishing all the necessary information about the totality of its nuclear activities strictly following the existing safeguards agreement between the I.R. of Iran and the IAEA (INFCIRC/214 of 13 December 1974) and related safeguards strengthening measures [(such as the implementation of modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to Iran's Safeguards Agreement on the early provision of design information)] and respecting the confidence building measures as specified below.
9. This agreed framework has to be respected in full by all parties. A violation of any of its parts will render the entire agreed framework null and void and the country responsible for the violation will be held responsible in front of the international community.
10. As confidence building measures and in order to progress towards a final agreement, the parties agree to the immediate steps described below. All the parties will suspend for a period of 6 month [1 year]<sup>8</sup> the sanctions against the I.R. of Iran *whose full implementation is due* after the date of June 18<sup>th</sup>, 2012<sup>9,10</sup>. If the suspension of the above sanctions will begin at a certain date, the I.R. of Iran will suspend at *the same date* and for the *same period of time*, the enrichment of Uranium above the 5% limit, [the deployment of new centrifuges in the Fordow facility,] the construction of new enrichment facilities and will refrain from any reprocessing of plutonium. Furthermore the I.R. of Iran will agree to swap the 20% enriched Uranium it has already produced with equivalent amount of ready- made fuel for its research reactors, as soon as this fuel will be available.

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<sup>8</sup> Square brackets denote alternative provisions or optional provisions.

<sup>9</sup> It will be equivalent to a suspension of say 240 days, the waiving of the implementation of a certain law mandating sanctions for two consecutive periods of 120 days. After the first period of 120 days, the authority that has issued the waiver may request the verification of the implementation status of the present agreed framework.

<sup>10</sup> The sanctions that are referred to include, among others, the US Public Law n. 112-081 of Dec 31<sup>st</sup> 2011 (H.R 1540) and the E.U. Council Decision 2012/35/CFSP ( January 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2012 ) and E.U. Council regulations no 267/2012 of March, 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2012.

11. Furthermore with immediate effects the parties of this agreed framework agree to drop all the limitations that affect the availability of spare parts and fuel for civilian aircrafts inside the I.R. of Iran.
12. Finally, in order to dispel the concern of possible military dimensions of the Iranian nuclear activities, the I.R. of Iran will agree with the IAEA on modalities for managed access to the non-nuclear-sites and facilities not covered by the IAEA safeguards, as determined jointly by the IAEA and the I.R. of Iran. This commitment on the side of the I.R. of Iran will entry into force on the same date and for the same period of time as specified in art. 10. It is understood that the IAEA will provide strict assurances to the I.R. of Iran on maintaining confidentiality regarding all information about Iran nuclear and non-nuclear activities.
13. The parties agree to work for a final solution of the present controversy about the nuclear activities of the I.R. of Iran that will include inter alia the total elimination of the sanctions against the I.R. of Iran and the full monitoring of all the nuclear activities in Iran by the IAEA, including the implementation of a model additional protocol.