Composite Report

Pugwash India-Pakistan Independent Commission
Dubai Meeting and Delhi Consultations

Pugwash Project on South Asia Dialogue
Dubai 26-27 February 2011 and Delhi 1-2 March 2011
Second Meeting of the
Pugwash India-Pakistan
Independent Commission

Dubai, 26-27 February 2011

Summary

The Pugwash India-Pakistan Independent Commission welcomed the decision taken by the
governments at Thimphu, Bhutan to resume dialogue. They discussed a range of suggestions for
ways to ensure that dialogue moves forward in a manner that emphasizes areas of commonality.\footnote{The second meeting of the Pugwash India-Pakistan Independent Commission met 26-27 February 2011 in
Dubai. The group included three former foreign secretaries, four Members of Parliament, two former
intelligence chiefs, senior retired military, leading voices from media, and renowned experts. This summary
should not be read as a consensus document. More detailed information can be found in the full report.}
The following points are not prioritized, nor do they necessarily reflect complete consensus.

Modalities for dialogue:
- The dialogue should be translucent, if not fully transparent.
- Emphasizing the concept of a ‘framework’ versus a ‘solution’ might help.
- Media statements should emphasize cooperation rather than confrontation.
- ‘Talks about talks’ can go far to creating the proper climate.
- A single cabinet level interlocutor might be appointed on each side.
- Establishing a fixed and unchangeable schedule for talks (possibly via a treaty framework) might
  be useful.
- Care should be given to the method of establishing the agenda (suggestions were put forward).
- Indian Prime Minister Singh’s visit to Islamabad should be concretized.
- A bold summit statement could create a counter-narrative and address the confidence deficit.
- Where agreement is possible, those agreements should formalized.
- Consolidation of progress made in prior discussions might be useful.
- In areas where agreement already exists, these should be formalized.
- Resumption of dialogue on Kashmir in both front and back channels should be prioritized.
- Areas of common interest in Afghanistan should be emphasized.

Possible items for consideration by the Home Secretaries meeting in March
- Exchange of legal/judicial expertise and the increase of mutual legal assistance.
- Intelligence interactions at the highest levels.
- Meetings of military leaders at the highest levels.
- Relaxation of the visa regime on an urgent basis.
- Strengthening joint anti-terrorism mechanisms.
- Demonstration of joint commitment to independent information and new media.

The importance of looking toward the new generation was emphasized. The Jasmine Revolution and
its continuing aftermath prove it is crucial to look for new areas of possible commonality that will
resonate with the younger populations and engage in a positive manner future leaders on both sides.

Participants noted the centenary of the poet Faiz, who wrote, “At a time of dire emergency,
helplessness is as reprehensible as blind passion and to lose either courage or reason is criminal.”
Given the catastrophic potential implications of another major terrorist attack, Commission members
urged governments to emphasize areas of convergence—or in other words, promoting some
significant common denominator.”

In side meetings in Delhi, exciting plans progressed for establishment of an interparliamentary group.
Overview

The second meeting of the Pugwash India-Pakistan Independent Commission met 26-27 February 2011 in Dubai. The group included three former foreign secretaries, four Members of Parliament, two former intelligence chiefs, senior retired military, leading voices from the media, and renowned experts.² This current report should be read in context with the report of the first meeting of the Commission in July 2010, as the issues highlighted there are equally relevant and remain of concern to the Commission.³

Participants welcomed the decision taken recently by the two governments at Thimphu (Bhutan) to resume dialogue. In particular, participants welcomed the fact that instead of a continuing stumbling block on the way to dialogue, questions and issues related to terrorism are now incorporated into the dialogue. They noted, however, that many questions remain as to what that dialogue should be and how it should be conducted.

The Pugwash Commission sought to highlight an array of recommendations on how to support that process. Without diminishing the seriousness of the well-known areas of contradiction that still remain, the main focus of discussion was on areas for possible continued forward movement. This report reflects that prioritization.

Participants shared the conviction that there is a grave need to get beyond talks which do not yield concrete results, toward implementation of some steps that emphasize convergence. It was suggested that emphasizing the concept of a ‘framework’ versus a ‘solution’ might help.

The Commission focused on two practical areas and noted some substantive topics for further consideration:

- Possible modalities for future talks.
- Specific suggestions for the planned March meeting of the Home (Interior) Ministers, which is charged with the very important task of progressing the dialogue.
- Other issues that need further attention: terrorism, Afghanistan, the role of outside (especially US) influence in the region, and strengthening civil society.

Discussion highlighted a need to create a counter-narrative to continuing conflict. One participant compared it to the weather and climate. While weather is influenced by events of the day (is it sunny, rainy, etc), the longer-term trends give the climactic outlook. In this respect there is room for great hope for relations between the two countries, as the two peoples do not perceive each other as

² The meeting was held according to traditional Pugwash/Chatham House rules to enable an open exchange of perspectives and exploration of creative possibilities for ways forward. Thus, the substance of the discussions can be reported out, but no item discussed can be attributed to any one individual. There was no attempt to seek consensus, and in fact the sharing of diverse views was encouraged. The rapporteur for this report was Sandra Ionno Butcher, Senior Program Coordinator, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs. Email: sibutcher@earthlink.net. The Pugwash Project on South Asia Dialogue is made possible through contributions by the Ploughshares Fund, USIP, and the US Department of State.

³ The report from the first meeting is available online at: [http://www.pugwash.org/Pugwash_PIPIC_Islamabad_FullRept_FINAL.pdf](http://www.pugwash.org/Pugwash_PIPIC_Islamabad_FullRept_FINAL.pdf)
enemies (one Pakistani said he has never encountered a rickshaw driver in Delhi with any animosity toward Pakistan). Dialogue (including in the media, public forums, and parliaments) is key to holding the middle ground, and to shifting the narrative.

Participants noted the centenary of the poet Faiz, who wrote, “At a time of dire emergency, helplessness is as reprehensible as blind passion and to lose either courage or reason is criminal.”

1. Modalities for Dialogue

While some noted the limitations of summits given the constraints of electoral cycles, there was hope that the possibility of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Islamabad will be concretized. If this meeting takes place in 2011, this would be an important new step after the resumption of dialogue.

Consideration of a bold statement such as “India and Pakistan will not go to war” would be an important step toward creating a counter-narrative and addressing the confidence deficit.

Modest steps will perhaps be the most important and ‘talks about talks’ can go far to creating the proper climate. As there is currently an absence of a counter-narrative to perceived ‘conflict’ between the two countries, it is essential to promote some significant common denominator.

A single cabinet level interlocutor could be appointed by each side, although some participants highlighted some limitations with this approach. Benefits include more efficient ability to balance ‘trade-offs’ across issue areas. Advisors could change as subjects change, but the central continuity is maintained.

A mutually agreed venue inside India and Pakistan must be found.

Frequency

As one participant emphasized, there is no substitute for “uninterrupted and uninterruptable” dialogue between the two countries, or as someone else said, “Dialogue must endure a crisis.” Lessons could be drawn from the precedent of the Vietnam talks in 1968-1973, where there was a fixed and unchangeable schedule for talks (each week at first). Establishing such a periodicity that is fixed removes uncertainty or sporadicism about getting together.

As such meetings now occur as a political decision, one option floated was the idea of establishing a treaty framework for discussions, i.e. a treaty benchmark that notes meetings will be held at x level x times a year. The forthcoming ministerial session could give consideration to having a legally binding framework.

Some others expressed doubt over the practicality of ‘uninterruptable’ dialogue. (Some distinguished official dialogue with people-to-people contacts, which should be uninterrupted or uninterruptable.)

Agenda

Either side should have the right, after giving notice at a previous meeting, to bring up any one or two
subject(s) it wishes to take up for discussion at the next meeting. This will obviate problems of diversion into what should be taken up for discussion by protecting the right of either side to bring up issues. If it is possible at the previous meeting to commonly agree subject(s) that should be encouraged and welcomed.

Provision should be made for ‘zero hour’ negotiations, to avoid charges of appeasement. Whatever might be current topical issue causing concern would be vented at the start of the meeting before moving to substantive issues.

Outcomes

It is critical to ensure that where agreement is possible, those agreements are formalized, allowing substantial advances to be seen (this has not happened so far).

In areas where agreement already exists, these too should be formalized.

One idea promoted by some (but not all) participants was an immediate effort to consolidate in some manner progress made in prior discussions over the past 14 years, i.e. to pull together specific documents (agreed minutes, communiqué, agreements, etc) which might then form the basis for the visit scheduled (but not dated) of the Indian Prime Minister to Islamabad. If such consolidation takes place, it could provide the basis for confidence and trust to embark on the next phase of dialogue. It was noted that while these discussions yielded many important results, some important issues remain. There will naturally be some change in priorities that either or both sides might attach to elements of that dialogue.

Outreach

Some felt this is now an incredibly important moment, and if this opportunity is lost it may empower militant groups to push armed struggle again. Creating a perception of cooperation to confront a common menace must be encouraged.

The dialogue should be translucent, if not fully transparent. It was pointed out that providing regular information to media (‘routinizing’ coverage), can in some ways decrease the heightened sensitivity to these talks in the media.

Constructive, unilateral, high-level statements also can help to address differing national perceptions and demonstrate understanding of each other’s internal challenges.

It was noted that there is danger in continuing to cede political space to those who seek to promote securitization/militarization, and that this phenomenon is in some ways growing in India as it has done in the past in Pakistan. There is a need for media statements that emphasize cooperation rather than confrontation. This narrative of commonality must trickle to civil society. It is part of the overall narrative of peace between India and Pakistan.

2. Thoughts for the March Meeting of Home Secretaries

Participants laid out various options for topics that might show promising forward movement if agreed at the Home Secretaries’ meeting in March. The following menu of possible options is not prioritized, nor does it necessarily reflect consensus. The main point was to suggest taking action on a
few items that are ‘do-able’. This could go a long way toward setting a positive tone that can be further built upon.

1. **Exchange legal/judicial expertise and experts on both sides and increase mutual legal assistance.** This could take various forms, including reinvigorating/reviving joint mechanisms that have been in place since 2006, but which have not met. A judicial commission could discuss progress and obstacles in litigation/prosecution in the context of the Mumbai terrorist attack. At or before the Home Secretaries’ meeting, additional information could be exchanged on terrorist attacks. Holding periodic press briefings on the exchange of notes and assessments might be helpful.

2. **Intelligence interactions at the highest levels should be started.** Increased or joint intelligence cooperation could be discussed. Intelligence sharing might be all that can happen, but if and when possible, it should happen.

3. **Military leaders should begin to meet at highest levels.** Direct contact between military chiefs will be very helpful, even if at first this is primarily as opportunity for them to get to know each other. For example, the importance of each military providing a guard of honor for the other’s chief may be symbolic, but it would be a welcome and reassuring gesture. It was noted that serious reworking is needed in both countries at an operational level so that military structures reflect changes in warfighting and the concept of conflict.

4. **Home Secretaries could urgently and vigorously initiate steps to relax the visa regime.** People-to-people contacts, cultural, scientific, political and personal communications should be made easier. It was noted that the frequency of follow-on meetings currently are restricted due to rules that require waiting times before allowing new visa requests. One small idea proposed was to grant SAARC visas to students and teachers of the new SAARC university in Delhi that is now up and running.

5. **Joint anti-terrorism mechanisms could be made more effective.** While there are inherent difficulties, meetings could happen more regularly and with more urgency (and political guidance) than earlier efforts that date back to 1989.

6. **In light of current events, Home Secretaries can take proactive step recognizing the importance of and emphasizing commitment to independent information and new media.** They should take steps to allow:
   - more frequent and easier access to journalists from each country to be based in other country;
   - reciprocal electronic media to function in both countries;
   - telephones to roam in all South Asia;
   - media in both countries to broadcast media from the other country;
   - access to cable TV channels from the other country;
   - increased understanding of the forces driving public opinion in both countries and the forces influencing both new and traditional media and the complex interactions between public opinion and government actions.

7. **It also was noted that when the Foreign Ministers eventually meet, they likewise will need a serious pre-planned agenda.**
3. Substantive Areas for Further Exploration

Terrorism

The meeting shared complete consensus on the need to act together to prevent terrorist acts. The concerns on both sides are well known, and were noted. Emphasizing the recent progress is not to forget that India still has concerns, nor to forget that Pakistan needs reassurance that steps taken deserve acknowledgement.

One participant posited that the way out of terror and extremism as a source of India-Pakistan conflict was signaled in the immediate aftermath of 26/11: Zardari’s statement, Gilani’s offer to send the director general of the ISI to India, and India’s acceptance of that offer. These steps were drawn back, but in future the way out is to return to that impulse, namely offers of cooperation and acceptance of the offers of cooperation.

It was noted that perceptions of terrorism have shifted. Years ago, terrorism in the region was somehow associated with the situation in with Kashmir, while this is no longer the case.

From the Pakistani perspective, it was pointed out that, differently from the past, the democratic government in Pakistan is not considering the use of terrorism as an instrument of state policy. Some compared this to changing the direction of a large tanker: it takes a while for the captain’s orders to change the direction of the ship. Some on both sides noted that India can show greater sensitivity to Pakistan’s predicament, and there was a belief that this can be accommodated. From the Indian side, there was a sense that if in Pakistan it is now a widespread and common belief that “1000 cuts” are not useful, then Pakistan should let that be known and provide more high profile clarity about that.

About the capability of persecuting those responsible of terrorist acts, it was noted that in four or five main high profile terrorism cases in Pakistan, including the attacks on Musharraf, the accused were not able to be sentenced. This is not insignificant, as there is a debate in Pakistan as to how to deal with more than 3,000 Tharik-e-Taliban fighters.

Some thought that the truth about the past should be ascertained, to the maximum extent possible, as a necessary condition for trust building. Past practices of supporting groups that would operate militarily across the Indo-Pakistani border should be clearly disavowed and, in any case, discontinued.

Jammu and Kashmir

The group noted that today the situation in J&K is less controversial than it has been in the past. Some pointed out the need for new ideas to address, with a collective approach, the problems that are plaguing the region. Certain reasons for this shift in perceptions were identified, including the fact that it is now the third generation after independence, with differing priorities. Many thought it was suitable to recognize that the diplomatic activity between India and Pakistan has had an impact in taking things forward.

There is, however, still urgency. Some raise the possible impact of the ‘Jasmine Revolution’ in Kashmir, and pointed out that if status quo policy is maintained, anything can happen. Both sides should take care to avoid inflammatory rhetoric.
Participants urged resumption of dialogue on Kashmir on a priority basis, dividing dialogue in front and back channels. If there are some proposals were made previously (in either channel) that need to be changed, this should be left open. As progress is made, Kashmiris should be fully included and involved.

Some felt that the governments should consider whether it is wise to resume the former process as the situation has changed. Some felt that if Pakistan would allow Delhi to reach an understanding with Kashmiris, forward movement is in the cards. Some thought the Four-Point Formula can’t be effectively revised. Some thought that there is a need for some cosmetic changes perhaps, but the essence of some progress/movement is there in that formula. Some felt it would be real contribution by civil society to push this forward and make this an element in ongoing relations. Some say it is possible to move toward maximum autonomy in the Indian Union (though noted there is not necessarily support for this idea in Pakistan).

Front channel agreements must be implemented, including importantly, the free movement of people and goods and some progress on the well known demands of the people of Kashmir on the Indian government regarding governance issues. Easing visas and transit will have important consequences.

In any case, cooperation and forward movement on the issue of J&K will be very beneficial to Indo-Pakistani relations. Equally beneficial will be reaching effective agreements on Siachen and Sir Creek. Some thought such agreements would create a win-win situation, creating an important degree of confidence. Some noted that progress on Sir Creek and Siachen will have different impacts, since the first case has to do with defining maritime borders, while the second case will be more substantial as it will imply bringing troops home, relieving them from danger and grave risks and halting damage to a very fragile natural environment.

The problem of the radicalization of young people of J&K was noted. Young people, whether radicalized or not, need a democratic way to develop a sense and perception of justice, opportunities for work and prospects for having a positive future. Some raised the point that radicalized groups or sectors of populations should be engaged and offered opportunities, as opposed to being equated to breeding grounds for terrorists.

**Afghanistan**

Participants warned against underestimating the importance of Afghanistan as it relates to the India-Pakistan dialogue. They highlighted the need to emphasize opportunities for further cooperation and convergence on Afghanistan as a way to guard against it becoming a new point of friction and discord. Some noted that India has a role in Afghanistan, and those parameters will be determined by Afghanistan, but equally Pakistan must be reassured that India’s role will not be at the expense of Pakistan. Some thought it is possible to cooperate, as Afghanistan is the one place closest to a ‘level playing field’ for the two countries.

Participants noted that more discussion is needed as to what happens after the US leaves Afghanistan. Reports of long-term leases on bases for US troops have generated some concern. Some suggested the possibility of trilateral US/NATO-India-Pakistan cooperation on Afghanistan. Others urged increased interaction with tribal leaders.
Participants welcomed news of cooperation between the two countries on Afghanistan. In this respect, trade with Afghanistan is an important issue. The transit treaty between Afghanistan and Pakistan is now operational, with a framework for implementation. Components of the treaty lock India into the process. Mechanisms are in place, so that once political agreement is reached and the goods from India arrive, third party trucks will take the goods to Afghanistan. The geostrategic importance of keeping land routes open was noted.

Role of US/external actors in region

The role of outside actors in the region was discussed. Some felt strongly that involving other states complicates rather than eases problems and diverts resources and attention. They felt it is much better if other governments are not seen as interfering.

The US is very much involved in the region, and some questioned the willingness of Pakistan to go along with this kind of US involvement. It has been suggested that Pakistan may go along due to a variety of reasons, including weakness, political expediency, the access to advanced weaponry and other arms. And yet, people in the region noted the symbolism of Clinton spending days in India, and ‘minutes’ in Pakistan, and that Obama went to India but not to Pakistan.

However, the general sense of the room was that the future of Pakistan lies as a partner with a considerable influence on global affairs in a larger South Asian entity, and not across the Atlantic. Some wondered whether Pakistan needs to punch above its current geopolitical weight. To the extent that outside actors are part of Pakistan’s foreign policy calculus, it can be seen in large part both as a historical role (from times dating back to the Soviet role in Afghanistan) and more recently as a result of a perceived need to countervail India. Many thought that if relations with India improve, the dependence on the US will decrease. Participants noted that the rising power of China also plays a role in strategic calculations.

Some felt that the view in Washington is that the US is going to stay in the region, but the questions remain as to what form that will take. Bases, drones, special ops will most likely all remain – some in Afghanistan and some in Pakistan. The upcoming US elections may clarify this further, especially if the Republicans win the White House. If aid changes, and/or the new House becomes less lenient regarding aid, then the US influence is likely to decrease. If that happens, it is likely the next government in Pakistan will have a different policy.

It was also noted that India and Pakistan might consider their global diplomatic strategy. For example, in DC India and Pakistan actively undermine each other’s position and this was considered detrimental and unhelpful.

What if there is another Mumbai-type attack?

A thought pervading the discussions was how to prevent the beginning of a catastrophic series of events if another Mumbai-type attack happens. Some believe that such acts take a limited number of people with a relatively limited availability of weapons to carry them out. Those attacks should be met with a coordinated reaction from both countries. If instead it will be known that one of the countries will feel compelled to act with some sort of military action, triggering an unknown chain of military events, then this will constitute a powerful incentive for the terrorists to act. There were different perceptions in the room about the ability to keep any possible military response from spiraling. In a neighborhood with nuclear weapons, this is not an insignificant concern.
While during the Cold War period we were concerned about a conventional war or a conventional military action becoming a nuclear confrontation, here we face the possibility of an action by non-state actors inducing a conventional confrontation and possibly then a nuclear exchange. So, in principle, a small number of people armed with simple weapons, can possibly generate a chain reaction of events that can go very far.

Some argued the legal perspective that, for example, India would not be able to launch a surgical strike into Pakistan unless it can show that Pakistan was clearly involved in the incident. Some questioned this interpretation. Others noted that “Pakistani involvement” doesn’t necessarily only mean official state policy. Some pointed out that within the establishment there are fissures where sections of the Pakistani state may be in collusion with non-state elements. Some thought that with this sort of a scenario it doesn’t take much imagination to stretch and put blame on Pakistan. There is, from this perspective, no refuge in thinking India has no legal resource to military action.

Some felt there is a need for an increased and unbiased understanding of the movements of terrorists and their relations with state structures, and that it is productive to separate terrorism and extremism and avoid putting the two things in the same basket. There were different perceptions as to the extent to which some extremists might be better engaged in democratic structures.

Some said no existential threat to Pakistan comes from India, as India has no designs on Pakistan. Others suggested that if India were to attack Pakistan, then Pakistan may quickly become India’s internal problem. Others referred to the old adage, “if we don’t hang together, we will hang separately,” and reinforced the notion that curbing negative rhetoric is very important in improving Indo-Pakistani relations and that trust between the two countries cannot be reconstructed in a climate of mutual accusations. Once again, some highlighted the need to improve the legal framework and the legal set of agreements between the two countries, to enable and better facilitate integrated action to prevent and punish terrorist acts.

Some also noted that the perceived threat to Pakistan from India in the military mind will only undergo a doctrinal shift if India moves its military focus away from Pakistan. Some felt that the race to militarize in India is making it into a perceived national security state, and this spurs crippling military spending in both countries. It was argued by some that the military establishments in both countries need to slow down.

**Civil society**

Participants encouraged both governments to facilitate cultural, political, academic and people to people contacts. Increasing the exchange of academics and scholars (including on issues related to Islam, jurisprudence, etc.) could help to change the discourse. Some encouraged Pugwash to take this up in further meetings.

Increasing understand regarding jurisprudence, for example, could help ensure that no bilateral agreement would be misread. Some suggested a loose structure where some Indian and Pakistani scholars are given option to come on TV, to exchange ideas. This might be helpful in recalculating areas under discussion. The suggestion of a possible India-Pakistan Peace Forum was raised.

Some felt an alternative discourse on religious issues is needed, and that there also is need to explore the citizens’ relationship to the state, as this can differ in the two countries.

There is an urgent need to engage future policy shapers—the ‘will-be-s’ as opposed to ‘have-beens.’ The Commission expressed support for this, and noted that the future lies in forward-looking
perspectives. The lessons of the Jasmine Revolution and its continuing impact were noted. While issues such as Sir Creek and Siachen are not to be dismissed, allowing roaming for mobile phones and opening up the new media might, for example, might have greater impact on the future relations between the two countries.

Future of the Pugwash Process

Participants acknowledged the important Pugwash tradition of bringing people together for dialogue on important and difficult issues, often going where others fear to tread. There was strong support for continuing this Track 2 initiative, with a hope that the periodicity could be guaranteed. Noting the difficulties, Pugwash was encouraged to create an environment where these meetings can happen in both capitals. Commissioners noted the interrelatedness of the various Track 2 initiatives, and felt in general there is a constructive synergy between these efforts. Some noted the need to enlarge this process and extend it to additional sectors of civil society.

There was discussion of ways to ‘feed’ the process, to ensure wider circulation of the work, not necessarily only in the media, but among constituents for change, including in parliaments. While it may be beyond Pugwash’s capacity, thought could be given to a more innovative presence in cyberspace. Consideration will be given to writing joint op-eds (with authors from both countries), which would then be published in both India and Pakistan.

There are a range of possible future topics, in addition to continuing synergy with the intergovernmental process. This could include: analyzing the two defense structures; Jammu and Kashmir in all its aspects (including energy, water, etc); Afghanistan; etc. There was mention of engaging young people in these meetings.

Pugwash stands ready to assist in any way, and the limiting constraints are financial. Participants discussed funding for this and related Pugwash initiatives. The sensitivity of outside funding was noted, and it was reinforced that Pugwash maintains substantive independence from its funders. Some pointed out that all funding for such initiatives in Asia comes from ‘outside’ and should not be considered an impediment to meeting in either country. This is potentially the last time these meetings will be held outside either country. In the meantime, Pugwash would be most interested to learn of possible funding possibilities from within the region.

Participants reinforced that joint delegations should go to the two capitals and that participants should go to their own foreign offices, ministers, and if possible Prime Ministers with the outcomes of this meeting.

The next activity of the Pugwash India-Pakistan Independent Commission will be a visit of approximately 14 participants to DC in late spring (May or June) for a series of consultations and events with the DC policy making community. In addition, discussions will be held among the organizers on the occasion of the 59th annual Pugwash Conference in Berlin, 1-4 July 2011. Commission members will stay in contact as further planning moves forward. The hope is the next full meeting will take place in Delhi.

All the participants thanked Pugwash and Prof. Paolo Cotta-Ramusino for their commitment to attempt to create peace metrics for a very vexed relationship.


5 Side discussions involving organizers were held as to the possibility of nurturing a Student/Young Pugwash network in the region, and/or organizing a side meeting of young people on the occasion of the next meeting. Separate funding would need to be secured for this.
PARTICIPANTS

**From India**

Mani Shankar Aiyar, former Indian diplomat who resigned from foreign service to become a politician working for Rajiv Gandhi from 1989-1991; member of the Indian National Congress party; former Minister of Panchayati Raj until 2009; former Union Cabinet Minister for Petroleum and Natural Gas (May 2004 through January 2006) and Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports (until 2009)

Ms. Sushobha Barve, Executive Director of the Centre for Dialogue and Reconciliation (Mumbai), Ashoka Fellow; Author *Healing Streams: Bringing Hope in the Aftermath of Violence*

Dr. Ajay Darshan Behera, Associate Professor and Coordinator, Pakistan Studies Programme, Academy of Third World Studies, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi.

A S Dulat, Former Secretary, Research and Analysis Wing, India

Amb. Salman Haidar, Former foreign secretary, head of the Diplomatic Service, Secretary East, and spokesman for the Ministry of External Affairs and later chief of protocol, among other diplomatic positions. In 1977-80, minister/deputy permanent representative of India at the United Nations in New York; has written a weekly column on political affairs for the Indian daily newspaper, *The Statesman*, since 2000

Prof. Happymon Jacob, Professor in Diplomatic Studies, Centre for International Politics, Organization and Disarmament, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University

Prof. Amitabh Mattoo (co-chair), Professor of International Relations and Member, National Knowledge Commission, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India [formerly: Vice Chancellor, University of Jammu, J&K; Member, Prime Minister’s Task Force on Global Strategic Developments; Member, National Security Advisory Board]

Ms. Malini Parthasarathy, Executive Editor, *The Hindu*

Amb. G. Parthasarathy, Visiting Professor, Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, India [formerly: Information Advisor to Prime Minister of India (1985-90); High Commissioner of India to Australia and Pakistan; Ambassador to Myanmar]

Mr. Syed Aziz Pasha, MP, Rajya Sabha MP, Member of the Communist Party of India

Mr. Vinay Thusoo, President, J&K Forum for Truth and Reconciliation, Jammu

**From Pakistan**

Hon. Ahsan Iqbal Chaudhary, MP, Chief Coordinator and Information Secretary PML-N; Chairman, Better Pakistan Foundation; Professor of Management, M.A.Jinnah University, Blue Area, Islamabad [formerly: former Minister of Education (2008); Deputy Chairman (Minister of State), Planning Commission, Govt of Pakistan; two-term Member, National Assembly (1993, 1997)]

Amb. Air Vice Marshal (ret) Shahzad Chaudhry, Retired air vice marshal of the Pakistan Army and former ambassador to Sri Lanka
Lt. Gen. (ret) Asad Durrani, Former Director General ISI


Amb. Humayun Khan, former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan

Lt. Gen (ret.) Talat Masood (co-chair), Independent Columnist, Commentator and Analyst, Islamabad, Pakistan [formerly: Secretary, Defence Production Division, Ministry of Defence; Chairman, Pakistan Ordnance Factories Board; various command, staff and instructional appointments in the armed forces]

Amb. Rustam Shah Mohmand, Pakistan Afghanistan Jirga, Former Chief Secretary NWFP, former Ambassador to Afghanistan

Mr. Tariq Parvez, Fmr Director General of the Federal Investigative Agency

Hon. Sherry Rehman, Member of Parliament, former Information Minister, Pakistan

Amb. Najmuddin Shaikh, retired Pakistan Foreign Service Officer; Member, Board of Governors, Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad; Senior Vice President, Karachi Council of Foreign Relations; Columnist for *Dawn*, Karachi [formerly: Foreign Secretary to the Government of Pakistan (1994-97); Ambassador of Pakistan to Iran (1992-94), the USA (1990-91), the FRG (1989-90) and Canada (1987-89)]

Ahmer Bilal Soofi, lawyer in the Supreme Court of Pakistan, founding President of Research Society of International Law; Lectures on international law at the National Defense University, Navy War College, Command and Staff College in Pakistan; writes on international law in leading dailies of Pakistan. [Formerly represented Pakistan at the UN General Assembly’s Ad-hoc Committee and led negotiations on behalf of G-77 countries to finalize the UN Convention on Corruption]

Ms. Sehar Tariq, Program Officer, Jinnah Institute

Ms. Nasim Zehra, Director Current Affairs of Pakistan’s News TV Channel Dunya TV; host of Current Affairs program (Policy Matters) on Dunya TV; has served on Pakistan’s Presidential Advisory Committee on Foreign Policy and National Security from 2000-2002, in 2005 appointed as Pakistan’s Special Envoy on UN Reforms

**USIP**

Moeed Yusuf, United States Institute of Peace (USIP)

**International Pugwash**

Prof. Paolo Cotta Ramusino, Pugwash Secretary General

Ms. Sandra Ionno Butcher, Pugwash Senior Program Coordinator
Overview

A few members of the Pugwash India-Pakistan Independent Commission travelled to Delhi immediately following the 2nd meeting of the Commission, held in Dubai, 26-27 Feb 2011. They held meetings with key elements of the Indian policy community, and plans emerged from this series of meeting for further interactions, including the proposed establishment of an Indian inter-parliamentarian group on related issues. Pugwash Secretary General Paolo Cotta-Ramusino accompanied the group.

Their agenda included:

- Visit to the Vice President of India Hon. Hamid Ansari
- Meeting with the Head of Back Channel / Indo-Pakistani relations Amb. S.K. Lambah
- Lunch with the High Commissioner of Pakistan Amb. Shahid Malik
- Meeting at Jamia Millia Islamia University (list of participants attached)
- Meeting/dinner with a group of Parliamentarians, Shangri-la Hotel (list of participants attached)

Participants from Pakistan

Ms. Sherry Rehman, Member of Parliament, former Information Minister, Pakistan.

Prof. Ahsan Iqbal Chaudhary, MP, Chief Coordinator and Information Secretary PML-N; Chairman, Better Pakistan Foundation; Professor of Management, M.A.Jinnah University, Blue Area, Islamabad [formerly: former Minister of Education (2008); Deputy Chairman (Minister of State), Planning Commission, Govt of Pakistan; two-term Member, National Assembly (1993, 1997)].

Lt. Gen (ret.) Talat Masood, Independent Columnist, Commentator and Analyst, Islamabad, Pakistan [formerly: Secretary, Defence Production Division, Ministry of Defence; Chairman, Pakistan Ordnance Factories Board; various command, staff and instructional appointments in armed forces].

Ms. Nasim Zehra, Director Current Affairs of Pakistan’s News TV Channel Dunya TV; host of Current Affairs program(Policy Matters) on Dunya TV; has served on Pakistan’s Presidential Advisory Committee on Foreign Policy and National Security from 2000-2002, in 2005 appointed as Pakistan’s Special Envoy on UN Reforms.
Consultation
Pakistan Studies Programme
Academy of Third World Studies
Jamia Millia Islamia
New Delhi

1 March 2011

From India

Mr. Najeeb Jung, Vice Chancellor, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi.

Prof. Shri Prakash, Director, Academy of Third World Studies, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi.

Dr. Ajay Darshan Behera, Associate Professor and Coordinator, Pakistan Studies Programme, Academy of Third World Studies, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi.

Ambassador T.C.A. Rangachari, Former Ambassador to Germany and France and served in the Indian High Commission, Islamabad.


Ambassador Veena Sikri, Former High Commissioner to Malaysia and Bangladesh, Consul General, Hong Kong and Director General, Indian Council of Cultural Relations, Ministry of External Affairs.

Ambassador Ishrat Aziz, Former Ambassador to UAE, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and Brazil.

Rear Admiral (Retd) K. Raja Menon, Distinguished Fellow, National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi.

Mr. Alok Bansal, Executive Director, National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi.

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6 Pugwash would like to extend a special thanks to the Vice Chancellor of Jamia Millia University, Mr. Najeeb Jung and to Dr. Ajay Darshan Behera for kindly hosting the meeting.
Dr. Dileep Padgaonkar, Senior Journalist, Consulting Editor *Times of India* and Chief Interlocutor, Jammu & Kashmir.

Prof. Sujit Dutta, Gandhi Chair, Nelson Mandela Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi.

Mr. C. D. Sahay, Former Chief of Research & Analysis Wing, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India.

Mr. Rana Banerjee, Former Special Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat and Consultant, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

Mr. B. G. Verghese, Senior Journalist and Former Editor of *Hindustan Times*.

Mr. Amit Baruah, Chief of BBC, Hindi Service.

Ms. Seema Mustafa, Former Editor, *Covert* Magazine and Foreign News Editor, *Newx* Channel.

Mr. Sushant Sareen, Former Editor of the *Public Opinion Trends*, Consultant, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses and Vivekananda Centre, New Delhi.

Dr. Mathew Joseph, Associate Professor, Pakistan Studies Programme, Academy of Third World Studies, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi.

Dr. Happymon Jacob, Assistant Professor, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

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International Pugwash

Prof. Paolo Cotta-Ramusino, Pugwash Secretary General, Milan.
Indian MPs who met with visiting delegation of Pakistanis

1). Mr. Rahman Khan: Dy.Chairman, Rajyasabha (R.S)
2). Mr. Mani Shankar Ayyar: MP(R.S), INC(Cong-I)
3). Mr. Sitaram Yechury: Floor leader of CPM (R.S)
4). Mr. D. Raja: Floor Leader of CPI (R.S)
5). Dr. K. Keshava Rao: MP(R.S), INC (Cong-I)
6). Mr. Seelam J.D: MP (R.S), INC
8). Mrs. Naznin Farooqui: MP (R.S), INC
10). Mr. Ali Anwar Ansari: MP (R.S), JanataDal (United)
13). Mr. Syed Azeez Pasha: MP (R.S), Dy. Floor leader CPI.

The outcome of this meeting is the proposed formation of an inter parliamentarian group. Several MPs belonging to various political parties have responded very encouragingly, and they are seeking to hold a meeting of 10-15 MPs in late March.

Pugwash would like to give special thanks to Mr. Syed Azeez Pasha for organizing this meeting.