European Delegation
Led by the Rt. Hon. Des Browne

Moscow
24 – 28 April 2010

Summary

A delegation of senior former European ministers visited key officials and experts in Moscow from 24-28 April 2010. The delegation included:

- Des Browne (delegation leader), Former British Secretary of State for Defence;
- Jan Kavan, Former Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the Czech Republic;
- Giorgio La Malfa MP, Former Italian Minister of European Affairs;
- Vappu Taipale, Former Finnish Health Minister; and
- Shirley Williams (Baroness Williams of Crosby), Former Adviser on Nuclear Proliferation to British Prime Minister Gordon Brown.

They were joined by Prof. Francesco Calogero, Former Pugwash Secretary General; Prof. Paolo Cotta-Ramusino, Pugwash Secretary General; Amb. Sergey Batsanov, Member International Pugwash Council; Prof. Alexander Nikitin, Member International Pugwash Council, and Sandra Ionno Butcher, Senior Program Coordinator, Pugwash.

Key Points:

1. The European middle ground is now in favor of multilateral nuclear disarmament. The delegation’s purpose was to engage the Russian decision-makers and political elite in the process of exploring how to ensure European security without nuclear weapons.

2. There is strong support for the ‘re-set’ of US-Russian relations as signified by the political importance of the New START Treaty. There are good chances for a positive vote on the treaty in the Russian Duma and Federation Council. There also is recognition that “there is no euphoria in Russia for nuclear disarmament.”

Please note: This report was written by the rapporteur, Sandra Ionno Butcher, Senior Program Coordinator, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs (sibutcher@earthlink.net). This is the rapporteur’s personal report of selected points of discussion from the delegation’s meetings in Moscow. As with all Pugwash meetings, there was no attempt to reach consensus. However, the report does seek to summarize the various positions presented. No position described herein should be attributed to any particular person.
3. While verification, transparency and irreversibility are all important elements of New START, the numerical decrease is not sufficient to ensure the current momentum toward further progress on multilateral nuclear disarmament can be maintained. Establishing a high-level independent citizen monitoring system may be useful as a confidence building measure, drawing on the experiences with the INF Treaty.

4. Planned synergy in US and Russian ratification is welcome. Debate on both sides is encouraged to proceed with sensitivity to the domestic political realities in both countries.

5. The issue of tactical (and, more broadly, non-strategic) nuclear weapons, and the interrelated areas of European security architecture, ballistic missile defenses, deterrence doctrine, and conventional force structures all need urgent and most likely asymmetrical exploration, especially as NATO undertakes its Strategic Concept Review.

6. Broader Russian concerns vis-a-vis NATO’s force structure and capabilities must be addressed if there is to be future progress on nuclear disarmament. These discussions must be led politically if they are to overcome NATO’s institutional dysfunctions.

7. The role of US nuclear weapons in Europe must be addressed urgently, and the concept of extended deterrence needs to be revisited. It is imperative to establish a principle that no country will base nuclear weapons outside its own territory.

8. The rest of the world is watching the US-Russian process closely. If there is a sense that nothing further will be accomplished on multilateral disarmament for the 7 years it will take for New START implementation, this will have a negative impact, not only on decisions among countries in other regions, but it may also affect range of issues, for example, forthcoming debates in the UK on warheads.

9. There was a shared desire to work cooperatively to address areas of common interests between Russia, US, and NATO on some of the most challenging issues, including the Iran situation, Afghanistan, addressing extremism, securing nuclear materials, etc.

10. While the overall message from the Russian side was sobering, the delegation was told that compromise solutions are possible “if you approach Russia with respect.” It is precisely this purpose that led to the delegation’s visit, and the intent behind the desire to work in partnership with Russian colleagues on ways forward via the emerging European Leadership Network, future Pugwash meetings, and other fora. The delegation was pleased with the variety of creative ideas that were produced and looks forward to continued interaction.
**Introduction**

The Pugwash Conferences\(^2\) brings together, from around the world, influential scientists, scholars and public figures concerned with reducing the danger of armed conflict and seeking cooperative solutions for global problems. In line with its mission, Pugwash has over fifty years' experience of Track II work in arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament initiatives, including supporting negotiation and implementation of seminal treaties such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the ABM Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and others. Pugwash also, since its inception, has worked to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in defense strategies, and thus the risk of the use of nuclear weapons in conflict.

**From 24-28 April 2010, former UK Defence Secretary Des Browne led a delegation of senior European leaders to Moscow** to discuss European attitudes to nuclear arms and disarmament policy with key policy makers and experts. This delegation builds on an earlier similar delegation that visited Washington, DC 1-4 March 2010.

This project on “New Nuclear Reality” was organized by the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, Russian Pugwash Committee, Center for Euro-Atlantic Security of the MGIMO University, Russian Political Science Association, and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Russia. We also would like to acknowledge the support of Connect US and the Ploughshares Fund who made this and related work possible.

**The delegation included:**

- Des Browne, Former British Secretary of State for Defence;
- Jan Kavan, Former Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the Czech Republic;
- Giorgio La Malfa MP, Former Italian Minister of European Affairs;
- Vappu Taipale, Former Finnish Health Minister;
- Shirley Williams (Baroness Williams of Crosby), Former Adviser on Nuclear Proliferation to British Prime Minister Gordon Brown.

Many of the delegates are engaged in a new European Leadership Network for Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament\(^3\) that Des Browne is convening. The ELN will bring together senior figures to help foster and coordinate debate within Europe and to increase the influence of the European voice on these issues in the US and globally.

They were joined by Amb. Sergey Batsanov, Member International Pugwash Council; Prof. Francesco Calogero, Former Pugwash Secretary General; Prof. Paolo Cotta-Ramusino, Pugwash Secretary General; Prof. Alexander Nikitin, Member International Pugwash Council, and Sandra Ionno Butcher, Senior Program Coordinator, Pugwash.

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\(^2\) [www.pugwash.org](http://www.pugwash.org)

\(^3\) [http://www.rusi.org/eln/about](http://www.rusi.org/eln/about). See also: [www.toplevelgroup.org](http://www.toplevelgroup.org).
Our meetings with a wide range of officials and experts took place at the MFA, the Duma (the lower chamber of Parliament), the Council of Federation (the upper chamber of Parliament), the Institute for Contemporary Development, International Federation for Peace and Conciliation, the Russian Academy of Sciences, and the Institute for Strategic Stability of the “ROSATOM” State Corporation.

**General comments**

The delegation’s message was to express the view that across the political spectrum *Europeans unanimously welcome the leadership Presidents Medvedev and Obama have shown* in negotiating the follow-on to START treaty and to express appreciation of the tremendous political significance of this ‘re-set’ of Russian-US relations and the impetus and energy it provides for further progress.

The delegation underscored the **urgency of cooperatively engaging with policy makers and experts in Russia to help keep this momentum moving**, not only in the ratification process for the so-called “New START” treaty, but also on other areas of shared objectives in creating conditions for an eventual world free of nuclear weapons, for promoting multilateral nuclear disarmament, revitalizing the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and securing nuclear materials. There is hope on the Russian side this may contribute to more widespread acceptance of Russia as an equal partner, sharing the same disarmament and non-proliferation goals with the international community. All sides seek to ensure that these perspectives will find their way into the US debates on these issues, accurately reflecting the new mainstream bipartisan European views in favor of multilateral nuclear disarmament.

The general tone of the Russian counterparts with whom our delegation met was supportive of the outreach made by the delegation, and there was overwhelming (though not unanimous) agreement that it is important to start to explore steps toward a nuclear weapons free world. However, this was counterbalanced by a seemingly a-synchronistic and extreme unease expressed by the lack of further progress in addressing *Russian concerns vis a vis NATO policy and force posture*, and a reminder that there is still widespread belief in Russia that nuclear weapons guarantee security. As one participant said, “There is no euphoria in Russia for nuclear disarmament.”

While the current focus is on US-Russian negotiations, given the fact the two combined arsenals comprise nearly 95% of the nuclear weapons in the world, the delegation reinforced the message that US allies over the world are waiting for US invitation to play into that environment, and they also are ready to develop a narrative receptive to and consistent with views of the Russian Federation.
New START treaty

Political significance is crucial

The recent agreement signed by Presidents Medvedev and Obama on 8 April 2010 is recognized on all sides as an important and positive political development.

In Russia it is widely perceived as a big political success, signaling a ‘re-set’ of relations between Russia and the US, and it will be the first bilateral arms control treaty between the US and Russia (as opposed to the former Soviet Union) to enter into force.

- It brings back arms control, and predictability via the verification and transparency regime.
- Irreversibility was also a major goal.
- The treaty provides a guarantee against a new arms race. It provides a basis for future cooperation.
- As one senior Russian policy maker stated, the Russians consider signing the treaty to be “the first major step toward setting up a global nuclear security system.”

The political leadership provided by the two presidents (who interacted personally during the 10 months of treaty negotiations on some 14 occasions) was perhaps unprecedented, and proof of the importance of strong political leadership in this area. Their relationship was referred to as “businesslike” and a “working interaction,” and this has developed an important “mutual understanding” between the two leaders.

The treaty corresponds with Russian national plans to downsize their arsenal due to technical realities of the life times of current weapons systems and is in sync with Russia’s modernization plans. For example, while START II (which did not enter into force) limited multiple-independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs,) this treaty does not.

Another important element of the “re-set” is that it was noted on the Russian side there is a lack of institutional memory and involvement in arms control at a practical level, and that the Russians had to rely heavily on people who were involved in START I. Many MFA officials lack technical ability on these issues. Reengaging in arms control will help redevelop this expertise.

This corresponds with the experience of the delegates who are working to set up a European Leadership Network to similarly educate politicians in their countries. It was noted that a generation of political leaders have been “de-skilled” on these issues. There are very few leaders in Europe who are sensitized to the complexity of issues involved with these discussions. There is strong hope that the emerging European Leadership Network will include Russians as well.

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4 This treaty has been dubbed “New START” on the US side, without a corresponding term, except the “START-III”, on the Russian side.
Numerical limitations do not provide for significant cuts

This treaty was referred to as a “status quo treaty.” It codifies a “text-based parity.” While the treaty went further than limits discussed in the US-Russian understanding of July 2009, the cuts are not as significant as the Russian side originally sought. It allows for a total of 1550 warheads and a ceiling of 800 deployed and non-deployed delivery vehicles (of which 700 can be deployed), in reality the actual numbers of cuts are not significant in and of themselves. These limits apply 7 years after the treaty enters into force, and the treaty will last for a duration of 10 years, with an option to extend for another five if both sides agree.

The treaty has been presented as a reduction of 30% in the limit on the deployed strategic nuclear arsenals of the two sides allowed under the 2002 Moscow Treaty.

Actual cuts will not be this significant. By some estimates\(^5\) under the agreed counting rules (especially the rule that allows bombers to count as only 1 warhead despite the fact they can carry many more) the actual number the US will cut might be approximately 100-200 warheads removed to storage\(^6\). This is perhaps the most controversial element of the agreement. The counting rules are a bit complicated, and estimates vary of the true impact of these cuts. Some Russian analysts say the cuts will be only on the US side (though Russian future plans are affected), and it is “reluctantly welcomed” by the Russian politically elite. However, the US Federation of American Scientists analysis is that the US deploys 1650 and Russia deploys 1740, meaning in actual terms the US will need to reduce 100 warheads and Russia 190 to reach the New START limits\(^7\).

The 1550 ceiling for warheads was lower than the initial US offer, and Russian analysts say the very limited actual cuts will be made all on the US side (in return the US achieved its goals on verification issues). Agreed limits are “comfortably high” from the Russian perspective, it saves the Russians from a perceived need to build up their arsenal but allows continued development of MIRVs and other desired technology.

While recognizing the treaty’s strong political significance mentioned above, some participants raised concerns that the lack of significant decrease of the number of weapons in the nuclear arsenals of the US and Russia must be followed quickly with plans for discussion of future reductions. Failure to do so may lead to a negative reaction at the NPT Review Conference, and may not be significant enough to curtail modernization trends in other states with nuclear weapons.

The seriousness of the risks of nuclear proliferation requires that further steps for disarmament must be bold.

In addition, rapid breakout capability exists. This is especially true on the US side, which could for example within days redeploy by one estimate approximately 2,000 additional warheads to Trident and Minuteman III. (It was noted however that this in effect represents de-alerting of

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\(^5\) Without access to classified information, it is not possibly to be precise about these numbers.

\(^6\) See for example, analysis by Hans Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists.  
[http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2010/03/newstart.php#more-2826](http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2010/03/newstart.php#more-2826)

\(^7\) Ibid.
the majority of the arsenal.) Russia is not concerned about this breakout capability, because they expect to have a similar capacity by the end of the decade.

It is important to note, however, that in this “fragile” world situation, the 7 years provided is a long time and the states were encouraged to take full advantage of this time period.

**Treaty provides a restart for limited verification and transparency measures**

Unlike the 2002 Moscow Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT, which one participant wryly referred to as a “SORT-of” treaty), this new treaty importantly contains verification and transparency measures.

Unlike the START I treaty that has expired, the new treaty does not allow for permanent inspections, an initial US demand. This change addresses what Russians considered an unequal situation given that the US is not producing strategic nuclear weapons and Russia has started a new modernization program. The treaty does allow for on-site inspections, data exchanges, exhibitions and notifications of changes to strategic nuclear forces, for example.

**Telemetry will be provided on a case-by-case basis,** and each side can decide what to provide (including the option of providing no data). Russians were concerned that telemetry information from Russian tests could help the US design missile interceptors. It is believed the US gave in to this Russian demand largely due to the fact it has its own national technical means and the Russians do not.

**The treaty contains real limits on strategic missile defense while encouraging cooperation on ballistic missile defense**

It was pointed out that in recognizing the increasing importance of the “interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms” the treaty’s preamble may have created some problems for ratification. It was noted that it is important to recognize how difficult it was for Russia to conclude the treaty in the absence of the previous pillar of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

However, **Article V of the treaty provides a real limit on the converting strategic ICBMs and SLBMs for missile defense interceptors and vice versa.** This is considered a real limit, and one which (barring unforeseen elements in the as yet unavailable technical annexes) may in fact mean the end of plans, for example, for US Ground Based Interceptor program.

**Ratification process**

Presidents Medvedev and Obama reportedly planned to simultaneously seek ratification of the treaty. There was some concern expressed on the Russian side that this may be unrealistic given the realities of the ratification process in the Duma. However, there was a strong signal for a cooperative engagement throughout the ratification process. This was originally supposed to start in late April, but this was delayed due to Russian holidays, until mid-May.
The lower house of the Russian Duma began its first informal consultations of the treaty on 27 April. At the time of writing this report, the US President transmitted it to the Senate on 13 May\textsuperscript{8}, and Russia is expected to begin the formal process within a few weeks\textsuperscript{9}.

There is no serious opposition to the treaty expected in Russia. Two-thirds of the Russian parliament are ready for it just because they support all governmentally initiated proposals. The remaining one-third may support being convinced by treaty’s essence. According to one senior policy maker, “This is a case where common sense should prevail over party.”

There was some discussion of the need for synergistic statements during the ratification process in both countries, as a way to help address possible concerns that may arise during debates. It was noted that the US political system is perhaps more deeply divided than any time since Vietnam, and the Obama administration has some very clear limits on what they may be able to accomplishing.

**Citizen monitoring**

It would be positive to establish a Track 1½ process for monitoring of the New START treaty by influential non-governmental public figures, involving international network of former Ministers and Defense and Foreign Affairs, with an organizational role of International Pugwash, on the model of parallel public inspections conducted in the years of the implementation of the INF Treaty (the Intermediate and Shorter Range nuclear Forces Treaty).

**Further progress on strategic nuclear disarmament**

The UK and others stand ready to enter into multilateral discussions, perhaps after the next US-Russian treaty, but if that time is too far removed, the current interest may not be able to be sustained. The engagement of France and China in the process needs to be nurtured.

It was noted also that the UK faces decisions in the next parliament on warhead issues, if there is a sense that multilateral nuclear disarmament is moving forward and that these warheads may be redundant then this could affect the thinking and attitudes toward making this investment. It therefore would be helpful to have more people who understand these issues visit the UK and make this argument.

The crucial role of the involvement of civil society, to the extent possible, was emphasized in our meetings.

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\textsuperscript{8} The US State Department’s website includes background materials: [http://www.state.gov/t/vci/trty/126118.htm](http://www.state.gov/t/vci/trty/126118.htm)

Tactical nuclear weapons

Tactical nuclear weapons are outside current US-Russian discussions

The new treaty does not touch the issue of tactical nuclear weapons. Russia is estimated to have at least 2,000 tactical nuclear warheads, and the US approximately 500, of which 150-200 are deployed on the territories of its NATO allies.10

Some NATO allies have requested reconsideration of the basing of US nuclear weapons in Europe. However, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reportedly linked any further action on this topic with the need for Russia to make significant moves in this area given the Russian numerical superiority. It is unclear how this topic is likely to be addressed in the NATO Strategic Concept Review. The recent US Nuclear Posture Review reinforced the role of extended deterrence, pledged to proceed with life-extension for the B-61 bombs, and said that “any changes to NATO’s nuclear posture should only be taken after a thorough review within – and decision by – the Alliance”.

Our delegation was told by some interlocutors that the media reports of Clinton’s Tallinn comments were greeted in Russia with a “sigh of relief” as her public stand now removes any pressure the Russians might have felt to engage in discussions on tactical nuclear weapons.11

Future progress on non-strategic/tactical nuclear weapons needs revitalization

It was clear from conversations across the spectrum of policy makers and experts that there is neither much thinking nor enthusiasm in Russia on next steps for tactical nuclear weapons arms control. It is equally clear that Russian policy makers do not feel pressure from the US to review their position on tactical nuclear weapons.

This was sorely at odds with the optimism that seemed possible when a delegation of senior European former ministers held a round of similar meetings in Washington, DC in early March 2010.

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10 Federation of American Scientists, ibid.
11 The actual position is more nuanced that media reports suggest. For example, NATO Spokesman James Appathurai said on 22 April 2010, “As I said, no decisions were taken. No specifics or specific proposals were put on the table, but one point was stressed by many and that is, of course, that this is a discussion that cannot just include NATO in the broader sense. NATO’s nuclear policy is for NATO to decide. But when it comes to reducing the number or role of nuclear weapons in Europe, it is impossible to ignore Russia, which has, I believe, some 3,000 sub-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe, and there was a substantial amount of discussion about how both from a bilateral U.S.-Russia point of view, but in a larger context of reduction, Russia should be engaged in a discussion of reducing the number of nuclear weapons in Europe…. I did not say that there would be no moves without the Russians. I did say that Russia had to be taken into account when looking at the broader issue of reducing the total holdings of nuclear weapons in Europe. So big distinction.” [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_62906.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_62906.htm)
The prevailing approach in Russia is that as long as the US does not withdraw its tactical weapons to its own national territory as Russia has done, it remains an unequal situation. From this Russian perspective, discussions need to start from an equal footing.

To some extent this represents a genuine confusion on broader issues, and need for further discussion on issues such as: What is the role of US nuclear weapons based, for example, in Turkey? Why does Russia need tactical nuclear weapons, for which missions and how many? One Russian expert asked whether from the Russian perspective they should want these weapons out of Turkey or if they might prove useful vis a vis, for example, Iran.

Some members of the delegation expressed an interest in holding a similar series of discussions with decision makers and experts in Turkey on these and similar issues and we plan to pursue this idea.

It was noted that discussions on tactical nuclear weapons will bring arms control to a new juncture, where it will no longer be adequate to discuss delivery vehicles, but discussion of warheads will be imperative.

**A signal of willingness to engage on tactical nuclear weapons is essential**

There is a largely silent majority view in the rest of Europe that US NATO weapons serve no purpose. There is intense private discussion within the alliance on what role they will play in 10 years, the length of time current Secretary General will be in place. There are those who want to play a part in these discussions, but they need to better understand: if they pursue this issue, would it be reciprocated by Russia?

The delegation was also told that the current Russian reluctance to discuss non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons is not necessarily unchangeable and the views within Russia are not necessarily homogenous. One participant said, *Everything can be discussed with Russia “if you show enough respect,”* meaning that Russia as a re-emerging global power wants to be an equal partner at the decision-making in international security area. However, some believe the military establishment won’t discuss this until the US withdraws its weapons from Europe and unless the UK and France join the discussions (addressing also some concerns about French sub-strategic nuclear weapons).

Possible ways forward include:

- **Linking informal tactical nuclear arms control with CFE Treaty follow up,** since if NATO might yield on the conventional side this may encourage Russia to give up some tactical nuclear weapons;
- Some parallel **unilateral actions could be considered,** however there was caution that there may be a need for full scale negotiations because there are not the same incentives today of the crisis situation that led to the last round of unilateral action;
- It might be possible to start with discussions for removing them to **central storage sites**;
- Tactical nuclear weapons can be linked with non-deployed strategic weapons cuts;
Emphasizing the need for progress given the **economic realities** (i.e. US NATO allies will find it extremely difficult to pay for the needed upgrades for the aircraft to carry the B-61s).

Discussions could explore creating a **possible nuclear weapons free zone in Central Europe**.

There was a concern addressed, however, that it is **important not to overload the already difficult political agenda** by trying to address this issue now. From this perspective it might be preferable to explore options for future directions of arms control, including tactical weapons, and involving other nuclear weapons states, thinking in a non-symmetrical way.

### Ballistic missile defenses

Though Russia formally does not consider NATO to be an adversary any longer, the Russians are quite seriously concerned about expanding NATO military infrastructure, and link questions to BMD to this context. To the extent possible, **Russia should be consulted**. The lack of consultation before decisions were taken on the new Bulgarian and Romanian deployments was noted. For example, the role of the recent Romania discussion highlighted an area of tension. The presidents reportedly reached an understanding not to allow this to undermine their efforts.

There is concern in Russia as to future potential instability that may created by continued massive US investment in BMD capabilities, and the perceived need to prepare their force structure to avoid a possible imbalance 20 years from now, particularly given concerns over possible space-based components.

There were some who thought that exploring further prospects for a **joint US-Russian BMD program** may prove useful, building on the NATO Tallinn ministerial discussions, and some felt Russia should respond positively. However, serious issues would need to be explored, including how the threat assessment would be conducted, how the chain of command would work in reality, etc. In other words, according to one participant, “the devil is in the political will.” The example was provided of problems encountered during the Yeltsin/Clinton initiated data exchange Center, when the project was killed for political reasons but with the technical pretext, relating to the tax status of the officers at the Center. Possible synergy could be explored on the military production side, to the economic benefit of both sides.

However, in this context it is imperative for further discussions to be held on the **feasibility and affordability of the proposed technologies**, and scientists can play an important role in advising their governments on this.

### Conventional weapons/European security architecture

**Conventional force balances affect nuclear arms control and disarmament**

In a reversal from the Cold War dynamics, today Russia sees an overwhelming conventional imbalance *vis a vis* NATO forces. There are many who believe that progress on further nuclear disarmament, especially in the non-strategic realm, cannot be made without tying this in with discussions on conventional forces.
It was noted that Russia is the only country in the world which shares borders with 16 other countries, which explains its cautiousness when it comes to conventional forces strength/weakness.

**Plans for new US conventional capabilities is a serious concern for Russia**

The US plans to pursue the new “Prompt Global Strike” program is causing consternation in Russian circles. There is concern that adding conventional warheads to US ICBMs will hold Russian ICBMs at risk.

**NATO posture is a major concern still in Russia and needs to be addressed jointly**

NATO expansion (one participant preferred the term “opening”) to Eastern Europe, and “the remilitarization of the Eastern border” remains a significant concern to Russia. Russians asked the delegation to give a greater understand of whether or not NATO policy is homogenous.

It was recognized that at a certain level, NATO is politically dysfunctional (a situation acknowledged by current NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen), and that the rules prevent a proper dialogue and debate on some key issues. At the ministerial level there is no discussion on the diversity of views within the alliance, and it is important to encourage NATO to develop a coherent political position.

It was noted that the NATO-Russia Council proved not to be effective enough, and it didn’t work as a mediator in political moments when such mediation was mostly needed, for example, in the days of the recent Russian-Georgian war and the respective increase of tensions.

Ways to increase Russian participation within NATO framework could be further explored. Some suggested the possibility of the ultimate goal of Russia becoming a NATO member or at least a partial member (integrated into the political and not military NATO structures). There is a danger, however, that such a broad “northern” alliance would increase insecurity among “southern” countries and may in fact be counterproductive in terms of creating international stability. The delegation members seek to send the message both to the US and to Russia that mainstream Europe will not oppose further Russian-NATO integration.

Dialogue could be renewed on discussions of non-offensive defense, and NGOs could play a significant role here, drawing for example on the Pugwash workshops on this issue during the Cold War.

There is a need to develop deeper understanding of the different viewpoints in NATO. All new NATO members do not have a common perspective. There is a need to discuss and analyze threats and what collective security can do to meet those threats. Russia can and should play a role in those discussions. For example, there is need for continued discussion on Afghanistan within NATO and with its partners, and this is an area where further building on common interests could be explored.
There also was discussion that many in the rest of Europe tend to think of NATO as a collective security mechanism, with a role that is not primarily focused toward Russia. In this sense, in Russia the prevailing frame of mind with respect to NATO is perhaps more traditional.

The Strategic Concept review process must be politically driven and as open as possible. It appeared that to some extent certain Russian interlocutors were better briefed on the NATO Strategic Concept Review than some US NATO allies.

**Russian proposal for a European Security Treaty**

This treaty draft is meant to be the basis for discussions on a new architecture for European security that would include also soft security issues. Russia pushes the idea of the new all-European security treaty quite intensively, insisting that existing old security institutions (like OSCE or NATO) do not work in time of actual political crises. Medvedev has said this draft is an “invitation to dance.” There has as yet been inadequate response.

One proposal for a way forward was to set up an international security commission, with subgroups/working groups, depending on priorities on agenda. This could be one more forum in which members of the emerging European Leadership Network might participate.

**Extremism**

It might be possible to further explore approaches to dealing with extremism. For example, a joint roundtable was proposed to bring together people who were involved in the Northern Ireland peace process and people engaged in addressing the situation in the Northern Caucuses. Parallels exist in the need for political solutions, despite one side having military superiority.

Some members of the delegation were concerned about news reports that the FSB was to be given increased powers. They were cautioned however that it is important in opposition to such moves, not to fortify the position you don’t want to strengthen.

**Nuclear doctrines**

It is important to further explore the role of nuclear deterrence. It is due to the continued legacy of deterrence postures that political relations between the two countries remain hostage to military infrastructures of the Cold War. At the same time, some of the Russian counterparts were suggesting, that while deterrence can’t be discarded overnight, a serious search for an alternative basis for security should begin soon.

Negative security assurances will be important to further explore.

Some participants thought it might be useful to start discussions on a treaty or UN Convention on non-use of nuclear weapons, drawing from the experience of the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use of
chemical and biological weapons, which contributed to creating norms that made possible the biological weapons convention (1972) and chemical weapons convention (1993). Others questioned the efficacy of such this and other no-first use pledges.

**Middle East**

The delegation discussed prospects for setting an agenda for progress at the NPT Review Conference on this important topic, which was part of the deal in 1995 that led to indefinite extension of the NPT. A draft proposal for establishing a UN-appointed representative or advisor was discussed, along with options for a conference in the region on these issues.

There is an intersect of interests between Russia and Europe/US on Iran. This issue comes up in discussion of BMD threats, regional stability, and tactical nuclear questions.

There was some concern addressed that the political debate about Iran has become separated from the technical realities. Russia could play a significant role in bringing back some of the earlier ideas discussed. For example, it might be possible to revisit the idea of removing the LEU to Kish Island under the IAEA supervision. This idea was supported at the time by Russia. There is a concern however, that the US and France are losing interest in this idea because their original goal was to remove LEU altogether from Iran and that Iran has now produced much more LEU.

Pugwash has proposed a commission in which scientists from Iran and the West could sit and discuss these issues, and there is a hope that Russian scientists and technical people could contribute to that debate. This process should be matched with encouraging the immediate implementation of the additional protocol in Iran.

It was recognized however that the time is drawing closer when UN Security Council may impose sanctions. Problems were discussed regarding the need to better identify an agenda for the process in the absence of a mutual interpretation between the E3+3 and Iran.

There is some discussion on the impact of a new UNSC resolution on the outcome of the Review Conference. Some warned that this could be risky and might have a consequence for the NPT that is not productive.

**Looking forward**

The bilateral US-Russian relationship is watched closely in other parts of the world. Further progress in arms control, disarmament, and revision of nuclear doctrines to decrease reliance on nuclear weapons will be needed to send the appropriate signals that the two countries take seriously their Article VI commitments under the NPT.

It is important to set a further process in motion now, as some raised the question, What will happen after Obama and Medvedev?

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12 Please note this section pre-dates the recent announcement of the agreement between Turkey, Brazil, and Iran and the recent US announcement regarding sanctions.
Final Schedule

24 April, Saturday
Main arrivals day

25 April, Sunday
14:00 – 17:00 Business lunch at the upper floor of the hotel, followed by orientation and introductory overviews:

- Overview, “New Russian-US Nuclear Treaty: Problems and Prospects” by Dr. Alexander Pikaev, director of the Nuclear Disarmament program at the Institute for World Economy and International Relations
- Overview, “Current State of Russian-Western Relations (Russia-EU, Russia-NATO)” by Victor Mizin, former MFA official, currently deputy director of the Institute for International Studies, Moscow State Institute of International Relations
- Overview of the program of the visit and information on ministries and agencies by Prof. Alexander Nikitin, member of International Pugwash Council, Director of the Center for Euro-Atlantic Security
- Delegation discussed potential international initiatives and approaches which it would be presenting to the Russian ministries and Parliamentary committees.

26 April, Monday
10:00 – 12:30 Discussion “New Nuclear Reality and Russian-Western Relations” at the International Federation for Peace and Conciliation (prospect Mira, 36) Discussion was attended by ~20 Russian experts. Presentations by:
- Dr. Viktor Kamyshanov, President of the Federation for Peace and Conciliation (presentation “Public Monitoring of the Disarmament”)
- Dr. Andrey Zagorsky, Director of the Center for War and Peace Studies, MGIMO University
- Dr. Sergey Oznobishchenev, Director, Institute for Strategic Assessments (presentation on “Russian Reaction to New Start: Time to Change Pattern in Russian-Western Relations”)
• Valery Zemskov, former official of the Russian MFA and of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, currently researcher at the Center for Euro-Atlantic Security (presentation “New Patterns of Military Integration”)

15:00 – 16:30 Visit to the Russian State Duma (lower Chamber of the Parliament). Meeting with MPs and experts from Defense and Security committees: Meeting is co-chaired by MP Igor Puzanov (Committee for Defense) and MP Sergei Kolesnikov, co-president of IPPNW, Deputy Chair of the Committee of Protection of Health, Russia State Duma

17:00 – 18:00 Meeting with leadership of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Presidium of the Academy, Leninsky prospect)
• Meeting with two First Deputy President of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Acad. A. Andreev),
• Director of the Arms Control Program at the Moscow Carnegie Center Academy corr. member Alexey Arbatov
• Deputy Director of the Institute for World Economy and International relations Academy corr. member Vladimir Baranovsky
• Director of the Institute for Oriental Studies Dr. Vitaly Naumkin
• Director of the International Nuclear Center at Dubna Acad. Alexander Syssakyan

20:00 Dinner meeting (at the hotel) with former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia Andrey Kozyrev

27 April, Tuesday
10:00 – 12:15 Discussion at the Institute for Contemporary Development. Topic of discussion: “Russia in NATO Someday? Future for Russia-NATO Relations”. Meeting is chaired by Institute’s Chairman of the Management Board Igor Yurgens. Presentations by:
• Dr. Tatiana Parkhalina, Director of the Center for European Security,
• Lt.-General (Ret.) Eugeny Buzhinsky, in 2001-2009 Chief of the International Treaties Department, Ministry of Defense
• Maj.-General (Ret.) Vladimir Rubanov, Chief of “Informexpertise”
• and by other ICD researchers.

13:00 – 14:00 Visit to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Meeting with Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov (responsibility area – security and disarmament) and officials from the Security and Disarmament department of the MFA.

14:30 – 16:00 Visit to the Council of Federation (upper Chamber of the Parliament) Dr. Sergey Kortunov, Chief of Expert Group of the Committee on Defense and Security, Council of Federation, and Dr. Alexander Korotaev, Advisor to the Chairman of the Committee

17:00 – 18:30 Visit to the Institute for Strategic Stability of the “ROSATOM” State Corporation (former Atomic Ministry). Meeting with the former Minister for Atomic Energy Acad. Viktor Mikhailov and experts of the Institute for Strategic Stability.