Composite Report of
Pugwash Consultations on Pakistan
June – October 2009

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Pugwash Project on South Asia Dialogue
The report was drafted by Moeed Yusuf (Part I), Sandra Butcher (Part II) and Paolo Cotta Ramusino. We also owe our gratitude to the Atlantic Council, the Research Society for International Law, Pakistan and the Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Pakistan for assistance in compiling minutes of the various meetings.

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INTRODUCTION

The Pugwash Conferences brings together, from around the world, influential scientists, scholars and public figures concerned with reducing the danger of armed conflict (especially when nuclear weapons are present) and seeking cooperative solutions for global problems. In line with its mission, Pugwash has remained deeply involved in South Asia, organizing track-II dialogues on Kashmir, regional relations, and confidence building measures about nuclear weapons. In its most recent effort, Pugwash launched a comprehensive track-II effort that sought to bring together Pakistani and US experts to discuss Pakistan-US ties, arguably one of the most critical and complex interstate relations today.

Our aim was to help bring about a better understanding of the respective positions of the two sides and to determine the most obvious possibilities for the improvement of the relations. This is important given that a sustained Pakistan-US partnership is crucial for the stability in the region. Yet, it is also a fact that the two sides face an ever-widening trust deficit. Tangible tensions over issues such as the drones, the so-called Af-Pak policy, the ‘do more’ message from Washington, and Pakistan’s continued concerns about India, among others are becoming more and more visible.

The effort was undertaken in two phases. Initially, we put together a series of meetings with a broad spectrum of policy shapers in Pakistan in June 2009. The meetings were focused on the Pakistan-US bilateral relationship, but other topics related to regional stability were addressed as well. Topics covered included: (i) addressing extremist and radical movements in Pakistan and in the region; (ii) management of the military operation in Afghanistan and in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas as well as the so called Af-Pak strategy; (iii) the India factor in determining Pakistan’s strategy; (iv) Pakistan’s nuclear weapons safety and security issues; and (v) the economic situation in Pakistan and the role of foreign (and particularly US) aid.

The timeliness of the meetings was confirmed by the extreme interest among Pakistani participants. A total of 150 academics, policy makers, military experts, economists, businessmen, and members of the media and civil society attended the meetings. Meetings were also held with Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) from Swat, religious leaders, and individual experts. The Pugwash team met with Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani during the visit and is thankful to him for taking time to meet with us.

Having established the Pakistani opinion on Pakistan-US ties, we brought over eight senior Pakistanis, including former ambassadors, generals, a member of parliament, an eminent legal scholar, and a nationally regarded journalist to Washington DC in October 2009. Representing the sentiment that emanated from the June meetings in Pakistan, they held a series of meetings and consultations with senior American policy makers and experts. These ranged from very private discussions in the ‘corridors of power’ to roundtables at influential think tanks, and from a press breakfast with national media to working dinners. The dialogues provided a welcome opportunity for an exchange of views and most importantly for some creative thinking as to how to direct Pakistan-US relations on a more positive trajectory. This round of meetings took place during a key moment in the immediate aftermath of the controversy surrounding the new US aid legislation (the “Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009”) and just prior to US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s visit to Pakistan. Once again, the timeliness was manifested by the extreme interest presence of this high profile Pakistani delegation generated across Washington.

The following report is a composite of the perspectives and opinions expressed in both phases, with an emphasis on identifying areas where further action and dialogue is needed. As with all Pugwash meetings, there was no attempt to seek consensus and the views in this report should not be attributed to any one participant.
Pugwash would like to thank the following organizations for working with us in organizing and planning the set of consultations in Washington: Brookings Institution, Atlantic Council, National Academy of Sciences, Heritage Foundation, New America Foundation, and the Henry L. Stimson Center. We would especially like to acknowledge the support of The Ploughshares Fund and ML Resources Social Vision for their generous contribution in support of this series of consultations. Finally, we would be remiss not to appreciate Mr. Moeed Yusuf (now with USIP) for conceptualizing and organizing this series of meetings. Without his strategic vision, the effort may not have been possible.

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SUMMARY OF MAIN POINTS

While the composite reports details all the issues discussed and the sentiments from both sides, some of the key elements flowing out of the discussions are as follows:

The importance of ensuring a cordial Pak-US relationship cannot be overstated. A sustained Pakistan-US partnership is crucial for the stability in the South Asian region. While disagreements exist on a number of issues, there is appreciation of the need to bring about a better understanding of the respective positions of the two sides and to determine the most obvious possibilities for further collaboration. Disagreements regarding the so-called Af-Pak policy, Washington’s desire for Pakistan to collaborate more deeply, and Pakistan’s continued concerns about India, among others need to be addressed at the highest level. This desire is already pervasive among the expert community on both sides.

Experts from both countries are agreed that it is imperative to prevail over the terrorist menace. US and Pakistan should appreciate each other’s political constraints. There is also a need to remain sensitive to the national sentiment on both sides; mere semantics have in the past caused disgruntlement and led to tensions. The military strategy must be broadened and the economic and social aspects of the strategy to normalize Pakistan’s troubled tribal belt must be set into motion at a faster pace. A number of lessons can be learnt from Pakistan’s Swat experience. The future of peace deals, national support for the Pakistan Army’s operations, and relief and rehabilitation of the displaced Pakistani should further operations be undertaken are aspects which will be informed by the Swat experience.

Participants acknowledged the presence of regional issues that are affecting Pakistan’s ability to tackle extremism within its borders. We support the early resolution of the Kashmir dispute, continued liberalization of trade and human exchange across the LoC in the meantime, and the eventual normalization of the Pakistan-India dispute. The two South Asian nations need to collaborate on the issue of terrorism while remaining sensitive to each other’s concerns. The US remains seriously concerned about bilateral tensions between these nuclear armed nations.

Ultimately, terrorism will only be defeated when constructive opportunities for the future South Asian generations are ensured through economic prosperity. Terrorism and extremism should nevertheless not be confused nor the first should be considered as a mere consequence of the latter. Economic distress complicates the situation: Pakistan remains in dire need of sustained economic assistance which the ‘Friends of Pakistan’ must provide in order to alleviate the suffering of the Pakistani people. Specifically, US-Pakistan ties must continue to follow the Obama administration’s vision of a broad-based relationship which seeks to improve the lives of the Pakistani people. Transparency and efficiency in spending US assistance remains a major concern. The Pakistan government must ensure effective use of US resources.

Pugwash maintains that all nuclear weapons (irrespective of the country possessing them) are intrinsically insecure. Yet, while they exist, the safety and security of the arsenals must be ensured. Pakistan is no exception. Pakistan’s efforts in improving its (multilayered) command and control system, enhancing the safety and security of the nuclear arsenal, and strengthening its export control regime and management of nuclear material after the AQ Khan affair is recognized. However, the world remains concerned about the Pakistani arsenal’s safety and security and thus Pakistan, like any other nuclear state, must continue to take steps to reassure the world community.

To reiterate, we fully support the virtual consensus among all participants that there is no option but to continue engaging on the issue of Pak-US relations. A rupture in the ties will prove to be very negative for both short and long term interests of the two parties.
General Comments and Concerns

1. One cannot avoid noticing that the concerns about and the diffidence towards the US seem to be quite widespread in Pakistan. There are issues about which the consensus is rather general, such as the concerns about US military activities inside Pakistan (in particular the use of drones) that are generally seen as politically counterproductive, irrespectively of their supposed military value. Concerns about the US strategy in Afghanistan and its consequences on Pakistan are also widespread (see below). Quite a few participants pointed out that the extremism in Afghanistan and North-western Pakistan is mainly the result of the Afghan jihad against the Soviets that was originally supported by the US. Complaints were also heard – in varying degrees and with different perspectives – about the US role in Pakistan’s internal politics, with particular reference to the support given to and the influence exerted upon different Pakistani Governments. The “special relationship” between US and India was also mentioned as a major worry.

2. There is the general perception that Pakistan’s image, as presented in the West, is exceptionally negative. This has ramifications for Pakistan including consequences for the economic well being of the country. Further, since Islam features prominently in the Pakistani ethos, the prevalent negative perception of the Islamic world in the US (and the western world in general) is also part of the problem. In this respect one should add that President Obama’s stance on relations with the Islamic world has been generally appreciated; expectations of a more conciliatory policy are quite evident.

3. There is a marked difference in tone between US official statements and the independent expert opinions expressed about Pakistan. For the most part, much of the alarm regarding Pakistan is flowing from the American press and media. Part of the problem seems to be the lack of transparency in official dialogues between Pakistan and the US. Both countries are engaged in ‘double speak’ which results in mixed signals and often incorrect information making its way into the public domain. This, many contended, lies at the heart of the misperception created about Pakistan. Participants were of the view that the US counterparts understood Pakistan’s compulsions and concerns but often turned a blind eye to the negative publicity Islamabad receives as a means to maintain pressure on Pakistan. In any case, the mistrust at both levels is real and must be kept in mind while designing policies.

4. A relevant grey area is the role that the international press routinely assigns to specific Pakistani Institutions. Notable is the case of ISI that is quite often described in the international press as a sort of “mother of all the murky operations” if not an instrument that directly supports insurgency, the Taliban, and terrorism in general. ISI instead of an instrument of the state, is presented as a sort of independent actor. While the practice and the guidelines of ISI were not discussed in detail in our meetings, there was a clear sense of unease with such blanket, good vs. evil categorization. There is a need to understand the complexity of each situation and present a nuanced view on the issue, including the ISI’s role.

5. Pakistani officials present at the meeting acknowledged that there is much more cooperation between US and Pakistan than is generally assumed. However, they were quick to add that
much is left to be desired since virtually all of the collaboration falls within the tactical realm; the broader, strategic aspect still leaves much to be desired.

6. Pakistani experts were unanimous in raising concerns about America’s indifference towards their country’s territorial integrity. The drone attacks were singled out as an example of a controversial policy that defies international law and is at best producing mixed results. It was recommended that Pakistan’s territorial integrity be kept in mind in all US actions (drones, legislative acts, or any other decisions). The sentiment prevailed even when the US stance that drone strikes are coordinated was brought up.

7. One of the fundamental questions raised was whether America is willing to invest in Pakistan’s well-being over the long run. Few if any in Pakistan are convinced that the US is decided on ensuring a permanent strategic partnership that goes well beyond the present interest in the so called “War on Terror”. The current relationship is largely seen as transactional with a one-point agenda, i.e. eliciting support for fighting militancy. There is therefore an urgent need to set into motion commitments that bind both sides into a long-term partnership. The spirit of the Kerry Lugar bill was appreciated in this regard (the specifics however receive lukewarm reception as discussed below). The ultimate objective seen as most desirable by Pakistani experts is to generate mutually beneficial interests, with Pakistan gaining from U.S. economic and military aid, and America finding a stable and reliable partner in a democratic Pakistan.

Regional Problems

8. The burden of history is ever present in the Pakistani mind. To begin with, as one prominent Islamic scholar reminded us, it was Afghanistan where the US used Islam for political goals by promoting the jihad against the Soviets. In this way, a monster was created that has come back to haunt everyone. Even the religious political parties who benefited from the Jihad (such as the JI) today seem not to have any sympathy for the US role.

9. Pakistanis point out that while there was not a single Afghan or Pakistani involved among the 9/11 attackers, people from these two countries have borne the brunt of the War on Terror.

10. The prevailing view among Pakistani experts of all denominations is that the US campaign in Afghanistan will fail to bring order and normalcy to the country and that Pakistan will once again be left to deal with an unstable Afghanistan. The precedent from the 1980s remains at the fore of Pakistani minds. Most Pakistanis we met were convinced that the Taliban will be able to force America out. This perception, incidentally, is self-defeating as it prompts more locals to join the Taliban, creates perverse incentives for the militants to increase America’s misery as much as possible in the short run, and leaves the Pakistani government in a lurch.

11. There is widespread discontent with America’s operations in Afghanistan, even though the motivations for the discontent vary considerably. While most Pakistani experts realize the negative implications of a sudden US pull-out from the region, there was periodic reference to the popular sentiment drawn by the civilian causalities due to America’s attacks on Afghanistan (and Pakistan). In this sense, hearts and mind seem not to conquered in Afghanistan (and Pakistan)

12. The Pakistani attitude towards the Afghan Taliban is not a sympathetic one in general. Some however, do point to that fact that the Taliban were able to restore order and a certain degree of security inside Afghanistan. Moreover, those who are strongly opposed to the US military
presence value the Afghan Taliban as fighters against foreign occupation, a goal that to them is praiseworthy.

13. At the same time, US presence in Afghanistan is not working to assuage Pakistani security concerns. In this regard, the India factor looms large in the Pakistani calculus. Pakistani experts dismiss the external pressure on Pakistan to redirect its entire effort to the western border as being detached from the on-ground reality. To the Pakistani mind, President Obama’s backtracking on playing an active role in resolving Kashmir was unfortunate. Pakistanis reminded us that the US Congress itself has previously passed resolutions on Kashmir which put it under a moral obligation to nudge India to reciprocate Pakistan’s flexibility. In essence, Pakistani policy wielders judge America to have clearly tilted its policy in India’s favor. They see America as paying lip service to Pakistan’s outstanding disputes vis-à-vis India.

14. On the other hand, the Af-Pak terminology is disliked and has received strong criticism from Pakistan. Pakistani intelligentsia is not pleased with a de-hyphenation of the Indo-Pak equation and the hyphenation of the Pak-Afghan calculus. The reason for this is not only national pride but also the perception that the ‘real’ danger emanates from India. For Pakistanis, hyphenation implies that Pakistan is considered to be part of the war in Afghanistan. This conflates Pakistani priorities with the goals of the coalition forces in Afghanistan – never have these aligned completely.

15. There is a strong desire to reinitiate the composite dialogue between India and Pakistan. The attitude towards India is not one of blind hostility. It is an attitude of serious concern mixed with the desire for reconciliation (generally meant). In fact, the skepticism towards US interests in the region is deeper and stronger.

16. Pakistan cannot be expected to defer Kabul’s future to America’s discretion. And it certainly is not willing to see Indian presence, which it contends is growing, on its western border. The US must think of mechanisms through which Pakistan’s security concerns in Afghanistan can be addressed. Many believe that the problem of Indian presence in Afghanistan must be addressed to pacify Pakistani fears of Indian encirclement. In general the need of initiatives promoting regional cooperation and better reciprocal understanding is strongly felt; this applies to the entire region from Iran to India.

17. Pakistan’s concerns about US indifference towards Indian activities go further. America’s reluctance to question India on its involvement in Balochistan and according to some, its undeniable role in FATA concerns Pakistanis as well.

**Managing the Border between Pakistan and Afghanistan**

18. Pakistan sees the need for Afghanistan and the US to own up to the fact that failure across the border is causing serious headaches for Pakistan. The flow of militancy is viewed as a bidirectional phenomenon. Pakistanis acknowledge that FATA is worrying the coalition forces, but they also contend that armed militants acting against the Pakistan military are also not being tackled on the Afghan side.

19. Participants highlighted that presently the 2400 km border between Afghanistan and Pakistan is severely under-manned. The Afghan government is not willing to expand the number of check posts on its side of the border despite Pakistani requests. The Pakistani government has established 825 checkpoints vs. 120 checkpoints set up by across the Durand Line. The
Pakistani perception is that the control of the border on the Afghan side is weak, if not non-existent.

20. Pakistani proposals for arresting the flow of armed militants across the Durand line have not been heeded to. Pakistan has offered to set-up biometric facilities on the Afghan border which would help track cross-border movement. However, the Afghan government has not agreed to the proposition.

21. By the same token, Pakistan would prefer to fence the Durand line; again, both the US and Afghanistan have not been receptive to the proposal. The usual reply to this contention is that the Durand Line is a sensitive issue and Afghanistan cannot be forced to accept fencing. Moreover, such measures are believed to undermine the easement rights which are legally binding on the Pakistan and Afghan governments. This needs clarification:

- If a decision is taken to fence Durand Line, legally it shall not require any changes in the Durand Line treaty between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

- It is a common misunderstanding that the text of Durand Line treaty allows easement rights and people can cross over at will. The legal position is that easement rights are not even mentioned in the Durand Line treaty.

- Easement rights have evolved outside the treaty through practice between tribes divided by the border. These rights are however not available to other ordinary nationals of Afghanistan or Pakistan. Therefore, people randomly crossing Durand line can be legitimately stopped and checked. If fencing is done or travel documents issued, it will be legally permissible and perfectly doable under the Durand Line treaty.

- The trade routes / passes on Durand Line were established by a separate treaty. Trade routes are not legal basis of easement. Based on these misperceptions it is sometimes argued that Durand Line will be legally diluted, which is actually not the case.

- This fencing of Durand Line will decrease drug trafficking, movement of criminal and terrorist elements, and smuggling. It will not however affect non-treaty easement rights of divided tribes, bilateral trade between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and transit trade with third states.

22. The US-Pak-Afghan tripartite commission’s efficient functioning is crucial to the success of the fight in Afghanistan. While the Commission has performed well in pockets, for the most part, tensions have resulted in sub-optimal performance. Thus far, the goal of developing complete synergy in the aims and operations of the three sides has remained elusive.

23. There needs to be better coordination in US and Pakistani policies. The concerns raised by Pakistan about the US troop surge in Afghanistan were echoed in our meetings. Similarly, participants raised the issue of a massive loss of arms from the Afghan Army some of which have found their way into Pakistan and are being used by the Taliban.

24. The US argument that poppy cultivation has a livelihood dimension may be true but its effect on Pakistan in terms of drugs trade, funding of the militants, and drug abuse is not taken into consideration. Again, this is another example of the divergence in the goals of the two sides.
where Pakistanis see the US as pursuing its own agenda without any regard for the fallout on Pakistan.

**Assistance to the Pakistani Military: Views from the Military**

25. Pakistani military continues to question US reluctance to enhance its counter-insurgency capacity. Thus far, while much cooperation has taken place – the US is increasing its support to training of the Pakistani para-military forces –, assistance in terms of weapons systems has not been as forthcoming.

26. Pakistani experts raised objection to the constant American worry that some of the requested equipment may be used to bolster Pakistan’s capability against India. They are perturbed by this and argue that as an ally, it is their right to request systems that bolster its overall capability. Not to acknowledge this would once again be tantamount to the transactional relationship Pakistanis so vehemently oppose. Participants invoked the demand for equality with India; they pointed to joint defense production agreements and the nuclear deal that may well impact India’s military equation vis-à-vis Pakistan.

27. Drones were specifically raised time and again. Pakistani military experts see an easy fix in terms of legitimizing the strikes: the US ought to hand over operational control to Pakistan.

**The Interplay of Insurgency, Ideology and Criminality: The Example of Swat**

28. The terms insurgency, terrorism, radical Islamic movements are often confused and used interchangeably. In reality, one has to distinguish the characteristics of the different groups of militants one is dealing with and view them accordingly.

29. The case of Swat has been of particular interest for our group. The tribal structure, the main reference point for the area for decades has undergone a significant loss of authority. Main problems affecting the people have been the lack of quick and reliable justice and the economic constraints. The state has been unable to address these; citizens have lost hope in its ability to do so altogether.

30. The power vacuum in Swat was filled by a group of individuals (Sufi Mohammad and, later, his son in law Maulana Fazlullah) who started as preachers and gradually became involved in militancy. They increased their leverage by a combination of coercion, promotion of so called “Islamic” ideology, and offering selected job opportunities and other economic incentives to those who were involved in keeping their “order”. All these activities were de facto tolerated by the state (due to lack of means, political will and/or capabilities).

31. Following the tradition of supporting the jihad against the Soviets, immediately after 9/11 Sufi Mohammed organized groups of people (in the range of 10,000) who departed for Afghanistan to support the Taliban. The State allowed them to leave hoping in this way to get rid of some trouble makers. Many of those voluntary Mujahideen were killed, a fact to which the Pakistani state turned a blind eye.

32. The Swat militants were/are substantially a local movement that undoubtedly grew with the help of some unspecified external financial support. After the short-lived (Nizam-e-Adl deal, the Government of Pakistan decided to intervene militarily. The civilian population was then
evacuated; partly it was put in make shift camps while the majority was forced to relocate itself with relatives, friends, host families, etc outside the Swat valley.

33. As “order” as been restored in Swat, the real challenge of rehabilitating people and their livelihood begins now. The risk, for the time being, is not so much that a Taliban-like ideology will be back in Swat (Sufi Mohammad’s example is seen as problem not a solution), but that the popular resentment against the Pakistani state and the US, the latter perceived to be calling the shots, will significantly increase and have an uncertain outcome. The brutality of the military intervention in Swat can be only condoned if a serious effort is made to reconstruct decent living conditions for the civilian population.

34. The solution to the Swat problem lies in swift reconstruction, spurred by a significant international aid, with the proviso that the aid will be effectively aimed at improving the well being of the civilian population and not be recycled to international contractors or funneled into the various bureaucratic structures of Pakistan.

35. The example of Swat illustrates the interplay between militancy, economic interests, aspects of criminality, ideology, and the responsibility –or the lack of it – of the State. It also illustrates the need for the main outside power (US) not to exercise pressure on the basis of a simplistic vision of the local realities.

36. The mix of ideology, criminality, and local interests is not the same for the militants or insurgents in all situations (this is true for western Pakistan as well Afghanistan). A thorough analysis is required for each case; only then can policy makers decide what policy to pursue. The precise combination of use of force and accommodation ought to flow from this.

37. The goal for all involved actors should be to see how they can effectively contribute to the improvement of the lives of the population at large in the affected areas. Without this, no stable “victory” is possible. Compromises with the Taliban and the militants in general are possible and should not be completely ruled out provided the result will be improvement of the living conditions of the people. A generalized military confrontation is not the solution. Certainly, victory will remain elusive if we continue to take out certain number of militants but also inflict heavy “collateral damage” each time. This only creates more militants.

38. From the Pakistani view point, the confrontation towards militancy in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area is not a ‘single” conflict. There is objectively no interest for Pakistan to be fully involved in what is happening outside its borders, namely in Afghanistan. And inside Pakistan, the confrontation with militants should be carried on but with an eye on the problems caused for Pakistan itself and with the one-point agenda of improving the situation on the ground. As involvement with the US mission blurs the line of what is in Pakistan’s interest, many Pakistanis ask what the real US objective is and why Pakistan is joining the US in this fight?

39. The ideological aspects of the militancy are critical for our understanding. There is no doubt that the ideology of the militants does, one way or another, reflect what is generally called “radical Islam”, specially with reference to the Deobandi and the Salafist traditional thinking. Again, one has to be very careful not to assume that the ideology of the militants is the “true” consequence of say the Deobandi school. Indeed, the ideology can and should be questioned; but as participants pointed out, the best way to fight or question an idea is to introduce a “better” idea.
40. A prominent role can be played by Islamic scholars and religious leaders. Even the variety of the so-called ‘Islamic’ parties can promote reasoning different from the one dominant among certain types of militants. Learned and informed Islamic scholars who criticize the Taliban ideology and practice can effectively question the politico-religious assumptions of the militants. It is not by chance that many of these scholars are under direct threat and few of them have been killed. Nonetheless, we should be clear that within the world of Islamic discourse, there are there are powerful voices who oppose the world view supported by the most radical Islamic movements.

41. Talking about the role of radical “Islamic movements”, Pakistan’s perception as the country with the strongest Islamic movements is not supported by facts. It is a common belief that if many of the so called “moderate” Arab states were to have fair elections, Islamists would most likely take power. The case is much the opposite in Pakistan.

42. One problem often mentioned is the role of madrassas in propagating radical Islam. There are about 17,000 madrassas in Pakistan with about 2 million students (200,000 graduating each year). Madrassas play a substantial role in the education of Pakistani youth, especially for the poorest strata. About 1,000 madrassas operate outside state control. Of these, few tens are active in promoting radicalism. While no short term solutions seem available, the state must continue attempts to exert stricter control on the curricula and sources of funding. Also there is a disproportionate amount of madrassas controlled by the Deobandis (say about 80%) while only about 20% of madrassas are controlled by the Barelvis; the percentage of followers of the two denominations of Islamic schools is in exactly the reverse order. All said and done, participants argued that the problems related to the madrassas should be addressed by the Pakistani institutions without interference from the US. The US is not considered an honest broker in this and other matters pertaining to religion.

43. Talking about public education, majority of Pakistani students are enrolled in public schools (at least ten times more than madrassas). The quality of public schools should also be a source for concern.

Sensitivity to Pakistani Constraints

44. Participants pointed out that Pakistan was under a legal obligation to conduct the military operation against the Taliban (UNSC Resolution 1373). It is doing so; this demonstrates that it is both willing and capable to fight against terrorist elements. That said, Pakistanis do not want the US to consider the issue of terrorism in simplistic black and white terms. Pakistani experts and officials alike were unanimous in arguing that the Pakistan Army must operate on its own terms, keeping in mind the context at home. The US’ visible discomfort with Pakistani deals with militants and the delay in launching a military operation created greater political complications at home. It is also important to note that the Swat operation does not suggest that the Pakistani Army has decided to use utmost military force across the board.

45. Today, each of the FATA agencies, Swat and Malakand, and other adjoining areas have a different dynamic in play and therefore must be dealt with differently. Pakistan is likely to treat

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1 It was pointed out to us that the most serious theological mistakes made by self-promoted Islamic radical leaders are: (a) the belief that the establishment or the implementation of religion is an absolute obligation and that the means do not matter; (b) the world is divided into dar ul Islam (realm of Islam) and dar ul harb (realm of war); (c) eradicating evil by force is an obligation; and (d) there are Muslims and there are infidels; the latter can (should) be killed
each situation on a case-to-case basis and therefore the extent and nature of military operations
and its mix with other alternatives could vary depending on the situation at hand. A negative
verdict should therefore not be passed on any effort by the Pakistani authorities to resolve the
militancy problem through means other than the military operation. That said, support for the
Taliban or the Taliban-like movements in the Pashtun area is not appreciated by the local
populace. Quite often local Pashtuns supported the Taliban due to shear intimidation; again, to
a Pakistani expert this is obvious given that the Taliban had challenged the very ethos of the
Pashtun culture by regularly targeting jirgas.

46. On another specific issue, the Berman Bill on the Hill makes a legislative presumption that Al-
Qaida and Jamat-ud-Dawa (of Hafiz Saeed) are in the same bracket and that the Government of
Pakistan needs to take action against them and their headquarters to qualify for aid. The
presumption that Al-Qaida and Hafiz Saeed are one is legally inaccurate because JD has
challenged its listing before UNSC Committee under 1267 and denied that it is linked with Al-
Qaida. The matter is sub-judice in the UN. Further, it presumes that Al-Qaida in formally
present in Lahore which is again incorrect. Such a provision shall provoke JD and its followers
unnecessarily. Moreover, in the eyes of most Pakistanis, this amounts to a US effort to exert
pressure on the Pakistani judiciary and use aid as an instrument for arm-twisting.

Terrorism

47. Pakistan has been victim of many acts of terrorism that have cost dearly in terms of human
lives, infrastructure, and economic well. The fact that Pakistan is almost always portrayed as
the source of terrorism in its neighborhood is deeply resented.

48. Terrorism is a complex phenomenon. Saying that terrorists are a spill-over of militant
movements does not imply that all militant movements comprise of terrorist outfits. Global
evidence from the past four decades suggests that terrorism is a complex interplay between
ideological motivations (related to political or nationalistic militancy) and individual desire of
“doing something big” or of changing the political reality by some exemplary act (possibly in
turn motivated by some desire of revenge), and is often helped along by support from specific
authorities and external funding from various – not always clear – origins.

49. The covering-up factor and even more than that, the external funding to terrorists should be
better understood. The presence of a large number of foreign (Arabs, Chechens, Uzbeks, etc)
militants in FATA, the ease with which weapons can be acquired in FATA, the large amount of
money coming in part from drug trafficking, among others are certainly worrisome elements
and point to the need for having better control of the area. In this regard, cooperation between
the US and Pakistan is pivotal as there are factors that lie outside Pakistan’s direct control.

50. One issue that came up frequently was the possibility of integrating FATA into the NWFP.
There are, on paper, obvious advantages of this proposal. However, issues arise when one
considers the local sentiment of the people of FATA and particularly the need to maintain
traditional autonomous prerogatives of the region (the suppression of which could only be
successfully carried out if tangible improvement of the economic and social standards of living
is ensured within a short period of time). While the issue of integrating FATA within NWFP
should be kept on the agenda and examined thoroughly, a hasty decision was not supported.
The Pakistani Nuclear Program

51. Pakistan has been forthcoming in improving its (multilayered) command and control system and the safety and security of the nuclear arsenal. Moreover, its role in strengthening its export control regime and management of nuclear material has been acknowledged. To the extent possible, Pakistan has also regularly briefed local and foreign interested parties about the progress in this regard.

52. The A.Q. Khan affair has been a source of embarrassment for Pakistan, but many other countries contributed one way or another to the A.Q. Khan network as well. About A.Q. Khan’s motivations, it has been privately pointed out that, besides economic gains, A.Q. Khan was probably also motivated by the desire to facilitate the acquisition of nuclear weapons for the larger Islamic community. While ideologically or economically motivated proliferators are certainly a serious cause for concern, the specific problem of A.Q. Khan, Pakistanis contend is now under control. The Pakistani Personnel Reliability program is strong and robust.

53. The reality of the matter is that all nuclear weapons (irrespective of the country possessing them) are intrinsically insecure. In comparative terms, why then should Pakistani nuclear weapons be more insecure than others? For example, the question has been asked “what information do we have about the security of nuclear weapons in India or Israel?” In terms of the risk of unauthorized use or launch by accident, the use of PALs and the recessed posture reduces the possibility.

54. Pakistani nuclear weapons are India-specific, namely they are an answer to India’s nuclear arsenal. Anything like the deployment of Indian BMD systems or expansion of the Indian Nuclear weapons program will exacerbate the situation and make it more unstable. To the contrary, the restart of the dialogue with India, joint discussions on nuclear restraints, strategic stability, conventional balance and the moratorium on testing – more generally initiation of the peace process – will lower the risks and could gradually result in reduced emphasis on nuclear weapons.

55. Scenarios have been described in the international press in which Pakistani nuclear weapons could be “lost” to militants, Taliban, or other radical movements. The scenarios include an Iran-type situation with a full revolution or a situation in which the Army can no longer control the insurgents. Both cases are not realistic, at least no more realistic than the worst-case scenarios than one can imagine for many nuclear states in different parts of the world.

56. Still, the scenarios described above are talked about quite often and, in relation to these scenarios the idea is spread that the US may prepare contingency plans to take out the Pakistani nuclear weapons.

57. Scenarios are also sketched where the US would attempt to disarm Pakistan forcibly. Washington’s reluctance to deny such plans or considerations is considered problematic. While experts dismiss these plans as unfeasible, they question why the US does not challenge this version to reassure Pakistan. As contingency plans call for other contingency plans, the attitude in Pakistan is that Pakistan should also prepare itself to defend against any such eventuality. It is not clear whether these Pakistani preparations will make the situation safer and more unstable. Again consider the case of India and Israel in comparative terms; both have terrorism issues within their borders. What would be their likely response were America to ask for intrusiveness into their nuclear programs? Pakistan’s efforts and relative keenness to prove itself must be appreciated in this light.
58. Those most skeptical in Pakistan believe that the nuclear frenzy is intentionally created to keep leverage over Pakistan. It is a pressure tactic often employed to put Islamabad on the back foot. Yet, it is counterproductive as it does not in any way lessen Pakistan’s resolve to retain its capability but does add fuel to the already negative US perception in the country.

59. The view that the AQ Khan affair is being kept alive as a pressure tactic finds even greater resonance. Given the sensitivity of the environment and the hero status of Dr Khan this issue puts the Pakistani government’s support to the US in jeopardy unnecessarily. Pakistani officials pointed out that Pakistan has been extremely cooperative in seeking answers to virtually all proliferation related questions raised by the US.

60. The nuclear issue has to be dealt with regionally, with India taking the lead. It is unrealistic to expect Pakistan to take the initiative when India is maintaining and expanding its nuclear arsenal. Pakistan has in the past presented a number of proposals to reduce nuclear risk in South Asia; in fact, it also tabled a NWFZ proposal. Pakistan’s position is clear: it wants a South Asia which is not held hostage to the possibility of a nuclear catastrophe and wants India to be an active partner in ensuring this. Pakistan’s position on CTBT and NPT is linked to India’s.

61. The US should play an active role in supporting Nuclear Risk Reduction Measures in South Asia. Thus far, Washington has been reluctant to do so.

62. Pakistanis insist that they have learnt and moved on from the proliferation scandal. Therefore, they are displeased with constant efforts to deny Pakistan equal treatment with other non-NPT signatories. Most participants believed that the US could negate all Pakistani concerns in the nuclear field by making it offers comparable to India. The civil nuclear energy deal with India has left Pakistanis bitter; they take it as a clear sign of America’s tilt towards New Delhi. Some claim that a similar deal with Pakistan should therefore be considered seriously. Apart from assisting Pakistan in meeting part of its energy needs, the move will play a major role in silencing critics of US policy in Pakistan. Others however argue normatively and point out that US-India nuclear deal is an unfortunate development, as will be any further deals containing similar provisions with other countries.

### Economic Relationships

63. Pakistani economic experts seek a revision of the presently transactional nature of the relationship with the US. The constant reminder of Pakistan being an expensive strategic partner for the US is not well received. During our meetings, quite a few participants repeatedly said that Pakistan needs mainly ‘trade’, not ‘aid’ from the US.

64. Specifically on aid, the US has not assisted Pakistan in overcoming the losses it has incurred in fighting militants. The $12 billion contributed by the Bush government is dismissed as a meager sum. Ideally, Pakistan would like to see both direct reimbursement as well as compensation for the ‘damages’ Pakistan’s involvement in the military activities has caused.

65. While Pakistanis remained appreciative of the new direction towards a holistic economic relationship under President Obama, the economic bills being debated in Washington have raised concerns:

- The aid being discussed is listed as ‘upto’ $1.5 billion per year. In other words, any amount would technically be compliant but there is no guarantee of the full amount being
provided. Without such a binding guarantee, the Pakistani Government cannot plan.
Therefore, the US Government must commit to the figure of $1.5 billion per year without
any possibility of a downward revision.

- Any aid bill for Pakistan should state that in case of any claims of the victims of acts
directly attributable to US action, the Government of Pakistan should have the right to
adjust the said claim from the annual aid being given pursuant to the Act.

66. Conditionalities on aid are extremely tricky. On the one hand, domestic compulsions for
American policy makers necessitate these. Yet, the Pakistani government demands minimizing
them. That said, lack of conditionalities often leads to leakage of funds and ultimately the
blame is transferred to the US for not supporting the Pakistani people.

67. Perhaps the US should consider providing funds with limited conditionalities but with an open
message to the Pakistani public which explains that the effectiveness of spending is the sole
responsibility of the Pakistani, not American authorities. However, whatever conditionalities
are imposed, they must be specific to performance in the sector they are being provided for, not
linked to terrorism.

68. Currently, 30-60 percent of the funds shown as ‘aid’ to Pakistan are actually repatriated in the
form of consultant fees, red tape, etc. Pakistan does not benefit from that money. The
composition of aid should therefore be altered. Local partners should be elicited in each case
such that Pakistani firms and nationals benefit as much as possible. This will also help generate
greater goodwill for the US. Moreover, commonly cited aid figures should only reflect the
amount actually delivered to Pakistan and utilized within the country.

69. USAID’s modus operandi of selecting projects and disbursing funds should be altered as well.
The Organization’s own reach is severely curtailed due to the security situation. Project
priorities are often decided behind closed doors without much input from the local communities
and key civil society stakeholders who are affected by the initiatives. Moreover, USAID often
tends to act without taking the local security context into account. For instance, development
and social uplift schemes in FATA are unlikely to deliver – they have not – under the present
environment. Therefore, initiatives have to be carefully targeted and timed with the help of
those with local knowledge to ensure maximum returns.

70. It was acknowledged during our meetings that the Coalition Support Funds supplied by the US
under President Bush were diverted in substantial amounts towards current expenditures of the
government. The military received only a certain proportion of the total. While US criticism on
this count is understandable, participants hoped that the US would comprehend the deeper and
more fundamental issue here, i.e. that Pakistan is a victim of the regional crisis and terrorism
and now finds itself in dire economic health. Therefore, rather than criticizing Pakistan for
diverting funds, the US should take on the responsibility and ensure adequate economic support
such the very need for diversion disappears.

71. Ultimately, Pakistan is after trade and investment from the US. Pakistan’s requests for a more
active partnership in this realm have been deferred since 9/11. Participants pointed to a number
of non-allied countries which have a more preferable trade arrangement with the US. Pakistani
exporters would ideally like to see zero-rated access for Pakistan’s principal exports in the
medium term. The goal from the Pakistani side is for the US to assist it in becoming highly
integrated in the global economy.
72. The general sentiment about the ROZs (Reconstruction Opportunity Zones) being created in FATA remained rather negative. Experts argued that the policy will be unable to deliver given the security environment and capacity issues in FATA. Also it is very difficult to establish an ROZ and promote the development of, say, textile industries in an area with no previous industrial experience in the sector. In order to do so, a Pakistani investor needs to be assured about the safety of his investment, provided substantial economic assistance, have the option of having visiting businessmen from western countries visit the area to check the quality of the product, etc. All these conditions look difficult to realize. It was also pointed out that making such a limited, economically isolated area a ROZ does not have any multiplier effects for the rest of the country. While there were suggestions for alternate models, the chief demand was to declare the entire Pakistan as an ROZ as far as goods destined to America are concerned.

73. On investment, Pakistani businessmen saw a negative US role. The frequent travel advisories for Pakistan and the perpetual hammering of a negative image in the media have kept even the most serious investors away. Compared to many other countries which have serious law and order problems, the US State Department has been hyperactive in raising alarm about physical presence of US citizens in Pakistan. This has hurt Pakistan’s investment attractiveness and kept western investors at bay. Pakistani businessmen argued that it is unrealistic to expect a western investor committing a specific job and then not being able to visit the area even briefly.

74. In the same vain, the long drawn out negotiations on the Bilateral Investment Treaty were raised. Differences have lingered as Pakistan has been demanding a more equitable treatment from the US rather than the generic formulae it applies to much of the developing world. A finalization of the agreement on terms acceptable to Pakistan is important for the Pak-US economic relationship.

75. Often held up as a pertinent example of US reluctance to support Pakistan’s economic needs is the lack of collaboration in the energy sector. Pakistan’s energy needs have made it desperate for a civilian nuclear energy deal. What is more, Pakistanis do not see the US as forthcoming in assisting in alternate energy sectors either. In fact, the pressure on Islamabad to pull out of the IPI without offering other options was yet again seen as a self-centered decision. The US has instead chosen to support the TAPI project which has no realistic possibility of coming on line for the foreseeable future.

76. The US financial support to the IDPs was lauded but a more active role was demanded across the board. They warned that both the Pakistani government and the friends of Pakistan should not underestimate the enormity of the rehabilitation challenge. They saw this as a perfect opportunity for the US to generate goodwill. They highlighted the spike in US popularity following the decision to use American Chinook helicopters in earthquake relief efforts in 2005. Similarly, visible, direct and transparent support to the IDPs is required. Given that the US is the principal party in the War, it does bear responsibility for coming out as the lead assister. Its overall financial pledge therefore needs to be increased rather than waiting for other ‘friends’ to deliver.

77. The Pakistan Aid package should specifically list a long term financial commitment from the US for the IDPs.
'Soft' Changes, Again

78. As mentioned, Pakistan experts showed concern about the constant alarm that surrounds Pakistan in the US press and media. The high profile nature of the War in Afghanistan has led U.S. officials to occasionally make provocative statements criticizing the Pakistani government’s inability to tame extremists. Such allegations disregard the thousands of Pakistani military and civilian casualties and the tremendous collateral damage. The rhetoric has played into the hands of the ultra-right. A more prudent approach is to tone down the aggressive communication through public channels, instead confining ‘hard diplomacy’ to behind-the-scenes negotiations.

79. Moreover, opinion pieces by some well-known policy experts have caused much distress as they are seen to be based on misinformation or an acutely exaggerated version of the problems Pakistan faces. Pakistanis argue that the US contention that these are independent opinions do not hold ground for an average Pakistani. These are enough to spur a reaction among the populous as well as those in the policy business. Moreover, these needlessly add value to the multiplicity of conspiracy theories floating around.

80. Constant allegations that Osama Bin Laden and Mullah Omar are in Pakistan and comfortably placed are equally counterproductive. Similarly the impression that the Quetta Shura is somehow operating publicly from Quetta and has been granted amnesty is troubling. Without evidence, such allegations only raise concerns and add to the mistrust. After all, the US with all its resources has been unable to capture or kill but a handful of the adversary’s leadership. The difficulty in doing so must be kept in mind.

81. By the same token, the constant, visible pressure on Pakistan to ‘do more’ is counterproductive as it elicits a negative popular response and makes it tougher for the Pakistani military to undertake the planned operations.

82. Another element of US policy that receives across the board criticism is the extreme visibility of US official visits to Pakistan. The US must not be seen meddling in Pakistani politics or attempting to arm-twist Pakistani policy makers. Pakistanis are not appreciative of the constant efforts of US officials to connect with political and military personalities in Pakistan. Participants thought that it was counterproductive both for the US and Pakistan if the former remained in the news and was seen as attempting to influence Pakistan. A much more preferable route is to deal in a low-key manner while only occasionally making public remarks of a specific nature.

83. The US has to decide once and for all to eliminate duplicity in terms of calling for democracy and then supporting military rule in Pakistan. This has been a long standing problem, one that has perhaps given more negative publicity to the US than any other limb of its policy. US support to Musharraf ended up being extremely unpopular and cost US diplomatically. Even now, the US sends mixed signals by continuously making statements in favor of the Army and US officials regularly meeting the Army top brass. There should be an unequivocal commitment to project US sincerity towards supporting the Pakistani civilian government; all diplomacy should be channeled through them.

84. The U.S. should also increase its own presence to portray a favorable image of its culture to Pakistanis. While American information libraries and cultural centers operated in Pakistan prior to the breakdown in relations in 1990 - the renowned Lincoln libraries in a handful of major universities are pertinent examples - the majority of youth in Pakistan have had no exposure to
American culture whatsoever. A program to open public libraries and information centers across Pakistan should be instituted. These centers should be encouraged to reach out not only to the elite, but also to the ordinary youth.

85. The dilemma the US faces is that its officials and citizens are ordered and warned respectively to restrict their movement within Pakistan. This implies that their outreach is severely curtailed. The most the US embassy can do is to reach out to the elite in major Pakistani cities. While the problem is complex, the US will have to find means of opening up. Efforts by the Embassy to reach out through newsletters in Urdu is a step in the right direction but by itself, hardly enough.

86. On the other hand, the U.S. would be well advised to revisit its visa and immigration policy for Pakistani nationals. Wary of the extremist tag, America has moved to virtually shut down previously attractive avenues for Pakistanis to study and/or find attractive livelihoods in the U.S. Moreover, the current discriminatory attitude at airports and embassies is causing resentment amongst mainstream Pakistanis. Pakistanis are increasingly challenging the dichotomy of supporting the U.S. as a frontline ally in the War on Terror and being singled out, deported or refused visas in large numbers. This bias needs to be corrected immediately.

87. Apart from students and workers seeking to relocate to the U.S. for a significant period of time, the U.S. and Pakistan could also seek to arrange short visits by Pakistani youth delegations with representation from across the socio-economic strata. The Fulbright Program could spearhead this initiative. It may be pertinent to allow translators to accompany such a delegation to avoid the negative consequences that a cultural shock may have, especially for those from the lower socio-economic strata.
Overall Context

1. From 18 - 23 October 2009, eight senior Pakistanis held a series of meetings and consultations in Washington, DC with senior policy makers and experts. The meetings were organized by the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs. They ranged from very private discussions in the “corridors of power” to roundtables at influential think tanks, and from a press breakfast with national media to working breakfasts and dinners, provided a welcome opportunity on all sides for an exchange of views and most importantly for some creative thinking as to how to point US-Pakistan relations on a more positive trajectory. The following report is a composite of the perspectives and opinions expressed, with an emphasis on identifying areas where further action and dialogue is needed. Please note, however, that as with all Pugwash meetings, there was no attempt to seek consensus and the views in this report should not be attributed to any one participant.

2. There was a shared understanding on all sides that there is a need to overcome the “trust deficit” that exists between Pakistan and the United States—both among the general population but also among the bilateral contacts between the governments, militaries, and intelligence agencies. The relationship needs to move toward mutual respect, finding the common ground, and managing differences through “discussion and not dictation.” In other words, there is a need the need to “weave a blanket of comfort and trust” between the two countries.

3. There is immediacy in the need to realign this relationship, to overcome what some perceive as a “serious lack of credibility” regarding the nature of the US commitment to Pakistan, and a need to “incentivize” the relationship.
**Pakistani Perceptions of Washington**

4. The US must still face up to the continuing impact of the policy of the past 10 years, and what is viewed by many in Pakistan as the anti-Islamic rhetoric and actions of the Bush administration. On the positive side, this creates a space for President Obama, while people are willing to see what he can do.

5. There is a perception that recent US actions may have been influenced by those who believe strong relations with India are more important to the US than its relations with Pakistan and there is deep suspicion of the possible influence of the growing Indian lobby in DC. Coupled with this, there is a sense that US does not “have open eyes” when it comes to the treatment of the people in Kashmir.

6. In addition, some Pakistanis are concerned that the US may elevate the importance of its policy toward Afghanistan to take primacy over the US relationship with Pakistan.

7. There is a sense that the US has not fully acknowledged that there is a “new Pakistan,” and that the changing role of the media and civil society has not been fully understood yet in Washington. It was asked, how many other states in the extended Middle East have gotten rid of a dictator and held elections?

8. There is concern based on mixed signals from the US, that the US may not have a long-term commitment to its relationship with Pakistan (and Afghanistan). This uncertainty is driving some who previously supported the US to change their minds and move toward supporting the Taliban. If pushed to the extreme, some worry that if this path is not altered it could lead to an ultranationalist government in Pakistan that might reevaluate the strategic relationship with the USA.

9. There is a feeling in Pakistan that the US is making Pakistan the “universal scapegoat” for the lack of clarity of the US policy in Afghanistan. The trust deficit leads many Pakistanis to believe that it is not Pakistan but the US that is played a “double game.” US sincerity towards Pakistan is perpetually questioned.

**US Perceptions of Pakistan**

10. Participants discussed the impact of the continuing perception in DC that the Mumbai attacks and the embassy bombings in Afghanistan were influenced by groups in Pakistan, with some associating Pakistani secret services with the insurgency or terrorists.

11. One survey by Pew indicated that Pakistan is seen by Americans as one of the 5 most “unfavorable” nations. The state of mistrust fuels a belief that Pakistan is duplicitious on those areas where interests diverge. Part of this, it was felt, comes from the deliberate “double speak” by both governments. Both governments have remained extremely non-transparent in their dealings with each other and have consciously allowed negative messages about the “other” to float around in open source literature. A number of tacit agreements on various controversial policies also have been kept clandestine, which causes the public to believe that the “other” party – read US – is transgressing without permission from the Pakistani government.
12. There is a perception among Pakistanis that the US does not fully understand the challenges Pakistan faces as a large country in a “tough neighborhood,” nor does it fully appreciate that as a result there will be some areas where US-Pakistan short-, medium-, and long-term interests converge and diverge.

**Relations with India**

13. It was questioned whether the US fully appreciates the huge importance Pakistanis place on getting to terms with India.

14. Concerns were raised on both sides about the possible impact of the US hosting the Indian Prime Minister as the first head of state to get a state visit under the Obama administration.

15. The importance of not allowing terrorist attacks to halt the peace process was emphasized. Reiterating the Sharm-el-Sheikh statements (of July 2009)\(^2\) may be helpful. High level intelligence sharing is very important, and needs to be pushed further. The unequivocal consensus was that disrupting the peace process after a terrorist attack (on any other disturbing event) only assists the terrorists’ cause and thus plays into the hands of those who both these countries ought to be fighting jointly.

16. It was suggested that in contrast to the 2006 experience, where discussions were a publicity device, which occurred at junior level and took place in public, there now needs to be a quiet, secret, high level mechanism (perhaps a tripartite arrangement). There is a real need to resume talks with India, to discuss military confidence building measures.

17. There is a worry that there are “lots of Muslim hotheads” with grievances in India, and there is a concern as to what would happen if Al-Qaeda develops links with them.

18. There was a general understanding from all sides that finding a way to improve the situation in Kashmir has to be at the heart of US policy toward Pakistan. From the US side, it appears this might be most promising if worked through back channels at first. One suggested first step was that Obama might say to the Indian Prime Minister while he is in DC that he would have the full support of the US if he moved toward dialogue.

**Kerry-Lugar (Berman) Legislation\(^3\)**

19. Most participants acknowledged for the most part the Kerry-Lugar legislation (the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009) is both positive and welcome. It provides a long-term commitment and represents a tripling of funding during a difficult financial time in the USA. According to senior American participants who were involved with the process, the intention of the legislation was to move toward a “transactional relationship.”

20. However, the final version of this multiyear $1.5 billion per year aid bill was described as “the worst enemy of the intended consequence of the bill.” While the controversy involves perhaps less than 10% of the bill, the concerns are significant on some key areas. While conditionalities on aid are to an extent an accepted standard, this legislation included new elements that raise

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\(^2\) The text is available online at: \url{http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Text-of-India-Pakistan-joint-statement/articleshow/4785494.cms}

\(^3\) “S.1707 - Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009” (Public Law111-73). This legislation is available online at: \url{http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c111:3:./temp/~c111HOUUcH:}
serious concerns from the Pakistani perspective. The Pakistanis believe that the depth of the problems this bill has created in Pakistan is still not fully understood in DC or perhaps even by Pakistani leaders themselves. The bill was called by one senior Pakistani participant a “public relations fiasco.”

21. It was noted that the US legislative system is not widely understood in Pakistan and that this may have contributed to the recent tensions about this legislation. From the US perspective, the legislation represents a growing trend toward greater accountability when providing funds, and Pakistan is not being singled out. Similar efforts have been made in legislation with Egypt, Colombia and Mexico. In security related assistance it is generally seen as normal procedure to include additional certification under the bill. Some insiders said that with this legislation, Congress was trying to signal its concern about continuing ties between certain elements and non-state actors and that in being specific regarding the required assessments, they hoped to avoid receiving bland and useless general reports. The political reality on the Hill also meant that drafters were faced by many in Congress who thought the bill was not strong enough.

Legal Concerns over Kerry-Lugar Language

22. Many participants (both Pakistanis and Americans) commented on the general tone of the language, which some called “patronizing, demeaning, and condescending.” Some of the language in the legislation is legally problematic as well. There is a concern that it gives finality to certain Indian positions rather than referencing international norms, perhaps inadvertently. This can be viewed as a legislative indictment on foreign policy issues. For example, when it references “cross-border safe havens.” It would have been better to say that Pakistan should adhere to the principles of ‘non-intervention’.

23. In addition, it was believed the bill language lends authenticity to certain issues. For example, the bill states that at the end of 2004 the Pakistani nuclear network “ceased to operate.” This language gives finality to an area where facts are questioned and implies that the US does not believe the official Pakistani line. It creates a legal presumption, without evidence.

24. In addition, the bill language identifies the Kashmir issue as counter-terrorism issue, as opposed to a human rights issue. This harms the Pakistani foreign policy position that this is a human rights violation (being pursued with the UN HR counsel, etc). Kashmir can now be used by India as a counterterrorism issue. Some terms, such as “extremists” were used without clarification, and the resulting innuendos can cause political problems.

25. Some were concerned that the bill seems to be based on two controversial underlying implications: that the military and intelligence are in bed with extremists, and that the military is not under civilian control. Some in Pakistan fear now that every step taken in Pakistan to confront militancy and counter-terrorism will be perceived in Pakistan as the US dictating Pakistani actions. There is a further concern that people opposed to Pakistan will reference this sort language from this bill in future in various UN forums, etc.
26. Some Americans, however, expressed surprise that there was a perception that some of the language implied support for Indian positions, as they said that was not the intention.

27. Some Americans also pointed out that the language that has caused the most concern is not a condition of the assistance.

Military Promotions

28. Another issue was language that suggested the US was encouraging Pakistani politicians to get involved with the military promotion process. It is unclear if Pakistan will be asked to provide details of the promotions. Some senior Americans, however, pointed out that in the US system, while politicians can be involved in the military appointment process, they are not involved deeply in the promotion process, and that such involvement would run the risk of politicizing the officer corps. There was a clear statement from a senior US participant, that “this US administration has no intention of influencing the appointment or promotion of Pakistani military. Period.”

Concerns about Required Assessments

29. The legislation calls for assessments in 15 areas, including safe havens, proliferation, etc. However, the legislation is unclear as to the nature of these assessments, leading to questions such as: How intrusive with they be? What facts will they be based upon? Will Pakistan need to volunteer records, information about the defense budget, or be asked to provide classified information on the nuclear budget for example? What is the review process?

30. It was pointed out that someone could create problems, for example, regarding language about “preventing attacks on neighbors.” Questions were raised as to whether the aid be stalled by a complaint? There is no mechanism for Pakistan to be asked to respond, and the assessment could then be stalled.

31. It is possible that every six months when these reports come due recurring tensions may surface and undermine the good gestures and intentions behind the legislation.

32. It was strongly stressed that the handling of these reports must be done carefully. One idea posed was for these assessments to include a classified annex including the most sensitive of information. This was especially discussed regarding point 11 of the bill’s monitoring reports section.

33. There is a concern that Pakistan is being singled out for additional certification obligations at a time when the two countries are working closely on shared objectives. And yet, seen in a broader picture, these reports are part of what some Americans called “an overwhelming series of Congressional reporting requirements” that extend beyond Pakistan, reflecting Congressional frustration at the lack of transparency in understanding where earlier aid ended up.
34. Staff in the DoD will be called upon to write these reports, and it may make sense for the US to discuss these reports with their Pakistani partners as they develop the assessments. There is precedent for this, as this has been done with other six month reports.

Waivers

35. It was pointed out repeatedly that the bill includes waivers, that the benchmarks should be achievable but if they are not, the President can waive them. These have been used in the past, and no one questioned them.

Dispensation

36. The bill was unclear regarding the manner of dispensation, where this will be done, and monitoring procedures.

Consultative Procedure

37. Some frustration was expressed that the passage of the Kerry-Lugar bill provided significant amount of time for the Pakistani state to react and attempt to affect changes. That it was passed in the shape that it was and Pakistan reacted sharply also points to a failure of Pakistani diplomacy. Finger-pointing within the Pakistani establishment is taking place but this is all after-the-fact thinking. Some felt that Pakistan must accept that its reaction was out of proportion given that hardly any serious objections were raised while the Bill was being hammered out. It also was believed that the new role of the broadcast media in Pakistan had been sorely underestimated.

38. Lessons must be learned from the process that led to this major controversy over the bill’s language. The legislative language was a compromise between Senate and House versions, with the final version being most heavily influenced by the House side.

39. Senior participants in the process express some dismay at accusations that they did not properly consult on the bill’s language, as it was shared with State, USAID, the DoD, who were all asked for input. In addition, the US ambassador, the US mission and military command also had opportunities for input. President Obama, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Michael Mullen all publicly supported the bill.

40. Likewise, insiders say that consultation with Pakistan was significant. The Pakistani Embassy and the Ambassador and Foreign Secretary and Gen. Kidwai were asked to weigh in. There seemed to be some debate as to how effectively this consultation was carried out. Some claimed that the Pakistanis were led to believe that the Kerry-Lugar language would ultimately prevail over the Berman language, and this ended up being an incorrect assessment. From this perspective, the US “institutional dysfunction” and “disconnect” became a highly personalized matter.

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*Amb. Teresita Schaffer, CSIS, and Michael Phelan, Staff Member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee at co-sponsored conference on US-Pakistan Relations, Brookings.*
41. It was also pointed out that this legislation is not yet through the appropriations cycle and that further complications could arise each year during the appropriations process. However it was stated that there was commitment “at the highest levels” of the US administration to ensure that the authorization legislation is followed by appropriations.

42. It is clear from many conversations throughout DC, that even those closest to the process were dissatisfied immediately with the outcome, and a bill that was supposed to bring the two countries together has become a “calculus for discord.”

Kerry - Berman Statement

43. This statement after the fact, intended to reinforce there was no attempt to imply the US was questioning Pakistan’s national sovereignty through this legislation, was controversial, and many felt it might have been a mistake or at least inappropriate.

Aid Versus Trade

44. The US-Pakistan relationship has been primarily security driven with not enough attention being paid to the economic angle. Pakistanis remain adamant that their demand is for trade, not aid. They feel that Pakistan has lost tremendously due to the direct fallout of the war in Afghanistan and it has the right to seek compensation from the US. However, it wants this to happen in a manner that will benefit the country’s economy. Trade is seen as the vehicle to achieve that; aid is looked upon as a favor being bestowed by the US, something that does not excite many in Pakistan.

45. Some highlighted the fact that Pakistani exports are decreasing, especially textiles. They raised the prospect of an economic slowdown in Pakistan, and raised the possibility of a trade preferential area. One participant referred to an IRI survey, where people were asked which action the US could take that would most increase the image of the US, and the answer was opening possibilities for trade. Another raised the idea that trade is “transformative,” while aid is not and cited the example of the UK DFID projects with women and girls.

46. Some suggested that the textile tariffs must be dropped.

47. There was some discussion of the limitations or misconception of aid packages designed by US-based consultants who, by some counts, may benefit from up to 60% of the funds that will stay in the US for overheads and other costs. Another estimate was that only 10% of effective resources will be spent in the region. Holbrooke is possibly exploring options for readdressing this issue.

48. Another potential problem highlighted was that the US aid doesn’t have any specific “identifier” (i.e. – nothing that can be pointed to specifically to show impact, such as steel infrastructure, or some such project).

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The New US Strategy

49. There is an understanding that the oscillation of US strategy over the past 60 years has not helped the situation, and that there is a need for constancy and consistency. In fact, a commitment from a group of nations is required to continue the momentum of engagement. A quick exit strategy from Afghanistan will not bode well for the region.

50. Senior American participants reaffirmed that there should be no uncertainty as to the US determination both to increase relations and trust with Pakistan and to stay in Afghanistan. There is recognition in the current US Administration that this relationship cannot just be about the immediate threat, but about a broader strategic concept. This will require a genuine relationship with a long-term commitment and trust building.

51. There is recognition, from the very top of the US policy stream, that a range of issues must be part of the dialogue, with engagement on every level and that to reach core objectives there is a need to invest in stability. There is a need to address topics ranging from the energy crisis to economic stability to military issues. This long-term policy planning would include economic and development issues integrated with a diplomatic approach that includes a focus on science and technology.

52. Senior US officials believe it is important to look at the regional dynamic, to develop regional processes and fora to engage on issues such as energy, climate change, broad technological issues. This can help bring regional countries together, while taking pressure off of the India/Pakistan dynamic.

53. There was recognition that forums like Pugwash are a vital link in this chain, to help develop ideas, to deepen the alliance, and to help enable Pakistan’s counterinsurgency efforts.

54. There is recognition that sanctions do not work, that providing large amounts of unaccounted funds doesn’t work, and that there is need for intense engagement and efforts to help strengthen the civilian government (in other words, there is a need to set an example that it is not useful to go to the military or ISI for a “quick fix”).

55. The US Vice President Biden was one of the strongest proponents of emphasizing the primary strategic importance Pakistan (compared with Afghanistan). Holbrooke is trying to strengthen civilian aspects of the relationship between the two countries.

56. The US strategic review had 20 major recommendations, 100 sub-recommendations. There was close coordination and cooperation with the Pakistani government in devising and developing the policy, include 3 days of deliberations with Foreign Minister Qureshi, the DG of the ISI, the chief of the army staff, etc.
57. Participants were encouraged to read carefully President Obama’s 27 March 2009 speech⁵ for a nuanced understanding of the US priorities. The speech highlights the broad goal of stability in South Asia, of which destroying Al-Qaeda is a part of the broader strategy. (There are of course now some who question whether this is an achievable goal, especially on the Afghan side.)

58. The US will work to ensure that the Saudis, UAE, China, EU also step up funding for counterterrorism, counterinsurgency and nuclear security.

59. Some Pakistanis felt there should be greater involvement from Pakistanis in the development and implementation of the “AfPak” strategy, which was considered damaging. There was general acknowledgement from all sides that the term “AfPak” is neither useful nor helpful and should be changed.

Drones

60. There was concern expressed on both sides that the US use of unmanned drones, while a warfare marvel in many ways, is not a cure-all. They are operating in the grey areas of the international legal environment. A better formulation of this policy in cooperation with the Pakistani government is essential.

61. A specific recommendation was presented to policy makers that a legal structure regarding the drones should be agreed, for example, assuring compensation for ancillary damage, etc, perhaps through a bilateral agreement.

62. There is a concern that if this is not clarified in a legal framework, other countries such as India, China or Iran might use this as precedent.

63. The above said, it was also largely believed that the drones have been tactically effective in that they have taken out some of the major Al Qaeda leadership. However, the extent of collateral damage is unknown, although anecdotal evidence suggests that it is not nominal.

Security Companies

64. There are no legal arrangements regarding the armed US security companies that are in Pakistan, and this fuels conspiracy theories since this ambiguity is read as illegality. The Vienna Convention indicates that the host state is to guarantee security, if there are some special circumstances where additional security is believed to be needed, these must be spelled out.

Transparency

65. Similarly, if expanding embassy or security staff this should be done by a legal memorandum of understanding.

Overexposure of US Officials

66. There were concerns raised that the US administration was seeking too high a profile in Pakistan, and that the photo opportunities, etc, were creating a negative dynamic in Islamabad

and the media. It was acknowledged that while there is serious work that needs to be done on all levels, some of this overexposure might be minimized by better coordination between agencies on the US side.

Military-Military Relations

67. Military-military relations have shifted as well, to focus assistance on Pakistan’s ability to deal with extremists. It was pointed out that economic relations are important to ensure a well-rounded engagement with Pakistan, so that the relationship will not be disproportionately military. Some also raised the need for increased intelligence-to-intelligence interactions.

Impediments to Dialogue

68. It was pointed out that it is extremely difficult for Pakistanis who want to speak with their US counterparts to do so. One of the Pakistanis who participated in this series of Pugwash meetings was held for 2 hours at the passport control for questioning, despite showing the trip itinerary. Similarly Pakistanis face long and humiliating security checks when entering the US embassy in Pakistan, even when they are invited there by the ambassador or embassy staff. Some alternate method of screening in these cases could be explored, for example, the embassy might send a car and conduct needed security searches off site to accelerate the process. There was indication on the US side that the Administration wants to address the issue of visas, etc. Questions were raised as to the impact of the “fortress mentality” on the officials in the US embassy.

Afghanistan

69. The US goals and objectives for what is achievable and do-able in Afghanistan are still not clear to those in the region. There is a perception that the argument as to why this is the US national interest has not been convincingly explained.

70. The US seeks an Afghan government that is stable and can hold its own, and so that it is not a safe haven for Al-Qaeda and extremist groups. There needs to be greater clarity over what is essential versus what would be nice. Pakistan and the US share an interest in Afghan stability.

71. Pakistan’s goals include a safe western border, a friendly neighboring regime, and a strong, prosperous and independent Afghanistan.

72. The Taliban is now very media savvy, and has said it won’t attack once the US is out of Afghanistan if they are able to fulfill religious duties. There is a sense that the Taliban believes they can be patient and wait things out. Some say this means there is a need to increase Afghan forces, which can demonstrate a resolve to fight, to foster stability and to build institutions.

73. The complexity of interplay of the issues is serious. The combination of difficulties now between Karzai, the opium issue, the war lords, all create a very complex dynamic, and it is difficult to know the way forward. However, there is a belief that the only reason why the
Taliban has any support is because things are so bad, people would literally rather side with the Taliban than die.

74. It was pointed out that control of territory cannot rely solely on military means, and a question was raised about the intention to extend the role of the civilian interaction in Afghanistan as well. However, the US is prioritizing clearing areas of insurgency and if they hold over time, then the will address the needs of the population, infrastructure, basic services, etc.

75. The US role in Afghanistan is having a negative impact in Pakistan and its fight against the insurgency in different regions. There was frustration expressed on the Pakistani side that the Americans did not take more serious efforts to stop people from leaving Afghanistan for Pakistan (this is a problem for example with Uzbeks who went first to Afghanistan and who are now going into Pakistan).

76. Pakistan needs to have a better internal dialogue on what to do if the US gets out of Afghanistan early.

Terrorism and Counterinsurgency

77. Some expressed strong opinions that this war against militancy/the war on terror is deeply misconstrued and that it would be better framed as a territorial control issue. Some say it is impossible to impose control in areas where it never existed.

78. One example is FATA, the Western Front. The state has no role in establishing justice there. This demonstrates another example why economic aid and ties are needed to guarantee stability in some of these areas. There is also a belief that the insurgency problems there are a direct result of the US role in Afghanistan.

79. While it is true that Al-Qaeda is present, it is not true that all Taliban are equal. Some of the Taliban are more criminal, some more ideological, and it was expressed that the West makes a mistake in trying to put them all in the same basket.

80. Some raised the need for a greater, more nuanced understanding of what is driving certain groups. One participant described it as “turning off the tap” rather than “mopping the floors.” Some of the problems that give rise to the Taliban include the need for more justice, security, and employment opportunities. The role of reconstruction opportunity zones, duty free entry, and other economic strategies was briefly touched upon. The need to discuss this further was raised, including gaining a better understanding of the salary levels, etc, that might be sufficient to deter people from joining the insurgents.

81. It is to be remembered that the fight is against the militants, not the tribal system. In fact, there is a strong argument that the tribal structures need to be revised and their supremacy in the FATA region reestablished so that locals can have a stake in the development process. Even the militants who agree to rejoin the mainstream society must be assimilated and provided a stake in such processes.
82. Al-Qaeda has its own, very intricate narrative justifying terrorism. It was felt that the US up to now has not provided a strong enough counter-narrative, and Guantanamo hurt the US image greatly.

83. There was an acknowledgement that President Obama’s Cairo speech began to lay out a different American narrative, and while speeches are good, actions are more important. There was some recognition on the American side that if the US “loses its stomach” regarding Palestinian rights, the US will lose this counter-narrative.

84. There were differing views on each side as to the seriousness with which Pakistan is addressing concerns. Some American participants raised the possibility of at least establishing some common ground, identifying some “demonstrable red lines,” for example, that there will be no support for people targeting Americans in Afghanistan.

85. From a military point of view, the operation in Swat was considered fairly successful: it destroyed training camps and weakened the leadership and its ability to re-group. The problem was that it was conducted more as a traditional operation and not a counterinsurgency operation. The Pakistani military, worried about collateral damage, gave people time to move out. When it succeeded, people were pro-army, and were usually able to return home in 3-4 months, though many of the homes were destroyed and there are now efforts to rehabilitate.

86. There was recognition of the difficulty of being a normal state with a tribal belt. Some felt that this area, which Pakistan has to some extent neglected in past, now poses the greatest threat to Pakistan in its 60 year history. The Mehsud tribe and Al-Qaeda (including some battle-hardened Uzbeks) are there in large numbers, as many as 2,000 – 3,000 or more. They have nowhere to go and will fight to the death. The military has done a lot of preparation, but expects to face tough resistance. Until Afghanistan is stabilized, there will continue to be turmoil in S. Waziristan. Some felt there has been little thought given to what happens if Al-Qaeda leaves Afghanistan. For example, it could operate from other countries, such as Yemen, Somalia, etc. There was a question raised as to the durability of the public support for military operations. Some wondered if there were ways in which the US might be able to be of more assistance to Pakistan in Waziristan – on civilian, military and intelligence sides.

87. A recent video of a Pakistani soldier interrogating a suspect has raised questions over the treatment of suspects. There is a need to better define the legal framework, under exactly what legal authority they are being kept, etc. This is important from a legal perspective, but also to avoid “blowback.”

88. There was recognition that there is still a learning curve on the Pakistani side. Even in instances when intelligence provides accurate information, the military and political leaders are not trained for counter-terrorism, and as a result they often rely on conventional tactics. It was pointed out that the US had its own learning curve after Iraq, and that Pakistan has improved in the past 1-2 years. There was discussion of the need to improve the ability to secure the state

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**Adil Najam, Boston Univ., Michael Krepon, Ahmer Bilal Soofi, Paolo Cotta-Ramusino, Hon. Ahsan Iqbal, seminar on the “Politics and Economics of US-Pakistan Relations” co-sponsored with the Stimson Center.**
presence after military operations succeed, addressing structural deficiencies, such as police, etc. One aspect that was singled out as essential was the need to have flexibility in the tactics and strategies being employed to tackle terrorism. Rigidity was noted as a problem both Pakistan and the US have experienced thus far.

Cultural Resources

89. The importance of “thinking outside the box” was raised, using the example of the “Quetta Shura.” It was pointed out that “there is no such animal as the Quetta Shura.” Some urged policy makers to set aside all the intelligence reports, and look more closely at the cultural resources available, the political and economic geography of the Afghan tribes, using the network of cousins/nephews in upper Balochistan, Quetta, Karachi, Dubai, London, DC, etc. (this is like the IRA, which drew on migration patterns in New England). This network can be an asset and not only a liability, and become active partners in splitting the Pakistani Taliban from the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Others raised the huge resources this would entail and pointed out that the government is not in a position to do this.

Need for Coordination between Pakistan and US/NATO

90. Better coordination between Pakistan and US/NATO is important to avoid people taking refuge in the mountains, and in the difficult terrain, i.e. to control exits and entries. On a tactical level the NATO, ISAF and Pakistani forces need to be on the same operational plan.

Relation Between ISI and Terrorist Groups

91. There was acknowledgement that discussion of alleged relations between the ISI and terrorist groups is an area where perspectives vary greatly.

92. The US perception is that this relationship is not yet clear. As one participant said, “there is no confidence the ISI is not a conduit to enemies”.

93. The Pakistani perception is that this relationship has been distorted in the West, and it was pointed out that all intelligence agencies have connections with such networks. There is a belief that the quality of intelligence and military leadership has been improved, and that this is not widely enough acknowledged.

94. Some worry that this argument provides the opportunity for scapegoating, and diversion of attention from more serious structural concerns.

Relationship between Counterinsurgency and Terrorism

95. It must be recognized that when engaged in counterterrorism, there is a big increase in public anguish and anger towards the government. This must be balanced by seeing to the public opinion by investments that improve lives, employment, etc. This then creates the nexus between the jihadi elements and the Taliban, for example. If one wants to convince someone not to support the

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Hon. Ahsan Iqbal, Brig. (ret.) Feroz Hasan Khan, and Gen (retd) Talat Masood at breakfast for national press at the Old Ebbitt Grill.
insurgents, then it is important to prove that you are better than they are (bringing back the importance of efficient social and governmental structures, etc).

Post Mumbai Prosecution Problems

96. Concerns were expressed that the pressure placed on Pakistan by India to quickly prosecute Mumbai suspects was counterproductive, jeopardizing evidence and making convictions less likely. It was pointed out that the average timeframe for a transnational case cannot be shortened artificially. This leads to “procedural incompetence” – for example, some telephone conversation evidence was lost because the evidence could not be properly procured on the timeline put forward by India. This will add to tensions between India and Pakistan. In addition, Pakistanis felt that what should be a welcome effort to tighten up legal structures and procedures has been hampered by this pressure.

97. There is a lack of coordination between the law enforcement agencies between the two countries that needs to be addressed.

98. There is concern that a likely Indian response if the Mumbai footprint leads to Pakistan might include: increasing the Air Force alert level (fueling concerns in Pakistan about possible airstrikes) and some mobilization of ground forces. This may lead to new situations of acute tension between the two countries and a possible role of the USA in the cooling down process.

The Future

99. There was a deep concern that any future terrorist attacks on the West or on India that may emanate from Pakistani territory may further complicate relations. On the Pakistani side, there were concerns raised about Pakistan’s inability to defend itself specifically on nuclear forensics. More work needs to be done in this area. One concrete idea arising from meeting was that this may be explored jointly through the Academies of Sciences (see separate section).

100. There was recognition that Pakistan has to progress on questions over how to better integrate the military into the political structure, increasing education, strengthening of the institutions of governance, etc.

Nuclear Issues

India

101. Pakistan is sensitive to India’s potential to grow its nuclear program. However, some pointed to a “competitive heating up” between India and Pakistan, which falls short of a nuclear arms race (someone referred to it as a “nuclear arms crawl”).

102. While someone said that “nuclear weapons don’t make peace possible, they do make war impossible,” concerns were raised as to the evolution of new military doctrines in the region, and the way that conventional doctrines are being influenced by the existence of nuclear arsenals. The Indian “Cold Start” strategy has raised serious concerns in Pakistan, especially

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6 See for example, Dr. Subhash Kapila, “Indian Army Validates its Cold Start War Doctrine,” South Asia Analysis Group, 07/06/05 : [http://www.saag.org/common/uploaded_files/paper1408.html](http://www.saag.org/common/uploaded_files/paper1408.html)
as regards possible escalation control once a conflict breaks out. Some are concerned that the qualitative Indian conventional modernization has some impact on the Pakistan nuclear equation, in that it can devalue the deterrent ability of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal.

103. Concerns have been heightened as a result of several developments: new breeder reactors in the pipeline, the US-India nuclear deal, the Indian sea-based deterrent is moving forward, cruise missiles development, the possibility that India may move toward a Delhi-centric ballistic missile defense system, the increasing military disparities between India and Pakistan, recent talk of the possibility of Indian renewal of nuclear weapons testing, the FMCT does not seem likely in the near term, and there is not much prospect for formal arms control negotiations due to the “triangular geometry” of the region. Some say the seriousness with which Pakistan takes its nuclear requirements is “increasingly obvious” to New Delhi.

104. The Chinese and Pakistani nuclear modernization efforts are both affecting India, although the Indian nuclear arsenal is perceived, some say, as low level concern for China.

105. It was pointed out that India (like Pakistan) still has not outlined its minimum deterrent posture and that both countries should do so.

106. Some posed the question as to whether or not a South Asian arms control treaty might be explored.

Misperceptions about Pakistani Nuclear Issues

107. Discussion focused on a series of misperceptions that pose problems for Pakistan. These include:

- If a nuclear weapon is fired it will be from Pakistan, either fired in anger or inadvertently;
- If secondary nuclear proliferation occurs, the source will be Pakistan;
- If another country provides a nuclear umbrella to other countries, it will be Pakistan (there are some unconfirmed suggestions that Pakistan has offered extended deterrence to Saudi Arabia, for example in a possible crisis with Iran);
- Many war games show that if there is a nuclear attack on the US or its allies, the assumption is to always attribute the source to Pakistan even before nuclear forensics are complete.

Nuclear Forensics

108. Concerns were expressed that since Pakistan has no experience in nuclear forensics, it would be unable to defend itself in the event of an accusation as above.

109. Concrete suggestions emerged as to possible interaction between US and Pakistani scientists on this topic. One idea was to discuss with the NSC if the architecture the US uses in its nuclear materials database might be shared with other countries, to provide a similar enough
architecture to allow good communication about any problems. This topic could be discussed, for example, in the upcoming nuclear security summit.

110. The idea of a “lock box” was put forward in 2004, which would be opened if a nuclear weapon went off. A similar idea has been hashed out regarding a banking system, with electronic keys, unlocking certain pieces without revealing more sensitive information.

111. It was pointed out that the Pakistanis may welcome this sort of interaction, as it would be in their defense. It was suggested that the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority might go to the IAEA for further information.

**Nuclear Security**

112. Discussion focused on various issues that have been raised as to the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.

113. Informed participants explained that structure of Pakistan’s command and control systems have evolved rapidly over the last 10 years in the face of 9/11, a near war with India, and the AQ Khan experience. As a result, the Pakistani nuclear security culture tightened its C3I structures at a fast pace.

114. Some Americans questioned whether it might help Pakistan to make public more information about AQ Khan. Pakistanis raised doubts as to whether in the current climate anything they produce would be believed.

115. Some participants referred to the “nuclear hype” around issues related to Pakistan’s nuclear security. The US has officially acknowledged there is very little danger regarding Pakistan’s nuclear security. Someone referred to the evolution of a new nuclear security structure in Pakistan as the nature of nuclear management continues to change, making its systems more redundant than other countries. India has reportedly been surprised with the Pakistani speed at operationalizing its nuclear deterrent. The Pakistani nuclear security culture is being developed based on best practices and with a great deal of US assistance from DOE and the NNSA, who have helped with material protection, border protection, camera security, etc. Many hoped this relationship would continue to develop.

116. Obama’s nuclear security summit was viewed in a positive light. Pakistan had been invited, but had not yet accepted. Questions were asked as to what Pakistan’s strategy at the summit might be.

117. The role of the NNSA was highlighted positively from the Pakistani perspective, in that they respect various limitations, they are supportive in a cooperative way.

118. Pakistan is paying close attention to the threat of sabotage, or a possible mole from a hostile country, someone sympathetic to the Taliban, someone intent upon theft for greed/money, and they are keeping a very strict watch, especially regarding any meetings with extremists or outsiders.

119. One US participant stated that it is believed some or all of the cores of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are separated from the non-nuclear components. This however still leaves a concern about the security of the fissile HEU cores themselves, both in storage and where they are produced.
120. However, it was pointed out that no one knows where the warheads and cores are stored, this is the highest classified secret—some say the only secret left, considered the “crown jewels.” While it is known that the warheads and delivery vehicles are not mated, they will not discuss the physical security further.

121. Concern was expressed that if there are more articles like Seymour Hersh’s recent article\textsuperscript{7}, this will fuel the problem of the lack of trust. There was a sense of frustration from the Pakistani side, that this discussion about nuclear security was counterproductive. From the other side, there was a sense of frustration in being accused of promoting “hype” in trying to raise what some consider legitimate concerns.

122. Some were concerned that if the security situation and the conventional imbalances widen, then it is likely that over the course of the next decade Pakistan may move to deployed weapons that are mated.

123. Pakistani nuclear scientists are involved in a “cradle to grave” program. No one can leave once they are no longer in the program. Some questioned whether it can be helpful to have some independent scientific voices who can be called upon by government, as in the US Jason group.

124. Some Americans raised the point that there is no independent verification of what is being done regarding nuclear security, and that Pakistan might want somehow for others to know more about these procedures, especially in the wake of the AQ Khan affair which has left deep mistrust.

125. It was noted that pre-delegation has neither been confirmed nor denied.

**Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty**

126. The CTBT will probably be put forward for US ratification in 2010. Hopefully, it will pass. One US participant said that when this happens the Indian and Pakistani ambassadors should expect to be called into the Oval Office, and those conversations at that time will be important bellwethers.

127. It is widely believed that there is no chance Pakistan will test. Nor is it likely Pakistan will take action on the CTBT at this time. The question was posed as to why doesn’t Pakistan sign the CTBT and, with this type of proactive move, box India in on it. This was seen as unlikely from the Pakistani side due to the history following the 1998 tests.

128. One proposal was that India and Pakistan might use joint talks on CTBT as a confidence building measure.

129. Another option discussed was the possibility of a dedicated bilateral Pakistani-Indian agreement to convert the moratorium to a treaty.

130. However, there is a legal viewpoint that the 1999 Lahore Declaration has treaty status, and therefore the moratorium on testing contained therein has treaty status. This perspective should be injected into the relevant policy debates in other Annex 2 countries. If India takes steps to test, some said it will be of interest to see if it takes steps to change the Lahore Declaration. Another possibility raised was the option that both countries might seek to test and then sign the CTBT.

Fissile Material

131. It was stated that Pakistan “sits in a comfortable position” regarding its fissile material stockpile, due to a sophisticated program. Plutonium and HEU are both available. Pakistan has no commercial-scale reprocessing.

FMCT

132. There was a general agreement that Pakistani action blocking consideration of the FMCT is not helpful. However, some considered that this is a by-product of the US-India deal and participants were reminded that some tried to warn against this sort of possible backlash in 2006.

New Capabilities?

133. Concern was raised over an increase in Pakistan’s HEU production, which leads some to presume that Pakistan is adding warheads to its arsenal. Questions were raised as to how additional nuclear weapons in the Pakistani arsenal may change India’s calculus on whether or not it would attack Pakistan, and how this would affect the targeting strategy of both countries.

134. A US acknowledgement of Pakistan’s right to nuclear energy would be seen as helpful from the Pakistani perspective.

Nuclear Strategy

135. A view was expressed that Pakistan needs to be more forthcoming on the purpose of its nuclear weapons program, providing more detail about its calculus and how many nuclear weapons it considers sufficient for deterrent purposes.

136. Some participants believed that there is a danger Pakistan may be on a slippery slope regarding the number of nuclear weapons it needs. Some worry that Pakistan is on path to accumulate greater numbers of weapons, more than 500, maybe more than 1000. Pakistan needs a thorough internal debate about what level of assured destruction it needs to meet its strategic aims. It was pointed out that in Pakistan six civilians and four army chiefs decide the goals, and that lately they have been perhaps most influenced by a 30-35% reduction of funding.

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8 The Lahore Declaration states (21 February 1999 Memorandum of Understanding): “The foreign secretaries agreed that the two sides....shall continue to abide by their respective unilateral moratorium on conducting further nuclear test explosions unless either side, in exercise of its national sovereignty decides that extraordinary events have jeopardized its supreme interests;” See for example: http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/lahore.pdf, p. 3.
Iran

137. A question was raised as to whether or not Pakistan can do anything to help with regard to Iran. There are conflicting views in Pakistan as to whether or not they would be comfortable sandwiched between two nuclear powers.

Incidents at Sea

138. A question was raised about the command, control and operational procedures involved with a possible incident at sea or accident under water in the Indian Ocean, given that there are six countries with assets: Indian subs, possibly Pakistani subs, Chinese subs, Israel has dual capable subs, Iran and the US.

Cooperative Threat Reduction

139. The name is admittedly in need of changing to remove implication that there is a “threat” from Pakistan (perhaps to something like “global security engagement” as suggested by the US National Academy in related work). The program is broader than just nuclear, it includes biosecurity, etc. The program is designed to address natural events also where things can get out of hand. The US Secretary of Defense was scheduled to sign a paper the following week that would lead to “robust dialogue” on the bio side.

140. One area identified where Pakistan might benefit from further interaction with the US is on port security, container security issues, including the Indus River and Punjab rivers.

Aging Arsenals

141. There was some question raised as to whether or not there are any lessons Pakistan and other newer states with nuclear weapons can learn from the US experience. It was noted that aging arsenals can sometimes become a driver of proliferation. In this respect, someone on the US side said the NNSA experience shows it is better to “go for a Cadillac rather than a Lamborghini.”

142. There is a developing North-South divide regarding modernization without nuclear testing.

143. It was noted that discussions of stockpile stewardship, design, forensics, etc, can sometimes yield too much information about the location of the stockpile, its shape, how many weapons are there, etc. From the Pakistani perspective there is a concern that Pakistan may in fact be talking too much, and that this fuels this fear that the weapons may be pulled out by the US if something goes wrong in Pakistan.
Summary of Possible Action Points

During the week’s consultations in Washington, DC, there were many creative and forward-looking ideas expressed. The following summarizes some of the possible action points raised:

144. The US should involve the Pakistani strategic community to the extent possible in revisions of the “AfPak” strategy. The “AfPak” term itself needs to be changed as it is highly objectionable to Pakistanis in deemphasizing the Indo-Pakistani equation.

145. There is a need to emphasize commonly shared goals: nuclear security, peace in South Asia, controlling the conventional arms race, etc and to jointly explore tactics and means to achieving those goals.

146. Americans need access to a wider range of authentic Pakistani voices, while understanding there are differences.

147. There is a need understood by both American and Pakistani participants to restart official back-channel & unofficial dialogue on Indo-Pakistani relations. Any more formal meetings (which could possibly be done in a tripartite arrangement) need to take into consideration the lessons learned from the 2006 experience, and they should be done at a high level and in secret.

148. Increased US public statements and attention to Kashmir can help with the “hearts and minds” of Pakistanis.

149. There is a need to develop a joint policy/legal arrangement regarding the use of drones.

150. The forthcoming reports required under Kerry-Lugar must be handled carefully to avoid any further exacerbation of tensions between the two countries. To the extent possible, these should be prepared in a mutually agreed way, with attention to the Pakistani concerns about the use of sensitive or classified materials. Staff in the DoD will be called upon to write these reports, and it may make sense for the US to discuss these reports with their Pakistani partners as they develop the assessments. There is precedent for this, as this has been done with other six month reports. One idea posed was for these assessments to include a classified annex including the most sensitive of information. This was especially discussed regarding point 11 of the bill’s monitoring reports section.

151. The response to possible future terrorist attacks, especially if they bear a “Pakistani postmark,” must be handled carefully not to endanger the Indo-Pak communications.

152. There is a need for increased coordination between the law enforcement agencies between the two countries.

153. There needs to be further action on the CTBT, and India and Pakistan need to plan carefully for their response in the immediate wake of possible US ratification. Pakistan and India might use talks on the CTBT as a confidence building measure. Another option was the negotiation of a joint Pakistani-Indian bilateral agreement to convert the testing moratorium to a treaty. Or, there is a legal interpretation that the 1999 Lahore Declaration has treaty status,
and therefore the moratorium on testing contained therein has treaty status.⁹ This fact should be injected into the relevant policy debates in other Annex 2 countries.

154. A possible joint project between the Pakistani and American Academies of Sciences focused on nuclear forensics might be useful and this topic could be discussed in the upcoming nuclear security summit. It was pointed out that the Pakistanis may welcome this sort of interaction, as it would be in their defense, and that the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority might go to the IAEA for further information about what this means.

155. President Obama’s nuclear security summit can be seen as an opportunity for forward movement. Further discussion is needed as to what Pakistan’s strategy at the nuclear security summit might be.

156. Pakistan should play a more productive role in FMCT negotiations.

157. India and Pakistan should reiterate the Sharm-el-Sheikh statements of July 2009.

158. An incidents-at-sea-agreement between the two countries would be a good confidence building measure.

159. Policy makers are urged to look closely at the cultural resources available, the political and economic geography of the Afghan tribes, and to use that network as an asset and not only a liability.

160. The role of reconstruction opportunity zones, duty free entry, and other economic strategies need further discussion, including gaining a better understanding of the salary levels, etc, that might be sufficient to deter people from joining the insurgents.

161. Increased interaction between scientists can be useful. There are already significant programs that exist between the US National Academies and their Pakistani counterparts. In this respect it was noted that CISAC is trying to establish links in Pakistan, and these sorts of linkages should be encouraged on all sides.

162. Pakistan might benefit from further interaction with the US on port security and container security issues, including the Indus River and Punjab rivers.

163. South Asian arms control negotiations might be explored.

164. There is a need to define legal arrangements regarding the armed US security companies that are in Pakistan. The absence of such arrangements fuels conspiracy theories in the country. The Vienna Convention indicates that the host state is to guarantee security, if there are some special circumstances, these must be spelled out.

165. Think tanks and business leaders can play a special role in helping to foster future leaders in Pakistan through a broader education on key issues.

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⁹ The Lahore Declaration states (21 February 1999 Memorandum of Understanding): “The foreign secretaries agreed that the two sides....shall continue to abide by their respective unilateral moratorium on conducting further nuclear test explosions unless either side, in exercise of its national sovereignty decides that extraordinary events have jeopardized its supreme interests;” See for example: http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/lahore.pdf, p. 3.
166. **Rules that make it extremely difficult for Pakistanis who want to speak with their US counterparts to do so must be reexamined and changed.** One of the senior Pakistanis who participated in this series of Pugwash meetings was held for 2 hours at the passport control for questioning, despite showing his itinerary. Similarly Pakistanis face long and humiliating security checks when entering the US embassy in Pakistan, even when they are invited there by embassy staff. Some alternate method of screening in these cases could be explored, for example, the embassy might send a car and conduct needed security searches off site to accelerate the process.

![Amb. Thomas Pickering and Major General (ret.) Mahmud Durrani at roundtable on US-Pakistani relations at the Atlantic Council.](image)
Major General (ret.) Mahmud Durrani served as Pakistan Defense and Military Attaché in Washington from 1977 to 1982. Most recently Major General Durrani was Pakistan’s Ambassador to the US (July 2006 to April 2008) and was advisor to Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani on National Security from April 2008 to January 2009. After retirement from the Army, Major General Durrani has remained actively involved in working towards peace between Pakistan and India as member of a dedicated group of Pakistanis and Indians. He is also the author of *Pakistan's Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons* (2004).

Ejaz Haider is Op-Ed Editor, *Daily Times* and Consulting Editor, *The Friday Times*. He hosts a political talk-show "Siyasyaat," on Samaa TV. Haider's areas of interest include politics, political Islam, defense and security, theories and concepts of war, and civil-military relations. He has written extensively on these subjects for various publications – including *The Washington Post, International Herald Tribune, Beirut-based The Daily Star, the Indian Express, Times of India, India Abroad, Central Asia Monitor* and *The World Today*, a monthly publication of the Royal Institute for International Relations in London*. Haider has been a Ford Scholar at the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and Visiting Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution in Washington D.C.

Hon. Ahsan Iqbal is the information secretary of the PML-N, Pakistan’s second largest party in the current national assembly. The party’s head, Mian Nawaz Sharif has been twice Prime Minister. Iqbal was re-elected Member of the National Assembly for the third time in February 2008. He served as a Federal Minister for Education in the PPP-PML(N) coalition government after the 2008 elections, but later resigned when his party pulled out of the coalition on 12 May, 2008. Previously, Mr. Iqbal has been Chief Coordinator / Minister of State, Pakistan 2010 Program (1997-99), Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission (1998-99); Chairman, Good Governance Group, Government of Pakistan (1997-99); Chairman, Pakistan Engineering Board, and Chairman, National Steering Committees on Information Technology and IQM and Productivity (1998-99). He also served as Policy and Public Affairs Assistant to the Prime Minister of Pakistan (1993).

Ambassador Aziz Ahmed Khan joined Pakistan Foreign Service in 1969 and served in various capacities in Pakistan Missions to Buenos Aires, Brasilia, Maputo, Vienna and Lisbon. Amb. Aziz Ahmed served as Ambassador to Afghanistan Nov 1996 to June 2000 and as Additional Foreign Secretary of Pakistan from June 2000 to June 2002. Most recently he has served as High Commissioner to India (June 2003 to Nov 2006) and was a Consultant at the National Defense University Islamabad (May 2007 to Sept 2008).

Brig. (ret.) Feroz Hasan Khan is a former Brigadier in the Pakistan Army. Prior to his retirement he served as Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs, within the Strategic Plans Division, Joint Services Headquarters. Khan had been a key contributor in formulating Pakistan’s security policies on nuclear and conventional arms control and strategic stability in South Asia. Khan holds a M.A. in International Relations from the School of Advanced International Studies, John Hopkins University, Washington DC. He has held fellowships at Stanford University, the Woodrow Wilson Center and the
Khan recently co-authored a book chapter “Pakistan: The Dilemma of Deterrence” in The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia and is currently working on a book on Pakistan nuclear weapons and U.S Policy. He is currently on the faculty of Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey California.

Lt. Gen. (ret.) Talat Masood served in the Pakistani Army for 39 years, retiring in 1990 as Secretary for Defense Production in the Ministry of Defense. Prior to this, General Masood was chairman and chief executive of the Pakistan Ordnance Factories Board. General Masood has authored several articles and book chapters and is a frequent participant and speaker in international conferences. He writes regularly on security and political issues in national newspapers and foreign magazines and is a prominent commentator on national and international television and radio networks. General Masood is the chief coordinator for Pugwash in Pakistan and a member of the international Pugwash Council.

Ahmer Bilal Soofi is a lawyer in the Supreme Court of Pakistan and is the founding President of Research Society of International Law; the first independent think tank of international law in Pakistan. He has appeared in several prominent cases including the Dr AQ Khan case, the Lal Masjid law enforcement operation case and the Pakistan Steel Mills case. Mr. Soofi represented Pakistan at the UN General Assembly’s Ad-hoc Committee and led negotiations on behalf of G-77 countries to finalize the UN Convention on Corruption. Mr. Soofi currently lectures on international law at the National Defense University, Navy War College, Command and Staff College in Pakistan and writes on international law in leading dailies of Pakistan.

Moeed Yusuf is a political scientist with a regional expertise in South Asia. He is South Asia Advisor at the United States Institute of Peace. He also holds visiting affiliations at the Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer Range Future at Boston University, the Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, of Strategic Studies at Strategic and Economic Policy Research, Pakistan, and at Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Pakistan. Mr. Yusuf specializes in South Asian political and strategic issues. He has spent the last five years researching various aspects of Pakistan’s foreign policy and domestic politics. He has also been involved in providing policy inputs to the Pakistan government in various consulting capacities over the years. He writes a weekly column for The Friday Times, Pakistan’s leading English weekly. Moeed is currently working on a co-authored book project, tentatively titled Pakistan’s Futures. The exercise entails a detailed scenario building exercise aimed at understanding Pakistan’s potential future trajectory. His recent publications include Kashmir: Ripe of Resolution (Third World Quarterly), Promoting Cross-LoC Trade in Kashmir: An Analysis of the Joint Chamber (United States Institute of Peace), Does Nuclear Energy have a Future? (Frederick Pardee Center), Prospects of Youth Radicalization in Pakistan: Implications for U.S. Policy (Brookings Institution), and Predicting Proliferation: The History of the Future of Nuclear Weapons (Brookings Institution).

Paolo Cotta-Ramusino has been Secretary General of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs (Nobel Peace Prize 1995; www.pugwash.org) since August 2002. He is also Professor of Mathematical Physics at the University of Milano (Italy) and Senior Researcher at the Italian National Institute of Nuclear Physics. In 1983, he co-founded the Italian Union of Scientists for Disarmament (USPID), which organizes the Castiglioncello Conferences on problems related to Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. He was formerly Director of the Program on Science, Technology and International Security at the Landau Network - Centro Volta (Como) (where he conducted research on the conversion of Russian Nuclear Cities and the development of programs for cooperation on energy-related issues in the Korean peninsula).
About the Pugwash Project on Dialogue in South Asia

The Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs is uniquely placed to play a positive role in South Asia, by building dialogue across seemingly intractable divides and by reinforcing this work with our related Middle East projects. Pugwash excels at bridging progressive voices in South Asia with outside scientific and policy expertise, keeping alive the hope of a more stable region. Our successful Track 2 initiatives over the past years have demonstrated the need for this sort of approach. The fact that regional players have sought our involvement during the most tense of times proves the urgency of the work we are doing.

Our work is based on solid organizational experience over the past 52 years, during which Pugwash has been a groundbreaking force in creating international networks that address and alleviate the root problems of arms control and disarmament. Our emphasis on private meetings that address the interrelated issues of nuclear disarmament, non-military resolution of conflict, and the social responsibility of scientists derives from the famous Russell-Einstein Manifesto of 1955—the last public statement from Albert Einstein. Our name comes from Pugwash, Nova Scotia, where the landmark meeting of scientists from East and West took place in 1957 during some of the darkest days of the Cold War. During its history, Pugwash has won private and public acclaim from world leaders such as Mikhail Gorbachev and Kofi Annan. The success of our approach was reinforced by the awarding of the 1995 Nobel Peace Prize jointly to Pugwash and one of its leading spirits, the late Joseph Rotblat.

Pugwash has a proven capacity to promote creative solutions to the conflict in South Asia, and to bring these issues to the attention of very senior policy makers in relevant capitals.

Our recent experiences demonstrate our ability to engage appropriate people at key moments. The following is a listing of major activities:

- In December 2004 in Katmandu, Pugwash convened the first meeting that brought together people across the LOC.
- In March 2006, a Pugwash meeting provided the first forum in which political leaders from the Indian State of JK visited Pakistan as acknowledged political leaders (including the first visit to Pakistan of Omar Abdullah, who is now chief minister of the Indian State of JK). Since then, Pugwash has facilitated an influential network of experts from both sides of the LOC, addressing a range of issues from economic relations to highly technical arms control and disarmament issues.
- In March 2008, a Pugwash workshop on Intra-Kashmir economic cooperation was held in Colombo, Sri Lanka, where participants encouraged a further meeting on prospects for economic cooperation across the LOC.
- A larger meeting in March 2008 in Islamabad involved Kashmiri leaders in mutual consultations with other regional parties on issues of common concern such as border contacts, trade, common regional concerns, with particular attention paid to Kashmir, WASIRIZTAN, FATA, NWFP, Afghanistan, etc.) Kashmiri leaders participated, including representation from both sides of the LOC.
- In March 2009, during the post Mumbai period when Track 2 dialogue between the two countries was frozen, Pugwash was asked by senior people in the region to convene a meeting to foster communication between India and Pakistan on an unofficial level.
- In April 2009, Pugwash leaders held a series of high level consultations with top Obama administration officials in Washington, DC.
Also in April 2009, a special working group on “Regional Stability in Central and South Asia: The Situation in Afghanistan, and India-Pakistan Relations” was held at our international conference in The Hague.

In June 2009, we held a series of meetings in both India and Pakistan, involving more than 125 people, which culminated in a meeting with Prime Minister Gilani, whose support for the restart of dialogue that came out of these meetings was widely covered by the media in both Pakistan and India.

In October 2009, we arranged for a senior delegation of Pakistanis to hold a series of meetings and consultations with senior American policy makers and experts, ranging from very private discussions in the ‘corridors of power’ to roundtables at influential think tanks, and from a press breakfast with national media to working dinners at some of DC’s most famous settings. The dialogues provided opportunities for some creative thinking as to how to point Pakistan-US relations on a more positive trajectory in the immediate aftermath of the controversy surrounding the new US aid legislation (the “Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009”) and just prior to US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s visit to Pakistan.

Please contact us if you would like further information about this project.

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