MAIN POINTS OF A POSSIBLE AGREED FRAMEWORK BETWEEN
KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES ON SOME IMMEDIATE STEPS AIMED AT BUILDING MUTUAL
CONFIDENCE ABOUT THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM

1. All the parties reiterate the validity of the NPT in all its parts, particularly the principles of non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. All parties reaffirm the right of States Parties to the NPT to develop peaceful nuclear activities, in keeping with the non-proliferation and safeguards principles of the NPT. Accordingly, in principle the I.R. of Iran has both the right to develop and use techniques for uranium enrichment and other nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes, and the responsibility to promote the goals of the NPT and to respect all its obligations. The parties will be ready to formally confirm this understanding at an appropriate moment during the implementation of this agreement.

2. The I.R. of Iran assures that the nuclear activities inside Iran are aimed exclusively at the exploitation of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The other parties take note of this declaration by the I.R. of Iran and welcome it.

3. All the parties affirm that the IAEA is the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in accordance with the Statute of the IAEA and the IAEA safeguards system, the compliance with the NPT safeguards agreements of NPT State Parties, undertaken in fulfilment of their obligations under article III, paragraph 1, of the NPT to verify the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. All the parties reaffirm that nothing should be done to undermine the authority of IAEA in this regard.

4. All parties agree that the IAEA Model Additional Protocol of 1997 is an important tool to promote the effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards in accordance with art. 3 of NPT and thus to provide assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities and material. The parties acknowledge that the I.R. of Iran has signed an additional protocol in 2003. Pending ratification by the Majlis of the I.R. of Iran, the Government of Iran is committing itself to implement indefinitely the additional protocol and to facilitate the ratification by the Majlis as part of a final agreement with the other countries that will include the removal of all the sanctions and the normalization of relations.

5. According to statements by the I.R. of Iran, the nuclear activities of the I.R. of Iran are exclusively aimed at peaceful aims including the production of electricity in nuclear power plants, the production of isotopes for medical purposes and the development of scientific and technological research. The parties acknowledge the positive role of international cooperation in the field of nuclear activities, reaffirm their commitment to such

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1 This proposed agreed framework is meant to lay the groundwork for a comprehensive agreement between all the involved partners. A more comprehensive agreement (or a series of agreements) will have to follow, based on the types of first steps and principles envisioned in this proposed model agreed framework.
cooperation and will work toward creating in the future an environment where this international cooperation will be possible among all the parties of this agreed framework.

6. The parties agree to cooperate in guaranteeing the safety and security and the integrity of the nuclear facilities inside the I.R. of Iran, consistently with the resolution adopted by the IAEA General Conference on 21st September 1990 (GC/XXXIV/RES/533).

7. The parties agree to cooperate in the field of preventing illegal nuclear activities and theft of nuclear material, and in developing jointly measures to strengthen the protection of nuclear material [through the implementation of the IAEA Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) as amended by the relevant Resolutions of the UN and other similar measures and in the spirit of strengthening the NPT. The parties also agree to facilitate the exchange of scientists and other technical personnel in order to cooperate more effectively in the fight against nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism and to work to remove the obstacles that may prevent such exchange].

8. The I.R. of Iran agrees to fulfil its obligations to the IAEA, in strict accordance with the existing safeguards agreement between the I.R. of Iran and the IAEA (INFCIRC/214 of 13 December 1974) and the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to Iran’s Safeguards Agreement on the early provision of design information.

9. As temporary confidence building measures and in order to progress towards a final agreement, the parties agree to the immediate steps described below. All the parties, to whom this applies, will agree to suspend for a [renewable] period of 6 months restrictions on the I.R. of Iran’s oil exports to the European Union and other customers and allow repatriation of revenues of those sales to Iran. If the suspension of the above sanctions will begin at a certain date, the I.R. of Iran will suspend at the same date and for the same period of time, the enrichment of uranium above the 5% limit, the deployment of new centrifuges and the construction of new enrichment facilities. Furthermore the I.R. of Iran will agree to complete the transformation of all the 20% enriched uranium it has already produced, into fuel for research reactors. It is understood that during this confidence building period the parties will undertake every effort to reach a final solution of the controversy according to art. 13 below.

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1 Parts in red included in square parentheses are optional.

2 The U.S. would have to provide guarantees in advance that it will renew relevant waivers repeatedly to allow third countries to maintain or increase their oil imports from Iran for a period of one year. Any short-term suspension would be practically futile, as the uncertainty would render reconfiguration of refineries, which already have weaned themselves off of the specific type of Iranian crude, risky and economically unsound.

3 To resume importing Iranian oil, the EU Council would have to reach a unanimous decision to suspend measures related to crude imports as well as those affecting the provision of shipment insurance and reinsurance under Council Decisions 2010/413 /CFSP and 2012/35/CFSP, and Council Regulation 267/2012. At the same time, the U.S. president would have to revoke Executive Order 13622 and waive for a renewable period of 120 days sanctions stipulated under the National Defence Authorization Act of 2012 against countries that resume or increase their oil imports from Iran. The president also would have to waive sanctions related to provision of insurance and re-insurance for shipments of Iran’s energy products stipulated in the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act and the National Defence Authorization Act of 2013 for a renewable period of 180 days. Finally, both the EU and U.S. would need to remove the National Iranian Oil Company and the National Iranian Tanker Company from the list of sanctioned entities.

4 The U.S. president would have to invoke his authority to waive the prohibition on repatriating Iran’s oil receipts, stipulated under the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act. A unanimous EU decision would be required to modify for similar durations relevant provisions in Council Decisions 2010/413 /CFSP and 2012/635/CFSP and Council Regulation 1263/2012.
10. The I.R. of Iran reaffirms that it does not intend to develop reprocessing of Plutonium. The parties are committed to develop suitable ways of cooperation in the nuclear field, in particular in the completion of the Busher reactor (and possibly other reactors), in creating joint fuel fabrication ventures and in completing the Arak reactor and developing the joint safeguards and capabilities to extract medical isotopes.

11. Furthermore with immediate effect the parties of this agreed framework, to whom it applies, agree to drop all the limitations that affect the availability of spare parts and fuel for civilian aircrafts inside the I.R. of Iran.

12. Finally, in order to dispel the concerns, expressed with regard to possible military dimensions of the Iranian nuclear activities, the I.R. of Iran will agree with the IAEA on modalities for managed access during a specified period of up to 6 months to the non nuclear-sites and facilities not covered by the IAEA safeguards, as determined jointly by the IAEA and the I.R. of Iran. This commitment on the side of the I.R. of Iran will enter into force on the same date and for the same period of time as specified in Article 9 of the present agreement. It is understood that the IAEA will provide strict assurances to the I.R. of Iran to meet the legitimate concerns of the latter, including the confidentiality of information and on the proper application of other rules of managed access. The agreement to this effect between the I.R. of Iran and the IAEA will be jointly discussed and jointly approved by the IAEA, I.R. of Iran and the other States that are party to the present Agreed Framework.

13. The parties agree to work for a final solution of the present controversy that will include inter alia the total elimination of the nuclear related sanctions against the I.R. of Iran and the full monitoring of all the nuclear activities in Iran by the IAEA in accordance with the Agency’s legal powers, including the implementation of a model additional protocol. Formal negotiations on the final settlement will start not later than 2 months after the conclusion of this Agreed Framework.

**PS:** It has been suggested to include in art 12 the following optional part.

[Finally, in order to dispel concerns about completeness of declarations by the I. R. of Iran, under its safeguards agreement-- and to enable the IAEA to verify and confirm the absence in Iran of declarable facilities, materials and activities, apart from those already declared and submitted to the IAEA monitoring – the following special arrangement is being agreed. The parties recognize the right of the IAEA to conduct, on short notice, three visits per year to undeclared facilities in Iran of the Agency’s choice, with the sole purpose of establishing the presence or absence of declarable nuclear materials and activities at the time of the visit. This arrangement will include the obligation of Iran to provide access to any such facility, requested by the Agency, based on the rules of managed access. The arrangement to this effect between the I.R. of Iran and the IAEA will be jointly discussed and jointly approved by the IAEA, the I.R. of Iran and the other States which are parties to the present Agreed Framework; it will remain in force until the final resolution of the PMD issue or until the beginning of the application of the Additional Protocol in Iran, whichever comes first.]

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6 Article 12 can include more details about the modalities of IAEA inspections to some specified sites not covered by IAEA safeguards.