The European Security and Disarmament Working Group picked up and developed themes from several Pugwash workshops over the past 18 months. Participants in the workshop came from Russia, many NATO and EU states, as well as states from neighbouring regions. The main theme of the discussions was the continuing transition in European security in the post-Cold War. Within in this theme the workshop addressed key issues in security and disarmament in Europe, including European security structures, nuclear doctrine and disarmament, conventional forces and disarmament, ballistic missile defences (BMD); as well as emerging threats and measures to address them. The workshop recommended policy solutions for debate by leaders, as well as future Track II diplomacy initiatives that Pugwash could usefully take forward.

**European Security Architecture**

The architecture of European institutions is in transition, and has been so for 20 years. NATO and the EU are both struggling to find a role and maintain their identity, something that is difficult today as both institutions’ cohesion was derived in large part from the pressures of the Cold War. NATO is seeking relevance in interventionist peace operations, usually but not always authorized by the UN. These are controversial, and have contributed to divisions within the alliance. The OSCE now has a very limited role, and the (Collective Security Treaty Organisation) CSTO while increasing in capability and influence, operates in Eurasia rather than Europe. CSTO interventions, more limited than those of NATO, have concentrated in the region of former Soviet states. However, as in Georgia, it is clear that there is no shortage of institutions, but old fashioned strategic and political differences, and a lack of political will to address underlying problems remain the main obstacle to building lasting regional security.

There is therefore a need for a serious debate on the security architecture of Europe that can be both inclusive across the region, and also capable of dealing with risks and threats to security that emerge. The Russian proposal for a European Security Treaty highlights the need, in deciding on new arrangements, to engage Russia as a partner and ally. The difficulty of doing this was highlighted by the differing threat perceptions between NATO and Russia. Russian national security doctrine views NATO as its greatest threat, while NATO is focused on Iran and international terrorism.

The Working Group debated a number of alternative ideas including strengthening the UN’s ability to act; unifying European security efforts in the EU, whether stand-alone or as part of a revamped NATO; and building a cooperative relationship between NATO and the CSTO. None of these ideas achieved a majority of support on the group, and there were many questions about where priorities for enhancing security through arms control and new models of architecture should lay.
It seems that for the foreseeable future that cooperation at a practical level on limited projects between NATO, the EU and Russia will be needed to slowly build a cooperative security regime in the region, in which context it was noted that Russia and NATO have significant cooperation for the NATO ISAF mission in Afghanistan. Other proposals discussed without achieving consensus in the working group included:

- Future cooperation between Russia and NATO on ballistic missile defences;
- Cooperation between the EU and CSTO on peace-making and peace-building in the Caucasus;
- A co-ordinating committee of heads of major European institutions to enhance transparency and build confidence.

It was noted that both practical security cooperation and the building of new elements of security architecture for Europe will need to be done taking into account the security needs of the regions to their south and east.

**Arms Control in European Security**

The Working Group had an in-depth discussion of interrelated issues of conventional and nuclear arms control, and ballistic missile defences. In an environment where there is no serious prospect of a European war, arms control can contribute to long term stability and security in the continent.

- **Conventional Arms Control**

While the CFE Treaty regime, focused in Europe, is in crisis, in the rest of the world there is a flourishing regime of agreements which is dynamic and growing, responding to current security threats.

Unfortunately, the CFE-Treaty as structured at the end of the Cold War and twice adapted is now in a deep crisis. It is open whether this centerpiece of European security will survive in a reformed mode or will be replaced by an agreement with less mandatory requirements. The Vienna CSBM mechanisms and Open Skies regime are still operating, but concerns were expressed that the current parity model is no longer stable and can also damage the verification and transparency system which could negatively impact European security in the long run. In part this is a result of shifting security concerns and threat perceptions in Europe, where (unlike in Russia) worries have moved from totals and deployments of CFE Treaty Limited Equipment to focus on longer range missiles and asymmetric threats from non-state actors, both from outside the continent. While Russia still fears a conventional imbalance and NATO deployments on its western border, it is providing logistical support to a 150,000 NATO force in Afghanistan on its southern border, something which would have been inconceivable during the 1990s. It was stressed that sub-regional problems in the Caucasus and the Baltics mean there is a need for arms control to help provide stability in those areas. It was suggested that Pugwash could convene a workshop to discuss these issues, and their link to prospects for tactical nuclear weapons disarmament. This subject is also directly linked to future New START II negotiations between the US and the Russian Federation.

It was suggested that the Vienna CSBM mechanisms and Open Skies, as well as arms control modeled on elements of CFE, could be the basis for similar regimes in Europe’s periphery and further afield. In this way, Europe could project stability and security, rather than military power. This could build on the new forms of humanitarian arms control which are vibrant, including the Landmines and Cluster Munitions bans. These have had their primary effect far from Europe, and have been built on a bottom up human security approach.

While examining the arms control regime governing Europe, participants suggested that Pugwash should convene a workshop to discuss how classic and new forms of conventional arms control can be brought together to strengthen both.

- **Nuclear Weapons and European Security**

The role of nuclear weapons in European security continues to be problematic. The US and Russia maintain 95% of the world’s nuclear weapons in a deterrent relationship, and 24 nominally non-nuclear states in NATO
rely on US nuclear weapons as the ultimate guarantor of their security. It was noted with concern that all nuclear weapon states are modernizing their arsenals.

While the largest part of global arsenals is comprised of strategic forces, the main concern of the workshop was tactical nuclear forces, and also nuclear use doctrine. The strong German leadership in initiating the current debate on the role of nuclear weapons in NATO doctrine, and on the basing of US nuclear weapons in Europe, was welcomed. Both Russia and NATO give cause for concern in this area.

Russia maintains a nuclear use doctrine which resembles that of NATO during the Cold War, when tactical nuclear weapons were allocated a role in leveling an imbalance in conventional forces. The solution to this problem lies in an agreement in the field of conventional disarmament.

The US is the only nuclear weapons state to base warheads outside its own territory. Its Cold War arrangements with NATO allies persist, and with countries like France and the Baltic states blocking change, its deployment and nuclear use doctrine have been very slow to change.

All participants agreed that tactical nuclear disarmament is necessary. There was a consensus that US tactical nuclear weapons should be withdrawn from NATO Europe in the shortest possible timeframe, to establish the principle that nuclear weapons should be based only on the territory of the possessor state. This would also facilitate negotiations between the US and Russia on overall numbers of tactical nuclear warheads, since most US tactical nuclear weapons are based in the US. It was noted that NATO is deeply divided by the presence of US nuclear weapons in Europe, and even the concept of using tactical nuclear forces has been controversial amongst NATO nations since the late 1980s.

There was a consensus that NATO needs to make major changes to its defence doctrines during the current Defence and Deterrence Posture Review, but that this will only be possible if NATO’s political leaders take ownership of the process from NATO HQ civil servants. In particular, NATO nuclear use doctrine should be revised in line with UK and US doctrine, and would preferably make clear that the only use of nuclear weapons is the deterrence of nuclear attack. The task for NATO is to find a means to provide the assurance of security its members, particularly in Eastern Europe require, while simultaneously providing assurance to nations to the East and South that NATO does not damage or undermine their security.

Workshop participants agreed that nuclear weapon states (both inside and outside the NPT) should be concentrating on the reduction and elimination of nuclear forces, and not pursuing modernization programmes that threaten to prolong the life of arsenals into the 22nd century. There is a recognized need for much more serious thinking on how to achieve this, both regionally and at a global level.

- **Ballistic Missile Defences**

The third element of the interrelated elements of arms and arms control in Europe is ballistic missile defences. BMD deployments are blocking conventional and nuclear arms control, but also hold the promise of NATO-Russia cooperation, if the many obstacles can be overcome. However, even successful cooperation, while it may be positive within the region, may cause significant security problems with Europe’s neighbours if it appears that NATO and Russia are uniting against outsiders.

It was strongly emphasized that there is little to no prospect of technological fixes to the problems with ballistic missile defence. However, perceptions amongst politicians and the public are that defences work, even when it is demonstrated that they don’t. There is no link between scientific reality and policy-making. The potential for BMD elements to be used for offensive anti-satellite warfare was noted.

NATO and Russia are discussing cooperation, but have made little real progress to date. The current US-NATO Phased Adaptive Approach to BMD is less threatening to Russia in the short term, but the final phases will bring a potential threat which Moscow regards as destabilizing – the politics of BMD are more harmful than the reality at this stage.
Participants did not in any sense endorse the deployment of missile defences, preferring rather the need to stress political solutions to problems that may spur missile deployments, and also a regime of restraint in such deployments. However, it was recognized that US-NATO-Russian cooperation in fields including early warning may be of significant benefit in confidence building and tension reduction in the nuclear field, and should therefore proceed.

**Emerging Threats**

There was some discussion of two forms of emerging threat, neither of which are particular to Europe, both of which may significantly impact European security. Since both of these developments have a basis in scientific and technological developments, it was felt that Pugwash is an excellent organisation in which to address the issues that they throw up.

We are on the brink of a wave of deployments of new conventional military technologies which will have strategic effect and change the way war is fought – conventional ICBMs, exo-atmospheric aircraft, robotic warfare, new kinds of conventional warheads etc. In the US these come under the heading of Prompt Global Strike, but many of these technologies, for example drones with a remote strike capability, are becoming available to many other nations. These technologies can dramatically increase the European and NATO capability for power projection, and there is a need to examine the dangers of the use of such technology to enforce their own interests. Pugwash should convene a workshop to examine these new technologies and a regime of restraint.

A completely new form of warfare, cyber warfare, is also emerging. The use of the Stuxnet worm on Iran’s nuclear facilities is currently the most striking example cyber warfare. Pugwash should convene a workshop on cyberwarfare and discuss whether ‘cyber-arms control’ is even possible.